EAST AFRICA REGIONAL
CONFLICT AND
INSTABILITY
ASSESSMENT
FINAL REPORT

MARCH 2012

DISCLAIMER

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<tr>
<td>ACSS</td>
<td>Africa Center for Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOPEDI</td>
<td>Action Communautaire pour la Protection de l'Environnement et le Développement Intégral</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>ASPD</td>
<td>Action Sociale pour la Paix et le Développement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASSODIP</td>
<td>Association pour le Développement des Initiatives Paysannes</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEDEWA</td>
<td>Bureau d'Etudes, d'Observation et de Coordination pour le Développement du Territoire de Walikale</td>
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<tr>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>German Federal Institute for Geosciences &amp; Natural Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-Based Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Centre d'Evaluation, d'Expertise et de Certification</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEMAC</td>
<td>Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWERU</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMM</td>
<td>Conflict Management and Mitigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple Former DRC</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Accord</td>
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<tr>
<td>CREDDHO</td>
<td>Centre de Recherche sur l'Environnement, la Démocratie et les Droits de l'Homme</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Certified Trading Chains Initiative</td>
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<td>CVE</td>
<td>Crime and Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>East Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces Démocratiques de Liberation du Rwanda DRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT-RN</td>
<td>Support Platform for Traceability and Transparency in the Management of Natural Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUDE</td>
<td>Groupe Uni pour le Developpement Endogene</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAG</td>
<td>InterAfrica Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference of the Great Lakes Region</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITRI</td>
<td>International Tin Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>iTSCi</td>
<td>ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative</td>
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<td>LPC</td>
<td>Local Peace Committee</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>MRC</td>
<td>Mineral Resource Conflict</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>NRI</td>
<td>National Research Institute</td>
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<td>NRM</td>
<td>Natural Resource Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAMI</td>
<td>Programme d’Appui à la Lutte Contre la Misère</td>
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<td>PDC</td>
<td>Peace and Development Committee</td>
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<td>RCA</td>
<td>Regional Transboundary Conflict Assessment</td>
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<td>RCM</td>
<td>Regional Certification Mechanism</td>
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<td>RCMG</td>
<td>Regional Conflict Management and Governance</td>
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<td>REBATISCO</td>
<td>Réseau de Batisseurs au Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIMC</td>
<td>Regional Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>RINR</td>
<td>ICGLR Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Response Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAESSCAM</td>
<td>Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small Scale Mining</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEC</td>
<td>Securities and Exchange Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>United State Government</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Conflict and instability trends in East Africa continue to make it one of the most unstable regions in the world. Significant portions of East Africa remain unable to break free of the lethal cocktail of armed conflicts, violent crime, extremism, communal violence, political instability, and state failure that has plagued the region for decades. Most of East Africa’s zones of armed conflict and instability today are concentrated near border areas; pose a major risk of spillover; and feature powerful crossborder drivers, interests, and actors. In recent years, regional governments have made a much greater effort to police their borders, and their renewed commitment to address transborder conflict issues constitutes an important window of opportunity. However, few regional states have the capacity to effectively administer their remote, expansive border areas. As a result, much transborder conflict management and prevention falls on the shoulders of local communities and local authorities, in partnership with central governments and interstate regional organizations. The resilience and adaptability of this collection of local and regional actors are critical factors in determining whether, and to what extent, crossborder conflict and instability issues are successfully managed.

REGIONAL CONFLICT ASSESSMENT

The diversity of East Africa makes it difficult to generalize about patterns of conflict and instability in the region’s borderlands, but several factors are of importance across most of the region’s conflicts.

- **Grievances.** Across East Africa, many armed conflicts—especially insurgencies, civil wars, and violent extremism—are fueled in part by frustration over limited economic opportunities; poverty; unemployment; and politics of exclusion along ethnic, religious, or class lines. The region’s high population growth rates have produced a youth bulge which exacerbates problems of unemployment, and steady urban drift is feeding the growth of large slums where these grievances are concentrated. In rural areas, grievances are most pronounced over land access and alienation of land. Most of these grievances are rooted in a sense of ethnic or sectarian marginalization. These grievances have been easily tapped and sometimes manipulated by political elites.

- **Mobilization and resources.** Insurgencies and armed groups in the region face few constraints in translating local grievances into material support. Recruits for armed gangs, tribal militia, insurgencies, and extremist movements are readily available as a result of high unemployment, the youth bulge, and large refugee camps. Young men in rural areas are often encouraged to join tribal militias by their community leaders. Financing of armed groups is rarely a major constraint, due to the practice of militia living off the land as their principal form of payment, support to tribal paramilitaries by regional governments, access to high-value “lootables” such as gold and diamonds, diverted aid, diaspora contributions, and the availability of cheap small arms across all of East Africa.

- **History of civil war.** The greatest single predictor of a civil war is the legacy of a civil war in the recent past. East Africa has endured many internal wars over the past four decades, some of which have left unresolved animosities and militarization.

- **Protracted nature of regional armed violence.** Many of East Africa’s zones of conflict and instability are sites of long-running crises; some of its civil wars and insurgencies have lasted decades. Long-running wars can create their own systems of adaptation, economies, and interests, which can reinforce instability. This includes the rise of war economies in which powerful interests seek to perpetuate conditions of lawlessness and violence. The initial causes of the wars in East Africa are thus not always the same as the factors that perpetuate them.

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1 USAID East Africa Regional Mission (USAID/EA) covers Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Somalia, Republic of Congo (ROC), Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Burundi.
• **Spoilers.** East Africa’s spoilers vary widely and cannot be understood as a single category. Some qualify as *total spoilers* with no interest in a return to rule of law; others are *situational spoilers* unhappy with the terms of peace or power-sharing; still others are groups which desire a return of peace and rule of law but which are animated by risk aversion and fear that a post-conflict state will be predatory. Many local actors are generally committed to peace and security but are capable of instigating armed violence or instability when it suits them.

• **Local adaptation and resilience.** East Africa is replete with instances of local communities building systems of governance and security arrangements in the face of state failure. These emerging orders are usually little more than coping mechanisms, but in some locations can form the basis of a new political order. These local systems of governance have variable relations with their central government, and variable legitimacy locally. Central governments sometimes view informal local security and governance arrangements as unlawful, extra-constitutional, and a threat, but in other cases forge fruitful partnerships with local informal political orders. Local Peace Committees (LPCs) involved in regional conflict early warning and prevention are all lawful and recognized by state actors.

• **Trends in government behavior and interests.** Both oppressive government and inadequate government are frequently cited as contributors to armed conflict and instability. East Africa features both. Governments in the region vary widely in their attitudes and legislation toward non-state or civic actors in managing transborder conflicts; some are highly restrictive while others are amenable to forging hybrid peace-building partnerships with civil society groups in border areas. The region’s stronger states have been much more assertive about projecting their authority into border areas and across borders into neighboring states, resulting in a high level of regional armed interventionism and proxy wars. This has also helped to reinforce “regional conflict complexes” involving multiple states and non-state actors. Some instances of regional interventionism reflect state security interests, but regional militaries have also been deployed in pursuit of parochial economic interests. The impact of regional armed interventionism has been variable—in some cases it has worsened insecurity and armed violence, in other cases it has reduced it. One of the most important trends in government interests is a much greater commitment to border conflict management and promotion of solutions to regional conflicts.

• **Political decentralization.** The push across much of East Africa for political decentralization is introducing new actors—district or regional authorities within states—into crossborder conflict management. This has major implications for local resilience in East Africa’s border areas, especially where new governmental authorities are inclined to represent local ethnic group agendas over national interests.

• **East Africa’s borderlands as zones of opportunity.** Three competing views exist over East Africa’s borderlands: as remote hinterlands, as security threats, and as zones of economic exchange and opportunity. Two new developments in the region favor the latter vision—the revival and expansion of the East African Community (EAC) and the proposed Lamu project linking South Sudan to northern Kenya.

• **Resource scarcity and transborder conflict.** Growing populations and fixed or declining natural resources, especially land and water, factor in most local clashes across the region and are intensifying.

• **Unresolved borders.** Dozens of borders across East Africa are unresolved and contested. When incidents occur or valuable resources are discovered in these areas, tensions spike between neighboring states, complicating peace-building efforts.

**PRIORITIZING REGIONAL CONFLICT ISSUES**

Based on an initial survey by the team, 10 conflict issues were selected for further research and prioritization. The issues selected for this round of research were:

• **Crossborder and regional land use conflicts:** to include land tenure and property rights, land use conflicts, migration/settlement issues, and legal crossborder disputes over contested regions;

• **Transborder crime and violent extremism:** to include piracy, terrorism, insurgency, organized crime, recruitment into armed groups, transborder crime, and illicit trade and trafficking;
• **Regional and transboundary water conflict:** to include issues of pastoral and ethnic conflict over water, climate change impacts, access and water rights, fishery disputes, interstate disputes over water sources, and regional management of transboundary water access;

• **Regional and crossborder mineral resource conflict:** to include a wide range of issues linked to the illicit mining and trade of high-value minerals in the Great Lakes area, such as livelihood access, human rights abuses, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), mass displacement, regional governance, and government collusion and corruption;

• **Darfur proxy wars:** to include the impact of armed movements involved in the Darfur conflict on the emergence of South Sudan, the stability of neighboring states, migration, and the spillover international influence and intervention (such as the International Criminal Court [ICC]);

• **East Kivu proxy wars:** to include the impact of armed movements involved from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) sub-region, migration and spillover effects, regional and national-level engagement, and international influence (such as the ICC);

• **Food security issues:** to include climate change, environmental degradation, migration, economic, political and social marginalization, use of food as a weapon, and land use policy;

• **Weak regional institutions:** to include an analysis of regional resiliency and governance gaps, regional conflicts over trade, border security, regional organization management and influence, and peace and stability mandates;

• **Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and crossborder and regional impact:** to include displacement; human rights abuses; livelihood impact in Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, and DRC; regional transgressions, and current and past efforts to mitigate this movement on civilian security; and

• **Failed states and ungoverned spaces:** to include regional insecurity and conflicts stemming from failed states in the region, poorly governed regions and borderlands, and countries in transition over central government authority.

To reduce these conflict issues down to a manageable number for field research, the assessment created a basket of weighted indicators. Those indicators included potential for destabilizing impact, number of people affected, geographic spread, potential to impede development, conflict trajectory, and feasibility as a possible USAID target for intervention. The issues were investigated and scored, and on that basis three conflict issues were selected for fieldwork investigation:

• **Crime and violent extremism (CVE),** with regional fieldwork conducted in Kenya and Ethiopia, and follow-up interviews with visiting officials and civil society representatives from South Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda;

• **Transboundary and regional water conflicts,** with regional fieldwork locations in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia; and

• **Regional mineral resource conflict (MRC),** with fieldwork focused in the DRC sub-region. Regional fieldwork was conducted in CAR, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda, and follow-up interviews conducted with officials and civil society representatives from DRC.

All three issues were understood to have the capacity to generate conflict as well as cooperation. The analytic question that guided the fieldwork was *under what conditions* are these factors causing or reinforcing conflict dynamics? Contextual factors—levels of resource scarcity, government interests and commitment, strength and capacity of spoilers, organization and resilience of local civic peace-building networks, capacity of regional organizations, and capacity and commitment of local administrations—were critical in determining whether these three issues reinforced conflict dynamics or cooperation.

Fieldwork revealed that of the three issues, crossborder water conflict currently constitutes the best-managed issue and is somewhat less likely to produce major violence and instability in the near term. One exception is the Lake Turkana border clashes, an issue we highlight separately in Annex 3, and which we believe could serve as a priority area for USAID programming in the event that one of the two selected priority issues is, for whatever
reason, not viable. MRC and CVE were advanced as top priority concerns for analysis and policy recommendations.

IDENTIFYING THE THREE PILLARS: ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE REGION

Across all of the conflict issues examined in the field, a common pattern of institutional resiliency emerged. Specifically, the critical factor in determining local capacity of peace in East Africa’s border areas is the strength, legitimacy, and commitment of three actors: (1) regional institutions and bodies, serving as platforms for intergovernmental cooperation on transborder conflict issues; (2) subnational governmental authorities (district, county, provincial) whose area of jurisdiction includes borders with neighboring states; and (3) civil society, often a hybrid coalition of civic leaders, traditional leaders, religious figures, women’s groups, youth groups, human rights activists, business interests, and professionals. Most importantly, what appears to give border communities the greatest capacity to manage and prevent crossborder conflict is the degree to which these three actors and institutions are able to routinize cooperation with one another both within and across state boundaries.

This finding points to the potential utility of a three-pillar strategy for conflict prevention and mitigation in East Africa, in which primary objectives are the strengthening of each of these institutions and the facilitation of strong and routinized cooperation between them, both within and across borders. This strategy is described in more detail below.

Central state authorities are, of course, critical as well, and a central government that is unable or unwilling to address transborder conflict issues can undermine any one of these three actors or even serve as a spoiler. But this study confirmed that central governments across most of East Africa are increasingly willing, if not always able, to address transborder conflict and instability. In most of the border areas of East Africa, the physical presence and capacity of central governments remains modest, but they are able to play an essential role via regional institutions or via local state authorities. Where central government security forces are deployed in border areas, their role must be accounted for.

CRIME AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Preliminary assessment. Evidence from existing research led us to select CVE as a priority concern. That research points to the following claims, which we tested in our fieldwork:

- Very few border areas in the region have been immune from the problem of crime. Smuggling and crossborder cattle rustling are the most common forms of transborder crime, but others are gaining in importance.
- Criminal elements use borders as a safe haven, and borderlands offer “affordances” for criminal activities.
- Crossborder criminality has grown in scale and scope due to commercialization of cattle rustling.
- Some of the most dangerous forms of crossborder crime and extremism are global in nature, involving powerful external interests ranging from Al-Qaeda to international drug and gun traffickers.
- Some crossborder violent criminality in East Africa is at least partially driven by aims to drive rival ethnic groups off of contested land, blurring the line between violent crime and acts of communal war.
- Spillover of CVE has been a major cause of instability; today, Kenya is most vulnerable to spillover of violent extremism from Somalia.
- Ready availability of small arms has greatly increased the lethality of crossborder crime and violence.
- Without effective state capacity to arrest and try criminals in border areas, local communities resort to retaliatory attacks, producing cycles of violence that create deep ethnic animosities.
- Finally, governments in East Africa are increasingly justifying crossborder military as responses to security threats posed by transborder crime or violent extremism.

This alarming inventory of the impact of CVE on East Africa is partially offset by three factors that existing research has also documented:
Robust local systems of public order exist in borderlands that at times effectively deter criminal and extremist violence. Some of these arrangements are informal; others have been formally integrated into government-sanctioned institutions. The widespread existence of these localized initiatives to ensure basic security and conflict mitigation is a reminder that communities are not passive in the face of state weakness and armed violence—they naturally seek to build mechanisms that provide some degree of law and order.

Shifts in interests on the part of agents of violence and crime have occasionally led them to support systems of governance. This has sometimes occurred when they accrue fortunes and begin to invest in legitimate commerce; in other cases, it occurs when militia leaders seek to shift to a political role and calculate that their political fate is tied to their ability to win over and maintain a local constituency.

Some activities which are technically illegal—specifically, the smuggling of consumer goods across borders—are in fact part of a vibrant, region-wide commercial economy that creates shared interests and alliances across communal and state borders and which represent opportunities for market-based cooperation.

**Research findings.** Project fieldwork confirmed and amplified these claims. Our most significant findings include the following:

- Sustained efforts by local communities, regional governments, and external donors to address transborder clashes over livestock raiding and other localized criminal activities have helped to reduce and manage retaliatory violence and harmful spillover in recent years, though this varies greatly by location.
- Trans-regional criminality is increasingly taking on the form of large, powerful, international syndicates. Recently, drug transiting—mainly through Kenya—has become a major new criminal and potentially destabilizing force.
- Evidence from Kenya and Somalia points to the growth in the “cartelization” of politics—that is, the growing political clout of a collection of distinct networks operating largely out of the public view. These well-funded cartels have the potential to overwhelm community-level systems of governance and security.
- Regional and international pressure is creating new opportunities to curb and combat at least some types of transborder criminality. East Africa is seeing some progress in combating criminal impunity, because of a combination of genuine government commitment, the threat of sanctions on individuals violating arms embargoes posed by UN Monitoring Group reporting, US and other external legislation on conflict mineral trade, and the robust activities of the ICC in the region.
- Violent extremism in the eastern Horn of Africa—specifically Islamic extremism, in the form of Al-Shabaab—is in decline. Al-Shabaab’s legitimacy has dropped in most Somali and Islamic circles, after a series of self-defeating policies by the movement. Kenya and Ethiopia’s recent military offensives into Somali territory have not, to date, produced blowback in the form of terrorist attacks in Kenya, but this remains a serious concern, as a weakened Al-Shabaab is in some ways a more dangerous movement.
- The existence of a non-Somali, East African unit that has flown under the banner of Al-Shabaab remains a serious threat to security in Kenya and Uganda. Many of the underlying grievances among regional Muslim populations remain in place, even if direct support or sympathy for Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda has waned.
- Local actors cannot easily be divided between peace constituencies and spoilers; armed violence, criminality, and promotion of instability are selectively used by local figures who may also, under other circumstances, promote rule of law. Most local constituencies and leaders have mixed motives and mixed methods for pursuing their objectives.
- Leaders of subnational political administrative units (such as districts, provinces, counties, woreda) in border areas play an under-appreciated but critical quasi-diplomatic role in managing borderland conflict.
- In the past, East Africa’s border regions were with few exceptions (such as the Great Lakes border areas) remote, poorly governed, of little economic interest, and zones of convenience for criminal elements and
insurgencies. That condition is changing. Thanks to increased crossborder commerce, the revival and expansion of the EAC, and proposed major infrastructure developments like the Lamu project (a proposal to link South Sudan, northern Kenya, and southern Ethiopia with a highway and pipeline), some of the region’s once peripheral border areas are poised to become zones of important commercial activity. This could increase both interest and demand in improved governance and security in border areas. Regional governments recognize this and are now increasingly viewing their border areas as “bridges” rather than zones of security and governance troubles, and are more amenable to strategies involving more open border zones for pastoral and commercial activities and access to services.

CONFLICT, INSTABILITY, AND REGIONAL MINERAL TRADE

Preliminary assessment. No other border region of the world has produced war-related fatality levels matching those that have beset the Great Lakes region since the early 1990s. The region’s multiple armed conflicts have had many causes, but conflict minerals are a pivotal conflict driver. Specifically, certain high-value minerals, the mine sites, and control of trade of these minerals are an important source of financing for government-affiliated militias and violent non-state actors that are responsible for the horrific levels of physical violence and coercion in eastern DRC. The instability and insecurity this breeds is felt primarily within the borders of the DRC, but the actors, interests, trade, and spillover effects span the entire Great Lakes region.

Most of the findings in existing research on the Great Lakes’ conflict minerals highlight the intractability of instability and violence spawned by the mineral extraction and trade. Existing analyses emphasize that a powerful array of local, regional, and global actors benefit from the illegal extraction and trade in high-value minerals—gold, tin, tantalum, and tungsten—out of eastern DRC. The political economy of mineral extraction and trade in the Great Lakes has thrived in conditions of “durable disorder” and lawlessness that are essential for armed groups and others to capture and control artisanal mines, coerce or tax mine labor, and smuggle the high-value minerals across the border. From this perspective, the main beneficiaries of the trade in minerals constitute a powerful network of stakeholders in perpetuating instability in the border areas. This line of analysis provides a compelling explanation for the long duration and extreme violence of the crisis in eastern DRC and Great Lakes.

Existing research on MRC in the Great Lakes region points to the following claims, which we tested in our fieldwork:

- Chronically weak government presence in eastern DRC is a powerful impediment to a solution to Great Lake transborder violence and instability.
- Some elements within the DRC government and military are beneficiaries of the existing crisis and trade in conflict minerals, and will resist efforts to bring governance and stability to eastern DRC.
- The governments sharing a border with eastern DRC continue to enjoy benefits accruing from the mineral trade and are in varying degrees complicit in the crisis, including their involvement in proxy wars inside DRC.
- Failed demobilization programs and high unemployment continue to drive youth into predatory militia involved in the trade of conflict minerals.
- The violence associated with militia tactics to control mines and mine labor is the source of some of the worst human rights abuses in the world, and has especially devastating impact on women.
- Violence associated with clashes over control of mineral areas has been a critical driver of the region’s high levels of internal displacement, which in turn exacerbates communal tensions and insecurity.
- A culture of impunity has developed among the region’s armed groups and their leaders and this is perpetuated by weak national and regional systems of security, extradition, and justice.
- A solution to the Great Lakes crisis must include a regional regime to stop the illegal trade in conflict minerals. One approach that is internationally recognized is to establish an effective certification system to ensure legally exported minerals are free of conflict to protect trade and livelihoods in the region.

This latter argument helped to advance important recent legislation in the United States, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act. The Dodd-Frank Act requires all companies that are publically traded in the American
Stock Exchange to ensure the raw materials they use to make their products are not tied to the conflict in DRC, by auditing the mineral supply chains from DRC and surrounding countries in the Great Lakes region.

Recently, assessments of the Great Lakes conflict have identified some promising regional and international developments which constitute a window of opportunity and challenge the pessimism of previous analyses. These observations include:

- International pressure and sanctions targeting human rights abuses linked to mineral smuggling is growing and is increasingly effective. Interests and political calculations of regional governments are shifting in ways that offer hope for collaboration on the monitoring and management of illegal crossborder and regional trade.
- The Dodd-Frank legislation is having a ripple effect in building greater international commitment to end the trade in conflict minerals, leading to creation of systems for accountability and transparency that are more difficult for elite and criminal networks and armed actors in the region to circumvent.
- Country governments in the region have reacted by revising mining codes, frameworks, and laws to adhere to some of these new systems, showing greater political will in the region then has existed in decades.
- Pressure from industry, reduction in international interest in exploration, and a significant drop in concessions is driving states in the Great Lakes to reconsider the desirability of illegal mineral exploitation, transit, and trade.

Fieldwork findings. Our field research confirmed that significant challenges remain in the region to mitigate illegal trade. There is ample evidence that the political economy of conflict mineral trade still remains a powerful force across the region and will resist initiatives to regulate mineral trade and improve governance and conflict mitigation in the border areas. But it also confirmed that shifts in regional political will and international interests to address conflict mineral trade constitute an opportunity to mitigate dimensions of a conflict that clearly requires regional and international pressure to resolve.

Some of the findings from fieldwork include the following:

- There is a greater commitment on the part of regional states to empower a regional body—the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)—to play a lead role in supporting host country governments to stem illegal mineral trade, partially due to international pressure to conform to industry and international standards. The cornerstone is ICGLR’s Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR), which has been working since 2010 to promote harmonized regional approaches to curb the illegal exploitation of “conflict minerals,” by creating tools to increase member state accountability for responsible mineral trade.
- The RINR is especially promising because of the breadth of the tools it and its member states are developing to combat illicit and illegal mineral trade. These tools include (1) a Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM), (2) harmonization of national-level legal frameworks governing the mineral sector, (3) a regional database documenting regional mineral trade patterns, (4) capacity building for the formalization of artisanal mining to improve taxation and transparency across borders, (5) peer learning mechanisms between member states in the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), and (6) a whistle-blowing mechanism to allow citizens witnessing illicit and illegal activity to anonymously report abuses to the ICGLR through a web-based platform.
- One of the most promising regional responses to the problem of conflict minerals is ICGLR’s RCM. This regional certification system will serve as a recognized guarantee that minerals were mined under acceptable conditions, in areas free of conflict, and have exited their country of origin in a legal fashion with all dues and taxes paid. Conflict-free mining conditions will be monitored at the national level by

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2 Referred to as “the three Ts and gold”, tin, tungsten and tantalum are known at their point of extraction by the ores from which they are derived: cassiterite (tin), wolframite (tungsten), and coltan (tantalum).
local systems, and will include third-party auditors to ensure standards are independently verified. The ICGLR certificate will serve as the sole acceptable document for intraregional mineral shipments and is critical in ensuring traceability of conflict-sensitive minerals exported from the region.

- Civil society groups are an important part of proposed independent monitoring mechanisms for certification standards. Their capacity to play this role varies by location. Strengthening the capacity of civic groups in monitoring, advocacy, and dissemination of information to local communities is a critical link in the certification chain.

- The shift in the interests of regional governments—from complicity in conflict mineral trade and associated violence, to greater willingness to explore a new, legitimate, and peaceful mineral trade regime in the Great Lakes—is real, but fragile. Independent auditing and harmonized standards for conflict-free mining is essential in pressuring country governments to mitigate exploitation of minerals by armed groups and in signifying to conflict-affected communities that human rights infractions matter to central and regional governments. These governments, and some powerful circles of interests within these governments, are calculating how they can continue to profit from the mineral trade without incurring costs associated with violation of proposed certification schemes. Those calculations can and will be shaped in large part by emerging international and regional norms regarding certification schemes, and associated penalties for illegal trade and transit of conflict minerals.

- ICGLR officials acknowledge that smuggling of minerals will not be completely eliminated by the emerging certification regime, but are confident that 70% or more of total mineral exports will be certified and traceable. This will have a profound effect in reducing the extent to which minerals finance armed groups and drive insecurity and human rights abuses across eastern DRC.

**BUILDING A THREE-PILLAR APPROACH TO REGIONAL CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MITIGATION**

The two strategic program recommendations made here—one on crossborder conflict management in the Horn of Africa, the other on promotion of responsible regional mineral trade and access—seek to seize windows of opportunity now presenting themselves on these issues. Both are relatively time-sensitive, requiring support and assistance to local conflict mitigation coalitions within the near future if they are to have maximum impact. Both seek to strengthen and build on existing local, state, and regional institutions and their resilience to conflict drivers, and to improve their capacity to work with one another. In this sense, the recommendations correspond closely to the main finding of the World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, which was “strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to break cycles of violence.”

The most resilient systems deterring or managing conflict and instability involve three pillars of authority working in cooperation: (1) regional institutions and bodies, (2) subnational governmental authorities in distinct conflict zones (district, county, provincial), and (3) legitimate and committed civil society. Building the response capability of these three key pillars has the greatest potential to mitigate regional and crossborder conflict. All three can only be effective when central governments in the region are supportive. Little progress can be made in situations where central governments act as spoilers rather than facilitators of borderland conflict mitigation.

Local communities, district or provincial authorities, and interstate regional institutions all play a vital role in managing a range of regional crossborder conflict issues. They are chiefly responsible for variable and sometimes dramatic improvements in borderland security across parts of the East African region in the past 15 years. Their capacity—both as stand-alone actors and as part of an integrated, three-pillar approach to conflict-management—is a critical source of resilience in the face of mounting conflict pressures across the region’s troubled border areas. Regional institutions and bodies can serve as platforms for intergovernmental cooperation on transborder conflict issues. These institutions and their technical and strategic response capacities are often critical in preventing and responding to potential and protracted crossborder and transnational issues such as crime, violent extremism, smuggling, and displacement as a result of humanitarian emergencies or the impact of civil conflict. Subnational governmental authorities in border areas are often the first responders to transborder conflict. The recommendations for both priority issues identified by this assessment address the need for greater emphasis on
programming support to these three pillars of conflict mitigation. Strategic and targeted programming for key regional institutions, interventions that seek to strengthen units of governance essential for crossborder and regional collaboration, and sustained support for committed civil society actors will provide an enabling environment for conflict prevention, mitigation, and transformation.

STRATEGIC APPROACH TOWARD REGIONAL AND TRANSBORDER CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Recommendations in this section stem from the fieldwork conducted in Kenya and Ethiopia looking at issues relating to CVE. Both our preliminary research and subsequent fieldwork reinforced our conclusion that transborder crime constitutes a serious and growing threat to borderland peace and stability. We concluded that modest levels of funding for reducing transborder violent extremism, however, would not be likely to have a significant impact, given the relatively weak results of recent civil affairs “hearts and minds” outreach in the region and the costs of large-scale media programs to counter radical narratives. Fieldwork reaffirmed that local, national, and regional mechanisms are in place which are responding to criminal threats in border areas; but with calibrated support, these entities could improve their capacity still further. It was determined that recent and pending changes in local governance systems in border areas would significantly benefit from increased capacity-building programs focused on conflict management and mitigation. Programs that focus on strengthening these local capacities and civil society through effective partnership with key regional institutions have the greatest future potential for impact.

Recommendations propose that the regional mission build on its current support of transborder conflict mitigation mechanisms in East Africa via the following three integrated projects:

- First, it recommends continued, though carefully calibrated, support to the Conflict and Early Warning and Response (CEWARN) mechanism in the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), to improve interstate cooperation in conflict early warning, prevention, and management.
- Second, it advocates expansion of USAID’s successful Peace II program on the Somali-Kenya border into other suitable border areas in the region (while maintaining support for the current work on the Somali-Kenya border). Many transborder corridors in the region merit attention, but feedback from government officials in the region pointed to several locations as top priority areas, including the contested Sudan-South Sudan border, portions of the South Sudan-Ethiopia border near Gambella, portions of the “Karamoja cluster” especially in the Uganda-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Kenya border area, and the Moyale border area of Ethiopia and Kenya.
- Third, it envisions a new project involving peace building and diplomatic training and support to local government authorities in the region. Major changes in the composition and nature of local government are occurring now in Kenya, South Sudan, and southern Somalia; these changes constitute a critical window of opportunity for borderland conflict prevention.

Over the past 15 years, a number of initiatives—some grassroots, others governmental—have sought to build and strengthen borderland conflict management systems in the Horn of Africa. Most of the focus has been on two of these three pillars. First, community-level peace building in border areas has been the object of considerable attention, and has yielded excellent, though predictably uneven, results across the Horn of Africa. Kenya’s Peace and Development Committees (PDCs) embody this approach to enfranchising local non-state actors in peace building and building partnerships between local community authorities and local governments in border management; USAID’s “Peace II” program exemplifies donor support to this pillar of borderland peace building. Second, regional states have, with substantial donor support, sought to routinize intergovernmental cooperation in the prevention and mitigation of border conflicts. IGAD’s CEWARN is an example of this commitment. The next logical step in this program is to support subnational government bodies which play an underappreciated role in border conflict issues, and support routinized coordination between these three actors.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE REGIONAL MINERAL TRADE

The drivers of conflict and instability in the Great Lakes region are numerous and complex, but unregulated mineral trade is especially significant both in triggering and perpetuating armed conflict. Unregulated mineral trade helps to create an enabling environment for armed conflict, fuels corruption, facilitates the illegal capture of resource minerals by state and non-state actors, and deprives countries of wealth critical for promotion of national and local development. Promoting more responsible regional mineral trade and strengthening the technical response capacity of regional bodies, national governments, and targeted civil society platforms in the region can mitigate conflicts over conflict minerals and protect essential livelihoods in the region.

Recommendations call for the regional mission to expand its programming into the Great Lakes region by providing support for regional responses working to combat the negative impacts of illegal exploitation of conflict minerals. A variation on the three-pillar strategy is applicable to conflict minerals as well, and informs our specific recommendations for programming in support of regional institutions, local government, and regional and local civil society groups and networks.

The following summarizes the proposed program components:

- First, our study points to opportunities for USAID/EA to support institutional strengthening of ICGLR, which is playing a critical role as a source of accountability and implementation monitoring of regional states’ agreements addressing trade of conflict minerals. In particular, we see opportunities to provide support to the ICGLR Secretariat to improve donor coordination, and the RINR technical unit to ensure effective implementation of regional tools and frameworks, designed to formalize and harmonize mineral trade in the Great Lakes region. In addition, this program could include training and capacity building for members of the Regional Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee (RIMC) to ensure harmonized approaches and tools comply with regional and international standards regarding conflict-free mining.

- Second, it is recommended that the mission support country-level pilot initiatives utilizing RCM or other tools of the RINR, promoting accountability and transparency between citizens and government. This component could include assistance with the development of the third party auditing system to strengthen collaboration between civil society, industry, and local governments in conflict-affected mining areas. This would include technical support and training for local government officials and civil society organization (CSO) networks to participate in mining audits to verify the status of “conflict-free” mines. This will support local and national initiatives that encourage regional replication of best mining practices and approaches that mitigate conflict, prevent human rights abuses, and increase employment.

- Third, we recommend that a component of this program strengthen national CSOs and their regional networks to promote increased citizen engagement in public campaigns supporting conflict-free mining practices. This could include support for watchdog approaches, community-based monitoring systems, or early warning systems that allow citizens to report abuses in conflict-affected mining areas and in exploitive mining practices. Working to support CSOs and their networks can contribute to regional awareness campaigns (CSOs, local media) on improved mining practices and standards at the local and national levels, particularly in conflict-affected and high risk border areas.
PART I: REGIONAL CONFLICT ANALYSIS
1.0 CONFLICT DYNAMICS IN THE EAST AFRICA REGION

Conflict and instability trends in East Africa—encompassing the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes, and the traditional East Africa region (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania)—continue to make it one of the most unstable regions in the world. The region’s chronic instability stands in sharp contrast to the notable successes in conflict management across most of the rest of Africa. Conflicts in South Sudan, southern Somalia, Darfur, and eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—combined with heavily armed communal clashes in some other parts of the region—wreak havoc on local, state, and regional security. Transborder criminal networks seek refuge in remote and weakly governed borderlands. While parts of the region are relatively stable and peaceful today, significant portions of East Africa remain unable to break free of a brutal and prolonged history of armed conflicts, violent crime, extremism, communal violence, political instability, displacement, human rights abuses, and state failure. The inability of central governments to protect their citizens from this violence—in some cases, government complicity in the crises—has eroded communities’ trust in the state.

Most of East Africa’s zones of armed conflict and instability today are concentrated near border areas and feature powerful crossborder drivers, interests, and actors. Crossborder spillover is thus a major problem in East Africa, and has the effect of tying the fates of relatively stable countries to their troubled neighbors. At its worst, spillover has produced new crises of armed violence that match or exceed the fatality levels of the original conflict, as the case of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and ensuing wars in eastern DRC illustrates. Under such circumstances, regional governments can ill-afford to ignore violent conflicts in neighboring countries, nor can they rest assured that containment strategies will adequately shield them. Few of the region’s central governments have the capacity (or in some cases the political will) to police and patrol their remote, expansive border areas. As a result, much of what passes for transborder conflict management and prevention falls on the shoulders of regional organizations, local communities, and local government authorities, in partnership with often distant central governments. Their resilience and adaptability are critical factors in determining whether and to what extent crossborder conflict and instability issues are successfully managed.

East Africa’s extraordinary size and diversity makes it exceptionally difficult to generalize about conflict and instability trends across the region. Each case has its own dynamics, drivers, and trajectories; each community afflicted by armed conflict has its own unique set of adaptations and levels of resilience. There is no substitute for close contextual knowledge of each case of conflict and instability. Nonetheless, some broad trends and dynamics exist across most of East Africa’s cases of armed conflict and instability and are assessed in this section, which draws on the Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0 as it primary analytic tool.4

3 USAID East Africa Regional Mission (USAID/EA) covers Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Somalia, Republic of Congo (ROC), Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Burundi.
4 USAID, Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0 (Analytics), (Draft as of April 26, 2011).
1.1 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS: GEOGRAPHY, DEMOGRAPHY, AND NATURAL RESOURCES

Assessing transborder conflict dynamics requires understanding the nature of the borderlands themselves. In some portions of East Africa—especially the Great Lakes region—border areas are high-value, and the site of fertile soil, watersheds, valuable minerals, fisheries, and dense populations. Governments in zones may or may not possess the capacity to project their authority into these border areas, but they unquestionably possess an interest in the production and trade flowing from these valuable assets. By contrast, border areas in most of the Horn of Africa have until recently been viewed as remote, expansive, uneconomic, and thinly populated. Governments have thus made what some observers argue are economically rational decisions not to expend scarce public resources to control areas with little prospect of an economic return. As a result, millions of regional residents in these borderlands have lived largely beyond the reach of the state.

Geography and climate are critical drivers of communal conflict across the region, but shape conflict in complex ways. In some parts of the region, worsening resource scarcity, combined with profound poverty and underdevelopment, are clearly exacerbating communal conflict. The more arid zones of the lowlands of the Horn of Africa suffer frequent and sometimes devastating droughts, and hence are prone to communal clashes over pasture and access to water. Rapid population growth, possible long-term climate change, increased alienation of land for irrigated farms or ranches, and disruptions of pastoral movements are among the many factors intensifying pastoral and agro-pastoral clashes in semi-arid zones. Periodic catastrophic droughts, including the 2011 crisis which produced famine conditions in parts of Somalia and which affected over 12 million people in the eastern Horn, also trigger large-scale population displacement and migration which can badly strain relations between host communities and newcomers. Portions of East Africa that receive better rainfall have a different resource problem—namely, growing pressures on available land due to dense populations and rapid population growth. Competition for land and water has intensified in recent decades across East Africa and can play an important role in both communal clashes and civil wars. Local communities possess well-established mechanisms for managing resource scarcity, but those mechanisms have in some instances been overwhelmed by the magnitude of new pressures and competition for land, water, and access to markets.

At the same time, some of the most deadly and destructive instances of armed conflict and violent criminality have occurred in resource abundant portions of East Africa, reflecting troubles associated with what some have termed the “resource curse.” This has been most dramatically in evidence in eastern DRC and the Great Lakes, where competition to control the region’s endowment of high-value minerals has been a major conflict driver at the local and interstate levels. Control over exploitation of and revenue from oil and natural gas deposits have also triggered or perpetuated insurgencies in Sudan and Ethiopia, and at times have raised tensions between neighboring states in parts of East Africa. Importantly, high-value mineral and energy resources introduce powerful external actors and money into the picture, complicating local efforts to manage resource disputes peacefully.

Under what conditions then, can resource scarcity and resource abundance serve to promote conflict or peace? In East Africa as elsewhere, evidence points clearly to the crucial role of effective governance. Resources need not be a curse, and resource scarcity need not provoke armed conflict, if effective and accountable governance structures are in place. Weak or indifferent governance capacity in East Africa has in the recent past made it much harder for border communities to cope with the pressures associated with both extreme scarcity and abundance.

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5 This line of analysis has been made most persuasively by Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
6 Pastoral conflict in East Africa has been the topic of extensive research. See for instance John Markakis, Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Sage 1998); Peter Nyaba and Peter Otim, Crossborder Pastoral Conflicts: A Case Study of the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Sub-Regions. (Addis Ababa: CEWARN, August 2001); and S. Kratli and J. Swift, Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya: A Literature Review (Sussex: IDS, University of Sussex, 1999).
1.2 IDENTITY, INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERESTS

1.2.1 TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT INTERESTS, CAPACITY, AND STRUCTURE

Effective, legitimate governance is not just important for managing resource conflicts; it is also critical in managing a range of other intrastate and communal armed conflicts. Where central governments are unable or unwilling to devote resources to conflict mitigation in borders areas, local communities are forced to rely solely on their own conflict management tools, which can be overwhelmed by powerful armed groups and well-financed external actors. Where central governments are actually complicit in fomenting conflict across borders, insecurity is virtually guaranteed. Even the strongest states in the region have difficulty extending their control over remote border areas and as a result, transborder conflicts can rarely be managed solely by neighboring states and often require collaboration and pressure from regional institutions.

Oppressive government and inadequate government are frequently cited as contributors to armed conflict and instability. East Africa has both, sometimes within the same country. In fact, the region features an impressive diversity of systems of government. This study emphasizes the importance of strong state-civil society partnership in borderland conflict mitigation, but it recognizes that East Africa possesses a high range of variation in state-society relations, not all of which are conducive to partnership. States featuring authoritarian and semi-authoritarian governments are much less inclined to partner with non-state or civic actors in managing transborder conflicts. These states typically view civil society organizations (CSOs) engaged in peace building or advocacy with suspicion, although they are comfortable working with tribal authorities and traditional structures. The region’s democracies are more amenable to forging hybrid governance and peace-building arrangements in border areas with civic groups. Not all of the region’s border areas possess strong CSOs, however. Sustained conflict, displacement, and the rise of violence entrepreneurs have weakened both traditional authorities and formal CSOs in some border areas. In other cases, CSO groups have become captured by political interests and used as instigators of violence and instability.

An enduring pattern in the region is the gap between the borderland behaviors of assertive or hegemonic states as opposed to the weaker governments. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Rwanda, and Sudan have shown little reluctance to intervene directly and indirectly, sometimes with sizable military force, in neighboring states. Other governments from the region have been relatively passive and or unable to project influence and force across their borders. Kenya’s recent incursion into southern Somalia represents the culmination of a major shift in Kenyan regional policy. Until 2004, Kenya was surprisingly passive in the face of spillover from Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Today, it is exerting both diplomatic and military means in an attempt to contain spillover from southern Somalia, roll back the jihadist group Al-Shabaab from its border areas, and promote friendly and effective local governance in the Somali regions with which it shares a border. As an additional illustration of how interventionist regional governments have become, five regional states—Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya—currently have armed forces occupying portions of Somalia, either unilaterally or as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping force.

The extensive and direct engagement of regional states and their militaries in one another’s affairs is only one part of what some analysts have described as “regional conflict complexes.” Regional governments also engage in extensive use of paramilitaries to engage in proxy wars in one another’s territories. Ethnic groups live across these borders, and mobilize for war against local rivals in two or more countries. An example of this is the extensive use of proxy forces in eastern DRC. While some government crossborder interventions have been in pursuit of national security, others are clearly cases of state security forces put in the service of parochial economic interests. The regional interventions in eastern DRC began with security motives, but morphed over time into operations designed to monopolize production and trade of valuable minerals.

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In recent years, East African states have become much more committed to addressing borderland insecurity. The increased attention to communal transborder violence stands in sharp contrast to past decades, when many of the region’s border areas and their conflicts were given little attention and instead were allowed to simmer and burn. This is, in our estimation, an important contextual change in regional politics and a window of opportunity for improved regional conflict mitigation.

Changes in state interests in their border areas are being driven by several different factors. First, border areas are increasingly seen as a threat—as “sanctuaries for combatants and nurseries for recruits and also as centers of shadow economic activities, and the interregional commercial or other connections that make for prolonged and intractable conflicts.” Extensive US counterterrorism support to allied governments in the region has also contributed to the securitization of border policies across parts of the region. In addition, spillover from criminal violence and communal clashes has become much more destabilizing and lethal. Governments which in the recent past were willing to let instability and violence burn unchecked in their remote hinterlands now have security interests in addressing them.

Second, democratic advances and open media in some key East African states have given border area communities more voice to pressure their governments to address crossborder armed violence. This has been especially true in Kenya, where previously marginal ethnic groups in northern regions have newfound means of pressuring the government to address problems of armed violence in their areas, and where a vibrant open media has shamed the government into action to address communal violence in the country’s northern regions.

Third, ongoing insurgencies, violent criminality, and/or communal violence in a country’s border areas can have a sharply negative effect on national economies. This is particularly true for countries like Kenya with important tourist sectors, as tourism is very sensitive to real or perceived security threats. But protracted armed conflict can also hurt the credit rating and investment climate of a country, a problem about which the region’s growth and development-focused governments are increasingly concerned.

Finally, East Africa’s borders are increasingly seen as zones of opportunity—a new optic from years past, when they were viewed only as crisis areas. Mineral and energy deposits in East Africa’s border areas are compelling governments to improve security and invest infrastructure in these regions. The revival and expansion of key regional bodies such as the East African Community (EAC) as a major driver of economic integration is also contributing to moves to facilitate the flow of goods and labor across borders. Finally, new infrastructure and development projects are opening up previously remote hinterlands. The most significant of these is the proposed Lamu port project, linking South Sudan to northern Kenya with an oil pipeline, highway, and rail-line. This has the potential to open up and integrate the expansive hinterlands of South Sudan, southern Ethiopia, northern Uganda, northern Kenya, and southern Somalia. It is a potential game-changer across what has long been viewed as one of the most troubled border areas of East Africa.

This latter trend mirrors a broader paradigm shift across Africa as a whole, one in which border areas are viewed as zones of opportunities—for shared services, crossborder trade, pastoral movements, and labor migrations. The African Union Border Program captures this new regional vision of borders in its slogan “African Borders: From Barriers to Bridges.” This is producing tension between government security programs designed to harden borders and peace building and development initiatives looking for ways to “soften” borders. The two need not be mutually exclusive, if creative policies can be worked out by neighboring states.

1.2.2 TRENDS IN REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS

In the recent past, East Africa’s regional organizations were very weak, handicapped by interstate rivalries and tensions that sharply limited opportunities for collective action. The original EAC collapsed in 1977, and in the Horn of Africa the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was paralyzed by interstate and proxy wars waged by several member states against one another. In the Great Lakes region, interstate regional

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cooperation on security matters would have been unthinkable a decade ago, due to regional rivalries and direct military interventions into eastern DRC. The collective result was a deficit of functional regional platforms to routinize and codify interstate cooperation on economic, political, development, and conflict management issues.

That context is changing. East African governments are manifesting a renewed interest in managing conflict issues and promoting regional economic development through greater support for and commitment to regional institutions. Though rivalry, mistrust, and even hostility endures between some East African governments, the broader trend across the region is much improved bilateral relations, driven primarily by a pragmatic realization that many of the region’s most pressing problems can only be addressed through cooperative relations with neighboring states and through multilateral efforts.

Regional organizations in East Africa are the chief beneficiaries of this new environment. They are playing a more prominent role in conflict management, peace operations, norm-setting, economic trade cooperation, and regional integration issues. The EAC was revived in 2000, and in recent years has actively widened and deepened the scope of the organization, and in 2010, established a common market for goods, labor, and capital. It has expanded its membership to include Burundi and Rwanda (with South Sudan expected to join in the near future); supports numerous multilateral institutions tasked with promising cooperation on specific regional issues, and is pursuing a common currency. Intraregional trade volumes have leapt upward since 2004, adding new pressure to improve crossborder infrastructure and maintain security in border areas where goods and laborers cross. IGAD is enjoying a revival in its roles, especially in regional diplomacy and conflict early warning and response, thanks somewhat to renewed commitment on the part of several key member-states to work closely together. Regional military cooperation has been enhanced by the collective action of several IGAD member-states contributing troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peace operation in southern Somalia.\(^9\) Finally, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), officially formed in late 2006 has enjoyed growing success as a platform for interstate cooperation and promotion of peace, security, and development. These regional organizations are examined in more detail in Section 3.1.

This trend of revival and strengthening of regional institutions in East Africa is not unique to the region. It tracks closely with a trend across Africa, where multilateral approaches to conflict management, peacekeeping, and development are making real gains. Not surprisingly, a recent study by the US National Defense University calls for robust international support to regional organizations in Africa, concluding that the continent’s regional economic communities “have emerged as the central norm-setting institutions in Africa.”\(^10\) Several other recent studies echo this conclusion.\(^11\)

### 1.2.3 LEGACY OF PREVIOUS CIVIL WARS

Almost every country in East Africa has been the site of at least one serious episode of armed conflict in the past three decades. Some regions, such as eastern DRC, south Sudan, and southern Somalia have been in a state of chronic insecurity and low-grade war; others like Rwanda have experienced brief but horrific bouts of armed violence. Research by the World Bank provides strong empirical evidence that the greatest single predictor of a civil war is a past civil war.\(^12\) Put another way, violence begets violence, creating conditions in which violence

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\(^9\) Uganda and Burundi were the sole troop contributors to AMISOM through 2011. Djibouti has pledged to send troops, and Kenyan forces in southern Somalia, in place since Kenya’s incursion against Al-Shabaab in October 2011, have now been re-hatted to form part of a larger AMISOM operation. The Ethiopian military is also physically present in parts of southern Somalia, and cooperates closely with AMISOM but is not part of the mission.


\(^12\) Paul Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap* (Washington, World Bank, 2003). By their calculations, 50% of all terminated civil wars revert to violence within seven years. More recent research suggests that percentage has declined, thanks in part to more effective post-conflict peace building.
drivers can mutually reinforce one another. Wars leave a legacy of festering, unresolved communal grievances; militarize societies; create alternative systems of power; damage or destroy economies; polarize politics; and shatter trust relations, all of which make post-conflict countries vulnerable to backsliding into renewed cycles of violence.\textsuperscript{13} The impulse by international actors to intervene in East Africa’s many wars with peacekeepers and diplomatic mediation has produced several transitional governments and unity governments, many of which features former enemies forced to work together politically. Not surprisingly, this kind of post-conflict arrangement is exceptionally vulnerable to reversals.\textsuperscript{14}

1.2.4 PROTRACTED NATURE OF ARMED VIOLENCE

The single most remarkable pattern of East Africa’s instances of armed conflict and instability is the protracted nature of armed violence. The form, intensity, and purpose of these conflicts often change over time, but the conflicts themselves have proven remarkably durable, in some cases lasting decades. Sudan’s civil war lasted almost 40 years, and despite the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) risks reigniting in new forms; Somalia’s crisis of state collapse and armed conflict involves dramatically different actors and interests today but has endured for over two decades; and the violence in eastern DRC continues to produce casualties, displacement, and assaults 17 years after conflict from Rwanda’s genocide first spilled across the DRC border.

This protracted nature of armed conflict is critical analytically. First, it changes the nature of investigation into causal factors, highlighting the distinct features of “intractable” conflicts and reminding us that the drivers that initially start a war are not always the same factors that help to perpetuate it.\textsuperscript{15} Second, protracted wars privilege political economy analyses which are best suited to illuminate the mutation of interests that can occur the longer a war is fought—specifically, rise of economic interests at both the level of war merchants and soldiers who benefit from perpetuating conditions of “durable disorder” within which a range of illegal and predatory behavior can take place.\textsuperscript{16}

East Africa is replete with cases of war economies, of local and external actors who seek to prolong civil wars for economic gain, and of entire communities who develop survival strategies around existing conditions of violence. The region has also generated many examples of leaders who foment communal divisions and violence to advance their narrow political interests, and for whom consolidated peace would likely mean the end of their political careers and perhaps even arrest. This serves as a reminder that though these conflicts have been extraordinarily costly, they are for some an opportunity to be exploited, not a problem to be solved. It also serves as a powerful explanation for protracted wars, in that some key actors are not fighting to win—war, in some corners of East Africa, has become an end in itself, a continuation of “economics by other means.”\textsuperscript{17}

1.2.5 EAST AFRICAN SPOILERS

The existence of war economies and violence entrepreneurs in East Africa highlights the problem of spoilers as a critical category of actor in the region. Close evidence from East African conflicts suggests, however, that spoilers come in a wide range of categories and need to be treated accordingly in conflict mitigation strategies. There is, for instance, an important difference between total spoilers (war criminals whose power base and survival depends on maintaining conditions of conflict and impunity) and situational spoilers (groups and individuals rejecting the specific provisions of a peace accord or power-sharing arrangement which they deem unacceptable,

\textsuperscript{13} Mats Berdal, Building Peace After War (London: IISS Adelphi Paper, 2009), pp. 77-94.
\textsuperscript{14} Karen Gutteiri and Jessica Piombo, eds., Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to peace and Democracy? (Washington DC:USIP, 2007); Andreas Mehler, “Peace and Power-sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship” African Affairs (2009);
\textsuperscript{16} David Keen, “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence” in Mats Berdal and David Malone, eds. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 19-42.
but not the peace itself).\textsuperscript{18} Evidence from southern Somalia reminds us that the interests of spoilers can and do change over time; local actors who accrue wealth through armed violence and crime can sometimes shift investments into legitimate commerce and develop newfound appreciation for rule of law.\textsuperscript{19} This observation is critical as it underscores that local interests in war and instability can and do change over time, and that conflict mitigation strategies must be based on theories of change to anticipate this.

East Africa offers ample evidence that economic actors and local communities can simultaneously promote the strengthening of informal systems of security and rule of law while blocking efforts to strengthen or revive formal state authority. The desire for law and order is not necessarily synonymous with enthusiasm about reassertion of the central government’s authority, especially when previous experience with the central government has been highly negative. When local communities and businesspeople have endured predatory or repressive state authorities in the past, and when local informal systems of security are working reasonably well, local groups can play the role of spoiler of state revival. This is an understandable manifestation of risk aversion in a high risk environment, and should not to be conflated with other, more virulent categories of spoilers.

1.3  GRIEVANCES AND RESILIENCIES

1.3.1 GRIEVANCES

Across East Africa, many armed conflicts—especially insurgencies, civil wars, and violent extremist movements—are fueled at least initially by deep social grievances. Some of these grievances are fueled by economic frustration. Poverty and unemployment are high across the region; dramatic population growth rates (in some countries exceeding 3\% per year) have helped to produce a “youth bulge” in East Africa that compounds problems of access to education and jobs. Urban drift is producing sprawling slums that serve as easy recruiting grounds for criminal gangs and armed groups; and the sense of deprivation is compounded by much greater exposure to conspicuous signs of wealth in the urban areas and over the television and internet.

In much of East Africa, upward mobility is very limited, thanks to political economies in which patronage and class are significant determinants of access to education and jobs, leading to a pronounced sense of exclusion among large portions of the youth population. Grievances in East Africa are equally strong in rural areas, especially where politically and socially weak groups lose access to land and water at the hands of government or the politically well connected.

Ethnic or sectarian marginalization constitutes one of the region’s most explosive sets of grievances. Almost all East African countries are multi-ethnic in nature, and many are multi-sectarian. Ethnic hegemony has been an enduring problem in the region, creating volatile grievances among ethnic groups which believe they have been shut out of political power, and by extension, economic opportunities. Almost all of the most deadly episodes of civil war or communal violence have had ethnic grievances as a driver, and almost all have witnessed political entrepreneurs exploiting those grievances to mobilize fighters. Marginalization of religious groups is equally dangerous, especially among Muslim populations in Christian-dominated countries like Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Eritrea.

1.3.2 MOBILIZATION AND RESOURCES

Insurgencies and armed groups in the region face relatively few constraints in translating local grievances into material support. The youth bulge, combined with extremely limited employment prospects for young men across East Africa, provide a ready source of recruits into armed movements, tribal militia, insurgencies, and extremist movements. The enormous refugee camps in the region, and the practice of warehousing refugees for decades as civil wars go unresolved, provide still more recruits. Tribal militias are also easy to mobilize when tribal elders


actively recruit on behalf of the commanders. In instances where locals are unwilling to join, militias such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Al-Shabaab engage in forced conscription. Financial support to armed groups is also relatively easy to come by across the region. Most local recruits understand that they will mainly be self-financed through looting and extortion of local populations; they make for inexpensive, though unreliable and predatory, fighters. Many regional governments outsource counterinsurgency to tribal paramilitaries or armed actors, often under the guise of local defense forces. Often militias garner material support from external actors, especially regional governments engaging in proxy wars against one another. Though regional states are increasingly organizing to manage and prevent armed conflict—a positive trend discussed below—deep regional rivalries and proxy wars remain a persistent impediment to peace, and a lucrative source of financing for armed groups, tribal militias, and insurgencies.

The region’s long-running crises have produced sizable diasporas, many of which have become powerful sources of funding for both peace building and mobilization for war. A robust small arms trade—mainly the domain of private arms traffickers, but in some cases promoted by regional and external states—has for decades saturated East Africa with cheap semi-automatic weapons and ammunition, making it easy to muster armed forces at low cost. In the Great Lakes region, armed groups raise money and control lucrative trade of high-value commodities, as evidenced in conflict minerals and illicit trade networks emanating from eastern DRC. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab is well financed through its control of charcoal exports out of the seaport of Kismayo, taxation of local populations and businesses, and diversion of humanitarian aid and assistance. It may also be earning a cut of revenues generated from piracy ransoms.

### 1.3.3 LOCAL ADAPTATION AND RESILIENCE

Resilience—of local communities, states, and regional institutions—is a critical factor in successful management of transborder conflict.

An enduring lesson from East Africa’s conflict zones is that local communities are not passive victims in the face of insecurity and state failure. Their resilience and capacity to respond varies from country to country, but in even the worst cases of armed violence, local communities have set out to provide security arrangements and informal rule of law for themselves. In many settings, this manifests itself in fairly rudimentary self-protection units, but in parts of the region, sophisticated, flexible systems of local and regional governance have arisen that provide residents with impressive (if fragile) levels of security, law and order, and basic services despite wider conditions of warfare and state failure.

Three points are critical here. First, these “emerging orders” in violent settings are vital coping mechanisms, and are built around a powerful sense of risk aversion in dangerous contexts. Local communities may be reluctant to embrace any major changes that threaten to undermine their existing security arrangements, even when they are far from ideal; like large organizations, communities in conflict zones are inclined to “satisfice” and embrace good enough rather than optimal solutions when their tolerance for risk-taking is low. Their successful short-term strategies to deal with armed conflict can sometimes work against the fashioning of more durable long-term solutions.

Second, the legitimacy of local security and governance arrangements is often a matter of contention; some are little more than warlord fiefdoms; racketeering (protection for sale); or systems that impose crude, illiberal, and extra-constitutional forms of law and order.\(^{20}\) Decisions as to whether to engage and strengthen these local security arrangements must be made on a case-by-case basis.

Finally, these local peace and security arrangements have variable relations with state authorities; the nature of that relationship is crucial as either a catalyst or impediment to transborder conflict mitigation. Often weak governments view informal governance systems as rivals and seek to undermine them, or see them as irrelevant and ignore them. But when governments view informal authorities as potential partners, new opportunities for

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hybrid security and governance systems are possible. This has been described as a “mediated state” model of governance and has been documented in eastern DRC, northern Kenya, South Sudan, and Somalia. In several locations—most notably Kenya—the government has even sought to institutionalize this governance partnership nationally, via local peace and development committees. This type of organizational resilience and responsiveness by some regional governments has been a major source of support to local-level conflict management in East Africa, and in a few instances has helped to transform whole regions of the country into relatively stable and peaceful areas.

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21 See the collection of essays in the special issue of Afrika Focus vol. 21, no. 2 (2008), edited by Koen Vlassenroot and Tim Raeymaekers.

2.0 PRIORITIZING REGIONAL CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY ISSUES IN EAST AFRICA

2.1 DEFINING CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY

Both conflict and instability are concepts that are commonly used in political analysis but are surprisingly difficult to define with precision. Both are expansive terms that can depict conditions in most political systems around the world. Moreover, conditions of conflict and instability do not always fall into neat categories of war and peace—as the USAID Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF) 2.0 notes, more often than not post-conflict communities live in a state of “not war not peace.” This assessment relies on the World Bank’s definition of conflict as organized violence, namely, “the use or threat of physical force by groups. [It] includes state actions against other states or against civilians, civil wars, electoral violence between opposing sides, communal conflicts based on regional, ethnic, religious or other group identities or competing economic interests, gang-based violence and organized crime and international non-state armed movements with ideological aims.” The team also focused on the civilian dimensions and impacts of conflict and used the term civilian security to mean “freedom from physical violence and freedom from fear of violence.” Applied to the lives of all members of a society (whether nationals of the country or otherwise), it encompasses security at home; in the workplace; and in political, social, and economic interactions with the state and other members of society. We interpreted the notion of a “conflict issue” broadly, to include both the actual transboundary conflicts themselves (the dependent variables) and the drivers of conflict (the independent variables).

2.2 STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT TASKS

The essential task of this regional assessment was to prioritize the top three regional issues contributing to regional conflict and instability and to conduct field research to develop recommendations regarding two conflict issues most suitable for USAID/EA programming. These final two issues were to be selected based on the following:

- A systematic field-based analysis to establish the potential trajectory of these issues over the next five years;
- Potential partnerships with regional bodies/organizations, national country governments, and local and regional civil society platforms; and
- The potential for significant development impact on this issue to be evident as a result of USAID-based conflict mitigation programming and intervention.

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2.3 METHODOLOGY AND PRIORITIZATION

The team began by conducting a survey of conflict and instability issues in East Africa. Issues in this survey were identified through secondary research, literature review, expert opinion, and a review of conflict issues that were most prevalent in state and regional media from East Africa. The team carried out an initial survey of social media, as well as mainstream newspapers, blogs, and websites of independent regional think tanks such as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), national and regional think tanks and academic institutions from East Africa, and from US based think tanks focused on East African policy and conflict analysis. The USAID CAF was an essential tool in this process; elements from the framework were used by the team to establish criteria for the prioritization of field issues selected for further investigation for USAID strategic programming recommendations. The CAF tool was also helpful in looking at the potential path of these conflicts, establishing initial scenarios, and identifying the likely trajectory and impact of these issues in the region.

Based on the initial survey by the team, 10 conflict issues were selected for further research and prioritization based on an established set of indicators to establish their potential conflict trajectory in the region and their relevance for USAID programmatic intervention. The 10 issues selected for this second round of research were:

- **Crossborder and regional land use conflicts**: to include land tenure and property rights, land use conflicts, migration/settlement issues, and legal crossborder disputes over contested regions;
- **Transborder crime and violent extremism**: to include piracy, terrorism, insurgency, organized crime, recruitment into armed groups, transborder crime, and illicit trade and trafficking;
- **Regional and transboundary water conflict**: to include issues of pastoral and ethnic conflict over water, climate change impacts, access and water rights, fishery disputes, interstate disputes over water sources, and regional management of transboundary water access;
- **Regional and crossborder mineral resource conflict**: to include a wide range of issues linked to the illicit mining and trade of high-value minerals in the Great Lakes area, such as livelihood access, human rights abuses, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), mass displacement, regional governance, and government collusion and corruption;
- **Darfur proxy wars**: to include the impact of armed movements involved in the Darfur conflict on the emergence of South Sudan, the stability of neighboring states, migration, and the spillover international influence and intervention;
- **East Kivu proxy wars**: to include the impact of armed movements involved from the DRC sub-region, migration and spillover effects, regional and national-level engagement, and the role of external actors;
- **Food security issues**: to include climate change, environmental degradation, migration, economic, political and social marginalization, use of food as a weapon, and land use policy;
- **Weak regional institutions**: to include an analysis of regional resiliency and governance gaps, regional conflicts over trade, border security, regional organization management and influence, and peace and stability mandates;
- **LRA and crossborder and regional impact**: to include displacement; human rights abuses; livelihood impact in Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, and DRC; regional transgressions, and current and past efforts to mitigate this movement on civilian security; and
- **Failed states and ungoverned spaces**: to include regional insecurity and conflicts stemming from failed states in the region, poorly governed regions and borderlands, and countries in transition over central government authority.

These 10 topics were then divided up among the team members for a second, more in-depth analysis, with the specific aim of generating data to feed into a weighted basket of indicators (see Annex 8) that guided the selection of the final three regional conflict issues prioritized for field research. This exercise produced a score of the severity of each conflict issue that afforded the team the opportunity to rank the conflict issues. On the basis of this ranking, the team then discussed and debated each issue and its score, allowing a revision of scores as deemed appropriate.
There were a variety of reasons why some of the conflict issues explored were not selected to the final phase of the project. Some, like Darfur proxy wars, were deemed to be too concentrated in a single border area, and had limited relevance across the wider region. Others, such as food insecurity, were recognized as powerful factors in internal and regional instability but have relatively limited impact across borders in terms of transborder conflict. Land was an especially intriguing possibility that earned close scrutiny; in the end, land conflicts were judged to be more of a cross-country rather than crossborder issue (that is, it recurs as a major source of domestic conflict throughout the region, but with limited direct spillover effect). Land-related issues reappeared as a secondary factor in our explorations of crossborder conflict related to water, minerals, and crime and violent extremism (CVE). Likewise, state failure was given very close consideration, but in the end we determined that it was less a source of transborder conflict than a syndrome that limited effective response to borderland conflict. It too reappeared as a factor in our treatment of water conflict, conflict minerals, and CVE.

The following issues were ranked as the most significant issues causing systemic conflict and regional instability: (1) transborder crime and violent extremism, (2) regional and transboundary water conflict, and (3) regional and crossborder mineral resource conflict (MRC).

2.4 FIELDWORK AND A THEORY OF CHANGE

A challenging part of this assignment was to ascertain the most appropriate sites for fieldwork. Only a few border locations could be visited per issue area. We sought to select sites that offered a wide diversity of conflict dynamics (to avoid selection bias), had potential to generate findings of broad applicability across the region, were feasible logistically within the time available to us, and offered reasonable potential for development program impact. This led to the following choices:

- **Crime and violent extremism**, with regional fieldwork conducted in Kenya and Ethiopia;
- **Transboundary and regional water conflicts**, with regional fieldwork conducted in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia; and
- **Regional mineral resource conflict**, with regional fieldwork conducted in CAR, Rwanda, eastern DRC, Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda.

Clear, concise, and well-formulated initial lines of inquiry were critical to the assessment methodology and the field study. The field teams developed individual interview protocols for each of the three prioritized issues that reflected their application of the theory of change, and identified the potential regional, national, and local institutions and bodies most likely to be impacted by the conflict and instability dynamics of the issue. Some examples of initial lines of inquiry identified for the field assessment were:

- The underlying dynamics of individual and group grievances and opportunities to employ violence within countries and across borders,
- The actors and organizations that can facilitate or deter the mobilization of these grievances,
- The institutional capacity and response potential of the state(s) and society to deter and manage violence,
- The impact of international and regional influences on conflict management, and
- Triggers of conflict and windows of opportunity for peace building.

Following the period of fieldwork research and production of a draft report, an opportunity presented itself for follow-up interviews with regional stakeholders. In March 2012, USAID convened a workshop in Dar es Salaam of regional partners that included representatives of civil society groups, regional institutions, and local and national governments engaged in aspects of crossborder conflict mitigation and conflict mineral trade certification. This proved to be an invaluable opportunity to vet the conflict analysis and its general programmatic impact.

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24 The team was not able to access Somalia, but interviews were conducted with Somali stakeholders in Kenya.
25 The team was not able to go into eastern DRC due to electoral instability in December 2011, but interviews were conducted with stakeholders from and working in the east in Gisenyi, Rwanda.
recommendations with key stakeholders; conduct follow up interviews to fills gaps in information or to refine analyses; and conduct interviews with representatives from East Africa border areas (such as South Sudan and the Uganda Karamoja area) we were unable to visit in field research. The proceedings of the workshop and the input from East African representatives gave us additional confidence that both the analysis and the priorities identified in this report reflect a growing consensus in the region itself.

2.5 WINNOWING AND FINAL SELECTION OF PRIORITY ISSUES

This assessment was tasked with selecting two priority issues for program recommendations, requiring us to drop one of the conflict issues following completion of the fieldwork. After extensive discussion, water conflict was eliminated by the team. Annex 1 captures insights from desk and field research on water stresses and conflict in East Africa; it aims to provide information that may be of use for additional conflict-related programming within the RCMG office, other cross-sectoral programming within the USAID/EA Mission, Democracy and Governance, or water or natural resource management (NRM)-related programming in regional bilateral missions. Though water was dropped as a conflict issue, the team concluded that some water conflicts in the region are serious and merit continued attention. In the event other programming recommendations in this report are not viable, some water conflict issues—particularly the Lake Turkana conflict, summarized in Annex 3—could serve as a suitable alternative. The rationale for dropping water conflict from further consideration is provided below.

2.5.1 WINNOWING OF WATER CONFLICT

Water as a potential conflict issue is the subject of a vibrant debate. Over the past 15 years, a number of organizations and analysts have rung the alarm bell over the possibility that rising demand for, and growing shortages of, water threaten to bring both local communities and neighboring states into conflict. Others note that scenarios of “resource wars” involving water have not in fact occurred, and that water management, whether local or crossborder, has actually constituted one of the more impressive instances of resilience and cooperation worldwide. Still others argue that this is a false choice—that water scarcity is not likely to pose a threat of open warfare, but that it can produce a range of other conditions such as large-scale migration and dislocation, and heightened distrust between neighboring states that in turn fuel armed conflict and instability.

The team approached the water conflict issue as an empirical question, focusing on the conditions in which water scarcity was likely to produce either cooperation or conflict. We placed special attention on the capacity and will of East African institutions tasked with transborder water usage and allocation management, as much of the existing literature stressed this as a critical intervening variable.

The decision to initially include water as one of our three conflict issues for further exploration was based on prima facie evidence. A number of high-level studies refer to the possibility of armed violence linked to water pressures, including the UK government’s 2008 Stern Review and a 2000 US National Intelligence Council Report. Top international statesmen have also raised the alarm; former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that “fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future.”

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31 Quoted in Postel and Wolf, “Dehydrating Conflict.”
Initial evidence from this regional conflict assessment of East Africa was even more compelling. This study was planned and undertaken during the last stages of a major drought in the eastern Horn of Africa, a crisis which triggered the destabilizing movement of a half million Somali refugees across the border into Kenya and which produced famine conditions in parts of southern Somalia. The drying up of the Shabelle river in the Lower Shabelle valley—normally Somalia’s breadbasket—underscored the vulnerability of regional countries to any major loss of flow in their rivers. Water conflict in the region has been the subject of considerable media coverage as well. Ongoing regional tensions over Nile River water usage (the Nile Basin Initiative) has been the biggest of these stories. But many others have attracted the attention of the media or advocacy groups, including Ethiopia’s ambitious dam projects and their downstream impact; disputes over fisheries in Lake Victoria; and lethal communal conflict over the shrinking resources of Lake Turkana.32 Recent academic research on water scarcity, conflict, and management in East Africa—including a powerful and very visible debate over the extent to which climate change is a root cause of the Darfur crisis—reinforced our sense that the issue was worthy of further investigation.33

Fieldwork mirrored the broader debate over water, with our research teams coming to somewhat distinct conclusions. Contrasting findings within the group were primarily a function of field site selection. Our fieldwork in the better watered areas of the Great Lakes region revealed an impressive collection of local and intergovernmental river basin management mechanisms. Throughout that portion of East Africa, transborder water conflicts are numerous, but management of the issues has been routinized and institutionalized. Far from being a major conflict issue, water in those areas has, at least up to now, served as an opportunity to build and maintain patterns of cooperation.

Local and state capacity to manage transborderwater conflicts in the Horn of Africa was, however, less in evidence. Instead, we encountered a worrisome collection of conflict issues in which water has played a contributory role. Again, this was not surprising, since water scarcity is a far bigger problem in that part of East Africa. First, the semi-arid, pastoral zones of the Karamoja cluster, South Sudan, Darfur, and the eastern Horn have been the site of rising communal clashes over both wells and pasture. Water access is only one factor in the growing and well-documented spike in pastoral armed conflict across the region, but there is no doubt that it is an important contributory factor. Second, the rapid increase in privatization of water catchments is cited as a flashpoint of communal tensions, reflecting part of a broader problem of commercialization of, what were in the past, public goods in the pastoral setting. Third, rapid development of agricultural settlements and major irrigation projects along rivers, driven by ambitious economic growth objectives in Ethiopia, is increasing clashes between farmers and pastoralists whose access to watering holes has been constrained or blocked.34 Irrigation schemes involving large-scale resettlement of newcomers, or which alienate large tracts of land from local groups for the benefit of private firms or foreign investors, has been cited as a trigger for communal violence and displacement in several border zones in the Horn of Africa, including the Omo River valley and along the Baro River in the Gambella region of Ethiopia.35 Another issue of concern was the lack of any river basin management authority

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32 See for instance the short film “When the Water Ends: Africa’s Climate Conflicts” (2010), which documents the armed communal conflicts over shrinking Lake Turkana. Available at: http://e360.yale.edu/feature/when_thewater_ends_africas_climate_conflicts2331/


for the two rivers flowing from Ethiopia into Somalia, the Jubba (or Genale) and Shabelle Rivers. Finally, a major ongoing communal conflict in the Lake Turkana border areas, pitting Turkana against Dessenesh communities, is directly related to the shrinking of Lake Turkana and the collision of two ethnic groups seeking to access valuable marshland fisheries. The fact that those marshlands are shrinking across the Ethiopia border into Kenya added an additional twist to the crisis.

Water, our assessment concluded, constitutes a conflict issue of variable and growing importance in parts of East Africa, and in the long term merits sustained attention. But most local transborder water conflicts at present are being managed effectively and demonstrate some of the most impressive examples of resilience in the region. At the region-wide level, interstate tensions over usage of the Nile River is a conflict issue already receiving sustained international and regional attention via the Nile Basin Initiative, and was deemed well beyond the scope of the limited regional mission budget. As a result, we elected to eliminate transborder water conflict from our final set of program recommendations. However, we identified the emerging water conflict issue in Lake Turkana as a case meriting further consideration; that issue, and program recommendations to address it, has been appended to this report as Annex 3.
3.0 IDENTIFYING THE THREE PILLARS—ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE REGION

Across all of the conflict issues examined in the field, three actors and institutions consistently emerged as critical sources of resiliency in mitigating crossborder conflict: (1) regional institutions and bodies, serving as platforms for intergovernmental cooperation on transborder conflict issues; 2) subnational governmental authorities (district, county, provincial) whose area of jurisdiction included borders with neighboring states; and (3) legitimate and committed civil society, often a hybrid coalition of traditional leaders, religious leaders, women’s groups, business interests, and professionals. Collectively, these actors constitute the “three pillars” of conflict mitigation and prevention in border areas.

Combined evidence from our fieldwork and from existing research strongly suggests the following:

- The collective capacity, legitimacy, and political will of each of these three pillars of conflict mitigation are critical sources of conflict prevention and mitigation.
- Successful crossborder conflict prevention and mitigation is possible when only one or two of these three actors are active and effective, but the most durable systems of conflict prevention and mitigation feature strong performance by all three.
- The ability of these three actors to establish and maintain routinized partnerships with one another is at least as important as their individual capacities. Strong cooperation by regional institutions, local state authorities, and civil society peacemakers both within and across national borders has a multiplier effect on peace-building efforts, and creates powerful networks of communication and cooperation for conflict mitigation.
- Low levels of institutionalization, structural changes in some local governments (driven by political transitions, decentralization policies, and constitutional reform), and frequent turnover of officials and leaders in all three of these pillars work against routinized cooperation. As a result, effective partnership in crossborder conflict mitigation has tended to be highly personalized and insufficiently durable, and requires continuous training and socialization.
- The commitment of central governments in the region to support all three pillars in pursuit of crossborder conflict mitigation is in almost all cases an essential prerequisite for success. Conversely, central governments whose interests are threatened by the work of these three pillars can easily undermine them.
- Even the best examples of crossborder partnership by these three pillars can sometimes be overwhelmed by powerful spoilers, though conflict entrepreneurs, predatory militias, and violent criminal syndicates face genuine challenges operating in a border area where all three of these actors are committed to combating instability and armed violence.

Over the past decade, a number of initiatives—some grassroots, others governmental—have sought to build and strengthen borderland conflict management systems in East Africa. In recent years, community-level peace
building in border areas has been the object of considerable attention, and has yielded excellent, though predictably uneven, results across the East Africa region. In addition, national governments have demonstrated more support for district or provincial-level peace and development fora critical for inclusive and participatory approaches to citizen engagement in conflict mitigation and management. All of this has created a window of opportunity for improved conflict prevention and governance in border areas once deemed hopelessly ungovernable and violent.

Everywhere in the region, the broader political context is a critical factor in creating a permissive or non-permissive environment for the three pillars to operate effectively. The political context across much of the region is currently in a state of flux. In South Sudan, a new state has emerged and is under construction, adding a new government actor along some of the most sensitive borders in East Africa. In southern Somalia, the jihadi group Al-Shabaab is being pushed out of border areas with Kenya and Ethiopia, but the nature and composition of the new local authorities filling the political vacuum is still uncertain. In Kenya, the new constitution is driving a process of political decentralization that will replace old systems of provincial and district administration with county authorities elected locally. Several states in the region are in various stages of completing political transitions, promoting political decentralization, and holding elections—all of which contribute to uncertainty in the wider political context. This observation serves as a reminder for the need for flexibility in programming across the region—both to adapt to unexpected obstacles and to seize unexpected windows of opportunity.

3.1 REGIONAL BODIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

Governments in East Africa express commitment to regional conflict management, but rivalries, low levels of trust, proxy wars, and direct wars between neighboring states have been a constraint on regional initiatives to manage transborder conflict issues. In recent years, intergovernmental cooperation across much of the region has improved, but protracted regional conflicts continue to erode trust. Although there are numerous regional organizations in East Africa, only a handful possess an explicit mandate for conflict prevention. Even fewer possess the institutional capacity and political will of member states to develop effective early warning mechanisms.

Fortunately, capacity of key regional organizations to manage conflict and instability in East Africa is growing and constitutes part of the window of opportunity now presenting itself in the region. This has the potential to provide platforms for more effective collaboration between member states. This, combined with some hopeful signs of improved levels of trust and cooperation between member states of these organizations, is reason to maintain support for existing regional institutions engaged in conflict early warning and mitigation. For instance, IGAD’s signature conflict prevention program, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), has been operational since 2003. Its mandate is to collect information on possible or imminent conflict in border areas, disseminate those reports to member states, and facilitate rapid response to the crisis. Its focus is principally on pastoralist conflict. The Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs)—national reporting units based in country capitals—are led by a government focal point. Field monitors in border areas are responsible for gathering and relaying early warning information to Local Peace Committees (LPCs) who in turn report to the CEWERUs.

The CEWARN program has considerable promise, but also faces predictable challenges. Many of these challenges are not unique to CEWARN but constitute universal difficulties of conflict early warning. Governments everywhere are often reluctant to share sensitive information even with close allies, and East Africa is no exception. In addition, the capacity of the organization at both headquarters and field reporting levels has been variable. Poor and irregular output for some reporting channels such as the Rapid Response Fund (RRF) and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems has led to some growing donor frustration. But member states are

36 Member states of IGAD are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda. At the time of this research, Eritrea’s request to reactivate its membership in IGAD was still under review by the organization.

37 For a recent review of these challenges, see OECD, “Preventing Violence, War, and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early Warning and Response,” (OECD, 2009).
committed to addressing these shortcomings, and interstate cooperation on security matters has improved in recent years.

Another example of the new commitment to regional cooperation is the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region\textsuperscript{38} an intergovernmental organization based in Burundi which has been leading efforts to address the illegal exploitation of minerals through legally binding protocols since 2006.\textsuperscript{39} Through member state collaboration, bilateral donor support, and interregional cooperation with other African partners, this organization is working to provide tools for regional harmonization and technical capacity building for member states on due diligence and mineral trade accountability and tracking in the region.

In December 2010, the ICGLR convened a Special Summit of the Heads of States in Lusaka, Zambia, specifically dedicated to the issue of the illegal exploitation of natural resources from the region. During this summit, all 11 members of the ICGLR signed the Protocol on the Fight against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources. The protocol outlines the specific actions that member states will take and also endorsed ICGLR’s Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR). This summit was influenced in part by recently passed US legislation that ICGLR had campaigned for with international and regional organizations. The Dodd-Frank Act, which was passed in July 2010, requires publicly traded companies on the American Stock Exchange to disclose whether they are using, in production, any of the “conflict minerals” (defined as tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold)\textsuperscript{40} from the DRC or neighboring countries that may have been used to finance armed groups or belligerents. This legislation and its pending impact has influenced ICGLR member states, as Dodd-Frank focuses on the due diligence that companies must take to transparently disclose the origin or their supply chain in the Great Lakes region, not only raw minerals that come directly from DRC.

This new development in the ICGLR is significant, as the trade in conflict minerals is a regional problem requiring regional solutions. Although much of the raw material emanates from eastern DRC, refinement and transiting of the minerals is an important income for surrounding countries in the Great Lakes region such as Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Valuable shipments must transit borders and move through multiple national custom channels before reaching ports such as Mombasa in Kenya and Dar Salaam in Tanzania to be shipped to their final destinations. At any point in this chain, minerals from various mines (both “conflict” and “conflict free”) can be mixed together, and records of mineral origins may not be kept or passed to new owners. Often certificates of origin and custom documents can be obscured and lack of harmonization of tagging and certification makes smuggling and illegal trade not only lucrative but highly accessible across borders in the region. In sum, any attempt to end the trade in conflict minerals necessarily impacts almost every country in East Africa. The RINR initiative is one of the ICGLR’s cornerstone programs and is an impressive example of a new regional commitment to codify, routinize, and institutionalize cooperation on an issue which in the recent past was a major source of regional conflict. The RINR serves as a platform for member states’ coordination and commitment to the protocol, which outlines six tools or proposed instruments for member states to implement to help curb the illegal exploitation of “conflict minerals”. The six tools supported by member states for development and implementation to combat illicit and illegal mineral trade are (1) a Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM), (2) harmonization of national-level legal frameworks governing the mineral sector, (3) a regional database documenting regional mineral trade patterns, (4) increased capacity building for the formalization of artisanal mining to improve taxation and transparency across borders, (5) peer learning mechanisms between member states in the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), and (6) a whistle-blowing mechanism to allow citizens witnessing illicit and illegal activity to anonymously report abuses to the ICGLR through a web-based platform.

\textsuperscript{38} Member states of ICGLR include Angola, Burundi, CAR, ROC, DRC, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia. South Sudan recently submitted an application for membership and will likely be admitted in early 2012.

\textsuperscript{39} Although ICGLR had a signed pact with member states in 2006 for intergovernmental cooperation on security and development issues, the organization was not inaugurated until 2008.

\textsuperscript{40} Referred to as “the three Ts and gold”, tin, tungsten and tantalum are known at their point of extraction by the ores from which they are derived: cassiterite (tin), wolframite (tungsten), and coltan (tantalum).
One of the key tools currently being developed and piloted in the region is ICGLR’s RCM. This system will serve as a recognized guarantee region-wide that minerals were mined under acceptable conditions, in areas free of conflict, and have exited their country of origin in a legal fashion with all dues and taxes paid. Mining conditions will be monitored at the national level by local systems, but will also include third-party auditors to ensure standards are independently verified. Standards for this system are still being developed in coordination with ICGLR partners and member states to ensure that this certification system takes into account nationally and internationally accepted standards relating to conflict mining, such as child labor, human rights issues, gender considerations, and due diligence.

3.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

In past decades, local governmental structures possessed little authority and few resources. In some cases, civil servants and police were posted to these remote border areas as a form of political punishment. Until recently, regional and local officials posted to remote border regions rarely spoke the local language or knew local cultures. This was and remains particularly problematic in conflict-affected regions, where mistrust, ethnic tension, or competition over resources is high.

Fortunately, since the mid-1990s, the quality of local administration across much of the region has changed. Democratization has empowered local communities to demand more responsive local government. Political decentralization initiatives have at least in some areas invested greater roles for district and regional administrative units, staffed by local professionals who are stakeholders in the well-being of their communities. A new generation of civil servants has begun to emerge, many of whom view their posts as stepping stones for career advancement and are thus eager to make their mark. In Somalia, where no state authority existed after 1990, self-declared municipalities and district authorities emerged from a variety of sources, including local civic leaders, diaspora returnees, and aspiring politicians hoping to use a position of mayor or governor as a launch-pad for national ambitions. The quality of these local government officials has been variable, but overall what has emerged is a class of government authority that is “willing but not able” to govern. This has made them much more open to partnerships with local community leaders and more attentive to the needs of conflict-affected groups. The best of these local governments has come to understand their role as “enabler” rather than “enforcer” of good governance and peace.

Today, local governments in East African border zones devote a considerable amount of time to crossborder conflict management, often meeting with their counterparts in the adjoining state on a frequent basis and attending multiple regional fora to encourage intergovernmental and regional cooperation on security and access issues. They can also serve as coordinators, intermediaries, or clearinghouses for other government agencies in the border area, including national security services and regional bodies and institutions. This coordinating role is critical given the sometimes crowded playing field of actors in border areas.

Critically, local government structures are changing across large portions of East Africa today. Kenya, which shares volatile and strategic borders with Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania, and shares boundaries on Lake Victoria with Uganda and Tanzania, is in a pivotal role in the East Africa borderlands. The new Kenyan constitution is advancing political decentralization by replacing the old system of provinces and districts with a new system of counties. The county boundaries have been drawn to roughly correspond to ethnic territories. In this sense, the new Kenyan system is a variation on the theme of ethno-federalism first introduced in the region in Ethiopia in 1994. Moreover, the new county system will be led by governors elected from the country population, in contrast to the old provincial/district system, in which governors and commissioners were appointed by the central government. The counties will also be governed by an elected county assembly, and will elect one senator for the new upper house or senate.

These changes are set to occur in mid to late 2012, and could have a dramatic impact on crossborder conflict management and on regional security. County leaders will now come from the local community and be expected to represent the interests of the community. Because the counties have generally been drawn along ethnic lines, this means in essence that the county governor and other elected officials may be advancing ethnic interests in their crossborder diplomacy. This may or may not coincide with Kenyan national interests, and may or may not
result in better borderland conflict management. The obvious danger is the potential for parochialization of local
government services and management. This could also complicate the governors’ coordinating role with central
government entities such as the security sector which will be present and at times active on borderland conflict
issues.

In short, the imminent transformation of local government in Kenya is likely to have a major impact on
borderland management across a critical part of East Africa. It is critical to ensure that these new governors are
trained in crossborder conflict management; socialized to work for the advancement of peace and not the narrow
interests of their ethnic group; and encouraged to partner with regional organizations, local community leaders,
and central government agencies across borders. This is a unique window of opportunity to establish responsible
local government management of border conflict issues. If the window is not seized, an important pillar of
authority could become part of the problem rather than the solution, and local administrations in Kenya will
devote most of their energies to power struggles with groups they should be partnering with.

Local government structures are generally less autonomous and empowered in the Great Lakes region, but still
merit close attention as emerging actors in borderland peace building and management of the conflict minerals
trade. There, subnational government structures are often marginalized by strong central governments. Local
officials in border areas and in remote regions lack training and resources to address the complexities of the
jurisdictions they oversee. Poor service delivery, chronic insecurity, lack of economic opportunity, crime, human
rights abuses, and conflict-related sexual violence can produce tensions between local communities and
government administrators appointed from the capital, as local communities expect—but often do not enjoy—
basic protection and rule of law from these offices. Local government officials working in border areas with
significant smuggling and illegal mineral transit are under intense pressure, and corruption is a serious temptation
to officials who are poorly supported by central government. Artisanal mining communities in CAR, Rwanda,
Burundi, and DRC can often be found in some of the poorest, most remote, and underserved areas. These areas
are prone to illegal capture by armed actors and belligerents partially because of weak local government authority
and weak security in these areas. Provincial authorities are expected to play a lead role to monitor illegal mining
practices and trade. These same authorities are also important as frontline responders to human rights abuses and
SGBV crimes committed by armed actors. The fact that they are ill equipped to enforce justice or investigate such
crimes erodes their standing in the local community.

Coordination and communication between local authorities is essential to stem illegal trade and transit of conflict
minerals. Local officials at border posts must be well trained and communication well coordinated with local
officials from mining areas to ensure that transit documents for shipments can be recognized and mineral
sourcing confirmed. It is not only a question of weak border security, but also of administrative management and
oversight of documentation. Shipments of minerals that can be audited at the local level as well as along transit
routes are less likely to be tampered with. Local officials along these transit routes and their monitoring of
administrative systems for tracking mineral shipments is a critical part of more responsible mineral trade.

The problem of conflict minerals is a problem of both governance and security, but creating more transparent
and accountable systems for trade and extraction can provide a “peace dividend” both to populations suffering
from immense civilian insecurity and to regional stakeholders and communities that rely on the economic
opportunity that mineral access and trade provide. Providing more training and support for subnational
government, particularly local mining officials and border staff working on monitoring shipments and trade, can
provide entry points to improved regulation that can mitigate over time incentives for illicit trade.

3.3 CIVIL SOCIETY

3.3.1 CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT IN BORDERLAND CONFLICT MITIGATION

As elsewhere in Africa, East African CSOs have exploded in number since the end of the Cold War, and have
dramatically expanded the roles and issues they have taken on. Among these roles is engagement in local-level
peace building and conflict mitigation. Traditional civic authorities—elders, religious figures, and others—have
always had a central role in managing local disputes, applying customary or religious law, and engaging in quasi-
diplomatic relations with other social groups. These traditional sources of conflict management have been joined by an array of additional civic actors, including women’s groups, businesspeople, faith-based groups, professionals, and youth organizations, creating a new landscape of local conflict management that is both more promising and more complex. Today, most borderland civic peace building involves “hybrid” coalitions of these civic actors. External actors—foreign donors, international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), diaspora groups, and regional states—have recognized the value of civic engagement in conflict mitigation and have actively sought to support CSOs in this role. For instance, community leaders are formally integrated into roles in the CEWARN system in the Horn of Africa.

There is no question that civic efforts to manage conflict and promote peace have been the most important source of local-level peace across East Africa. Especially in remote border areas, traditional community and religious leaders devote much of their day to the tasks of mediating disputes within groups, managing conflict between groups, and hearing criminal cases. It is also incontestable that the greater involvement of a wider array of civic actors in local conflict mitigation and prevention has strengthened local resilience and “governance without government,” as has been argued in Section 1.3.3. At its best, civic-led conflict management has had a transformational impact in once conflict-ridden areas of East Africa (discussed further in Section 5.1.1).

Civil society may be even more important as a source of indirect peace building. Comparative research demonstrates that CSOs’ role in community advocacy builds greater government accountability and can shame potential spoilers to a peace process; that CSOs serve as both incubators and repositories of local expertise and leadership; and that CSOs promote dense networks of affiliation—or social capital—in communities, which improves trust relations and communication, inculcates a greater sense of responsibility to the common good, and builds local community resilience to efforts to polarize the community along a single type of identity or affiliation.41

At the same time, civil society roles in peace building have produced uneven results, and have led some observers to suspect that civil society as a concept, and CSOs as institutions, have been oversold. CSOs and leaders are not always a force for peace; they can be venal, corrupt, politicized, and even spoilers in peace processes. Their capacity is variable. The extent to which foreign aid agencies have viewed CSOs as key peace builders has led to the “projectization” of CSO work, leading to concerns about the sustainability of some civic peace work and the degree to which civil society in some East African countries is as much a product of foreign aid programs as it is an authentic manifestation of local initiatives to organize to build peace. Finally, concerned critics argue that civic leaders seeking to promote peace in areas of recent or ongoing armed violence are exceptionally vulnerable to threats and attacks, and cannot be expected to directly challenge powerful armed groups.

These concerns about the limits of civic peace building in war and post-conflict settings have led to a number of recent studies looking to critically examine the empirical record of civil society in peace-building roles.42 The findings of this research are nuanced, and suggest that civic peace building is more effective in some roles (such as advocacy, track two dialogue, and public education) than others (direct negotiation). It also reinforces the conclusion that civil society is most effective when operating in partnership with states and other actors, and that the particular context of a conflict is crucial—some settings are much less permissive than others for civil groups to play a positive peace-building role.

This latter observation is especially powerful in East Africa, where the context for CSOs as well as informal civic authorities varies enormously both within and between countries. For a variety of historical and cultural reasons, customary law and traditional elders are more resilient and legitimate in some places than others. CSOs engaged in


peace building operate in restricted legal conditions in some East African states, while in others they enjoy wide berth. CSOs are institutionally stronger and more sustainable in countries which have enjoyed a longer period of peace and expanded civil liberties than in countries only recently emerging from war and/or authoritarian governance. Even in Kenya, a country lauded for its vibrant civil society, government attitudes toward the sector are described as “ambivalent.”

Our East Africa fieldwork confirmed these findings of existing research on civil society and peace building, and amplified the following observations:

- The “hybridity” of civic coalitions engaged in conflict mitigation and prevention creates a more complex set of actors, which requires more time and energy to coordinate, but which generally serves to improve the resilience, legitimacy, and effectiveness of civic peace building.
- Hybrid civil society peace building in border areas is based in towns. Where towns exist on both sides of a border, prospects for effective civic peace building are strongest. In border areas featuring only pastoral rangeland and small settlements, few if any CSOs exist. There, traditional civic actors (tribal or clan elders) assume the main role of conflict mitigation. They can, however, call on distant civic partners in towns in the event a conflict escalates beyond their capacity to manage.
- Concerns about the unevenness of the capacity of CSOs in the region are fully warranted. We encountered considerable disparity of CSO capacity across the region.
- In democratic countries in the region, CSOs are often used as launch pads for aspiring local politicians, which can complicate and politicize peace-building work.
- Officials in governments across East Africa appreciate the potential of CSOs but also express wariness about them for a variety of reasons. This wariness is reciprocated by the CSOs toward government offices. Gaps in trust relations are often greater between civic and government actors within the same country than they are across borders.

### 3.3.2 CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT IN ADVOCACY AND MONITORING

Whereas CSO engagement in peace building is crucial in crossborder conflict mitigation, the role of civil society in advocacy, monitoring, and reporting is of special importance in the Great Lakes region, where civic groups are expected to play a role in the evolving system of certification of conflict-free minerals. For this reason we also assessed the status of civil society groups in that region.

Generally, CSOs in the Great Lakes area are less robust than their counterparts in most other areas of East Africa. Uganda is the exception—it has a strong civil society, although most of its CSOs are service providers, not monitoring and advocacy-based groups. The general weakness of CSOs in the region is due to a variety of historical and political factors. Areas of protracted and profound dislocation and violence, like eastern DRC, have been difficult environments for most civic organizations to thrive, though some—including the Catholic Church—have retained a strong role. In other settings in the Great Lakes, governments have limited the ability of CSOs to engage in directly political activities. Nonetheless, our fieldwork confirmed that CSOs are growing in importance across the Great Lakes region and have the potential to play an important role in conflict mineral certification schemes.

For example, in March 2011, a group of prominent CSOs from eastern DRC formed a coalition to address the linkage between natural resource exploitation and human rights abuses in the region. Focusing primarily on North Kivu mining sites, a platform of nine local human rights organizations with proven records in activism in and around the mining sector came together to merge their efforts under the banner of what is being called the

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Support Platform for Traceability and Transparency in the Management of Natural Resources, or GATT-RN.45 The efforts of GATT-RN’s members are earning the group regional and international recognition as a reliable interlocutor.

Civic groups in eastern DRC have also demonstrated a capacity for advocacy on behalf of the wider interests of Congolese society. After the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010, the DRC government praised the passage of the law as needed leverage to help sever the linkages between minerals exploitation, the financing of armed groups, and the enforcement of transparency initiatives in mineral supply chains. Three months after the passage of the US law, President Kabila announced a mining ban in the Kivus. In the face of uncertain access and regulation, several large mineral buyers pulled out of the region, including some of the world’s largest electronics manufacturers. In response to growing industry uncertainty, and based on the impact that this embargo had on local livelihoods, civil society groups from DRC convened a series of workshops that included representatives from the DRC mining ministry, and stakeholders working with the ICGLR in DRC and Rwanda to address the regional and national impact.

Since the US legislation passed, industry has been lobbying both the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and State Department for a delay of the implementation of the law for up to three years. In response, a coalition of over 40 Congolese women’s and human rights groups led by SYNERGIE, CREDDHO, and BEDEWA have been urging swift implementation of the Dodd-Frank legislation. These groups have also documented serious human rights violations including child and forced labor, women’s enslavement, sexual abuse, and different forms of illegal taxes, in and around mining communities in the east. Additionally, they collectively wrote Secretary of State Clinton, calling for the US State Department to oppose efforts by mining operators to delay new US regulations on conflict minerals from the DRC. In reaction to the coalition’s stand urging swift implementation of the Dodd-Frank legislation, the mayor of Goma threatened to ask the government to track down and punish everyone who was behind the initiative, reinforcing our broader finding that civic efforts to engage in political advocacy in the region exposes them to conflict with both non-state and state actors.

Despite these tensions, GATT-RN is nationally registered and has established itself as a permanent independent monitoring unit in the field, built to provide third party checks and balances to the DRC government traceability scheme in North Kivu province. By educating local communities about the various traceability tools including the ICGLR’s RINR initiative, the OECD due diligence guidelines, and the US conflict minerals legislation, GATT-RN aims to be a whistleblower for any violations at the local and national levels. In addition, this coalition of CSOs has taken part in regional fora and is seeking to build stronger networks in the Great Lakes on auditing and monitoring functions of the ICGLR regional certification system.

3.3.3 CIVIL SOCIETY AND GENDER CONSIDERATIONS

Civil society’s growing role in conflict mitigation and advocacy in East Africa is especially important as a platform to advance the voice and interests of women, who have borne the brunt of years of armed violence and criminality in the region. Existing research unequivocally finds that CSOs have helped to amplify women’s voices and have cultivated a generation of vibrant female civic and political leadership. Many of the region’s prominent female social and political leaders emerged from CSOs, and women’s civic groups have been at the forefront of peace building and advocacy across East Africa. Our fieldwork generated considerable evidence that this continues to be the case.

One of the most visible cases of women’s roles in crossborder conflict mitigation in East Africa is the work of the Wajir women’s market group in northern Kenya. That group of local women drove a process of peace building.

45 The organizations are Bureau d’Etudes, d’ Observation et de Coordination pour le Développement du Territoire de Walikale (BEDEWA), Centre de Recherche sur l’Environnement, la Démocratie et les Droits de l’Homme (CREDDHO), Association pour le Développement des Initiatives Paysannes (ASSODIP), SOS AFRICA, Action Sociale pour la Paix et le Développement (ASPD), Programme d’Appui à la Lutte Contre la Misère (PAMI), Groupe Uni pour le Développement Endogene (GUDE), Réseau de Batisseurs au Congo (REBATISCO), and Action Communautaire pour la Protection de l’Environnement et le Développement Intégral (ACOPEDI). The author, in addition to working for the Enough Project, helped to found SOS AFRICA and works with GATT-RN in this capacity.
that expanded to include a wide coalition of civic actors and produced dramatic improvements in local governance and conflict management across Kenya’s northeast border areas with Somalia, an accomplishment detailed in Section 5.1.1. One of those women, Dekha Ibrahim, later won an international peace award, “the Right Livelihood Award,” for her peace-building work.

Efforts to regulate conflict mineral trade also have important gender implications. Gender considerations in mining policies are an important place to address some of the conditions under which the rights of woman can be protected in national frameworks. By incorporating gender considerations in mining policies and frameworks, the conditions under which women work can be directly addressed at the national and local levels. There is often little regulation and monitoring of artisanal mining sites, and this can contribute to issues of impunity relating to human rights abuses, rape, and child labor.

During the 2010 ICGLR Lusaka Summit, the RINR initiative worked with regional and national civil society groups and member states to discuss ways to weaken the links between human rights abuses, SGBV, and the exploitation of conflict minerals. The 4th ICGLR Annual Summit—held in Kampala, Uganda in December 2011—focused on the roles and responsibilities of member states to address these issues and provided a five-day working forum for civil society partners from the region working on mineral resource conflicts and human rights and SGBV issues. By providing a platform for regional and host country civil society partners to address heads of state, the ICGLR has been able to strengthen the credibility and internal advocacy necessary for member state implementation of key actions.

Among the agreements of the summit was the commitment of ICGLR member states to integrate gender aspects into their national mining policies. The ICGLR Secretariat, supported by GIZ, is following up on this decision and organizing a regional conference for the adoption of guidelines for the integration of gender aspects into member states’ mining policies. To follow up on this decision, a joint conference with the Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) on gender in the mining sector in the Great Lakes Region will be held in Bangui, CAR, in May 2012. As a direct output of this event, member states of the ICGLR and CEMAC shall discuss and agree on a set of guidelines aimed at supporting the integration of gender aspects in national mining policies.

3.4 CHANGING STATE INTERESTS IN MANAGING TRANSBOUNDARY CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY

The combined strength of the three pillars noted above—regional intergovernmental organizations, local government, and civil society—is essential to crossborder conflict mitigation in East Africa. But their effectiveness is premised on the willingness of regional governments to support efforts to prevent and mitigate conflict. In the past, some regional governments were actively complicit in fomenting transborder instability and armed conflict. This constituted an insurmountable obstacle to conflict management in the region.

State interests in regional borders areas have shifted, producing a window of opportunity for conflict prevention and mitigation programming. Without this more favorable political context, the three pillars described above would have limited success in addressing borderland instability and armed conflict.

This is clearly the case with regard to state commitment to combating crossborder armed conflict in East Africa. As we document in Section 5.1.4, our fieldwork found convincing evidence that governments in the Horn of Africa have a growing interest in strengthening the three pillars of border conflict mitigation. New economic development opportunities in the Horn’s border areas, the impact of the revival and expansion of the EAC, and the rising costs of spillover of instability are all factors that help to account for this shift in government prioritization of crime and armed conflict in remote border areas. Our fieldwork also confirmed that, despite occasional outbursts of heated rhetoric, East African governments are strongly committed to peaceful management of interstate water sources. This is especially in evidence with the Nile River and its watershed. Though disputes over water rights usage of the Nile is a matter of profound, even existential concern for regional states, regional governments have sought to negotiate these matters peacefully through the Nile Basin Initiative, as discussed in Annex 2.
Finally, there is growing evidence that regional governments are shifting their positions on conflict mineral trade toward greater commitment to a region-wide certification scheme. Importantly, the interests of regional governments have not necessarily changed—they continue to be driven by the desire to capture the enormous profits that accrue from the export and transit of high-value minerals. But their strategies are shifting, in response to the Dodd-Frank legislation and the new international conflict mineral regime it represents. Regional governments are calculating that their long-term interests are better served by backing regional certification schemes and routinizing the legal export of conflict-free minerals rather than profiteering from the previous practice of transiting smuggled conflict minerals. As we detail in Section 4.2.1, this shift in policies from complicity in conflict mineral trade to support of certification schemes to end the trade in conflict minerals is manifest in the DRC’s temporary ban on mineral exports, region-wide support for the ICGLR’s certification scheme, and national-level legislation to reform the mineral extraction and trade sector.
4.0 PRIORITY REGIONAL CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY ISSUES

All three of the priority conflict and instability issues selected for further investigation are the subject of vibrant academic and policy debates. All three can, depending on circumstances, serve either as dangerous drivers of transborder conflict and instability or can serve as sources of stability and conflict prevention. A central focus of this assessment was thus the question: under what conditions are these issues likely to serve either as triggers or sources of violence and instability, or of conflict mitigation and cooperation?

4.1 CRIME AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Crime and violent extremism are two interrelated and very serious sources of transboundary conflict across East Africa. Crime and extremism are both cause and symptom of armed conflict, and interact with other conflict drivers in complex ways. They were selected as priority issues for further investigation based on the following prima facie evidence that was captured in our preliminary research:

- **Ubiquity.** Crossborder crime is widely cited as a major problem in communities along East Africa’s borders. Few border areas in the region have been immune from the problem. Smuggling and crossborder cattle rustling are the most common forms of transborder crime, but others are gaining in importance.

- **Impunity.** Criminals, insurgents, and extremist groups use borders as a source of refuge from law enforcement and security forces. In parts of East Africa, border zones have become populated with violent non-state actors exploiting the borderlands in this manner.

- **Borderlands as criminal hubs and business opportunities.** Lucrative smuggling opportunities exist across all of East Africa, even in areas where strong governments seek to exert control. Smuggling—of minerals, guns, consumer goods, and people—is only one of the many “affordances” of border areas that attract criminal operatives with a vested interest in evading, co-opting, or intimidating local law enforcement, as well as a range of other middlemen and opportunists. Portions of Somalia’s coastline have attracted concentrations of armed men as pirates.

- **Commercialization.** Some transborder criminal activities have grown enormously in scale, violence, organization, and government complicity due to commercialization of the looted items. This has been frequently cited as a major problem with regard to livestock rustling in the past 15 years, thanks to lucrative urban markets for meat.

- **Globalization.** While much transborder crime and violent extremism involves local or regional interests, some have become essentially global in nature, bringing powerful external actors and forces into the fray. Islamic extremism in Somalia and coastal Kenya has, in the past two decades, been transformed by linkages to Al-Qaeda; the mineral trade in the Great Lakes region is driven entirely by global demand; arms trafficking in the region has involved dangerous international criminals like Victor Bout; piracy off the Somali coast affects shipping throughout the Indian Ocean and implicates external financial investors.

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global systems of public order that they cross at their peril. Ample evidence from the region highlights the impressive capacity of local communities to build informal systems of protection and rule of law that deter, mitigate, or at least modify some forms of transborder criminal violence. Al-Shabaab’s units in the Somali-Kenya border area, for instance, have had to negotiate with local social authorities and respect their prerogatives. The resilience of local security and governance arrangements in the face of new or heightened criminal activity and violent extremism was a central research question for the fieldwork phase of the study.

Second, existing research also points to the possibility that in some cases transborder criminal elements and violent extremists, whether in the form of small gangs or large syndicates, can simultaneously be sources of stability or protection and armed violence. This observation is borne out in general research on mafias and related protection rackets which occupy gray zones between predatory criminals and local protection units, as well as in historical research on state formation which reminds us that pirates and bandits can, for self-serving reasons, become a force for building political orders. Empirical evidence from East Africa confirms this can occur. Al-Shabaab, for instance, maintains forceful local law and order in areas it controls even as it sows instability and violence elsewhere; and some of the safer zones of East Africa’s “ungoverned spaces,” such as the pirate villages of coastal Somalia, are under the control of criminal networks. Neither organized criminal groups nor jihadists flourish in zones of complete anarchy; they prefer political orders and security arrangements they can manipulate.

This alarming inventory of the impact of CVE on East Africa is partially offset by three factors, forming the debate over when and under what conditions criminal and extremist groups actually produce violence and instability. First, transborder criminal and extremist groups sometimes encounter robust local systems of public order that they cross at their peril. Ample evidence from the region highlights the impressive capacity of local communities to build informal systems of protection and rule of law that deter, mitigate, or at least modify some forms of transborder criminal violence. Al-Shabaab’s units in the Somali-Kenya border area, for instance, have had to negotiate with local social authorities and respect their prerogatives. The resilience of local security and governance arrangements in the face of new or heightened criminal activity and violent extremism was a central research question for the fieldwork phase of the study.

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Third, some activities which are technically illegal—specifically, the smuggling of consumer goods across borders—are in fact part of a vibrant, region-wide informal commercial economy that creates shared interests and alliances across communal and state borders and which, in the words of a recent study, represent “a robust resource for market-based cooperation and local economic security.” Our research treated the impact of informal crossborder commerce on conflict and instability as an open question, not a given.

The study’s fieldwork on transborder criminality and violent extremism concentrated geographically on the border areas of northern Kenya with its neighbors—Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda. These borderlands face all three threats: violent crime, crossborder insurgencies, and violent extremism. Findings from these borders areas may not hold across the entire East African region.

4.1.1 FINDINGS

First, sustained efforts by local communities, regional governments, and external donors to address transborder clashes over livestock raiding and other localized criminal activities have helped to reduce and manage retaliatory violence and harmful spillover. Instances of massacres and mass casualties from crossborder raids still occur, but the overall fatality and incident rates are lower than a decade ago, and better systems are in place to ensure the return of stolen property and compensation for losses. We noted considerable variation by location, with the Lake Turkana area among the most intractable crises.

Second, trans-regional criminality is increasingly taking on the form of large, powerful, international syndicates and cartels. This has long been true of certain types of criminality in East Africa, such as mineral smuggling and gun trafficking. More recently, however, drug transiting—mainly through Kenya, but with a worrisome presence in southern Somalia—has become a major new criminal force, providing annual revenues to those involved in Kenya alone of up to an estimated one billion dollars per year. As with Somali piracy and the conflict mineral trade, the drug trade may implicate top-level political figures in some regional governments. This is raising concerns about the possibility of organized crime syndicates with enormous revenues exercising growing influence over some regional governments.

More broadly, evidence from Kenya and Somalia point to the growth in the “cartelization” of politics—that is, the growing political clout of a collection of distinct cartels operating largely out of the public view. These include not only the drug cartel, but a piracy cartel, a food aid cartel, and two cartels actively diverting funds from and indirectly influencing the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia. All of these cartels have an active interest in subverting and weakening the state’s role in law enforcement; and all contribute directly to the region’s exceptionally high levels of corruption. Some but not all actively foment instability through armed conflict or humanitarian crises.

The growing clout of criminal cartels is of added concern when considered in the context of local sources of resilience. The money and coercive violence that large criminal syndicates can muster in pursuit of their interests can easily overwhelm a local system of governance and conflict management, and can silence government law enforcement agencies. Border communities in zones of active criminal syndicates are extremely vulnerable. None of the local governance arrangements we researched in border areas were strong enough to resist criminal syndicates on this scale.

Third, regional and international pressure is creating new opportunities to curb and combat at least some types of transborder criminality. East Africa is seeing some progress in combating criminal impunity, thanks to a combination of genuine government commitment, the threat of sanctions on individuals violating arms embargoes posed by UN Monitoring Group reporting, US and other external legislation on conflict mineral trade, and the robust activities of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the region.

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Our fieldwork findings also reinforced the observation about expanding military roles in regional politics and economies. Though most regional states are led by civilian governments, security sectors are playing an increasingly important role in border area governance and security, crossborder diplomacy, and transborder economic activities. Part of this reflects the securitization of borderland issues over the past decade, sometimes with direct US assistance, but the trend is bigger than mere border patrols. Regional militaries are involved in multiple peacekeeping and stabilization operations in neighboring states, and at times have been central actors in pursuit of the control of smuggling of valuable resources across borders. Whether their role is constructive or disruptive, security sectors in the region are now important actors on most transborder issues.

Finally, violent extremism in the eastern Horn of Africa—specifically Islamic extremism, in the form of Al-Shabaab—appears to be in decline. Al-Shabaab’s legitimacy has dropped in most Somali and Islamic circles, thanks to a series of self-defeating policies by the movement; its gross mishandling of the 2011 famine in southern Somalis was the latest example. The group has also suffered from deep splits in its leadership, lost much of its external financial support, lost territory to multiple offensives, and had to resort to forced conscription in parts of southern Somalia. Though Kenya and Ethiopia’s recent military offensives into Somali territory raised fears of blowback—of Somalis and other regional Muslims rallying to Al-Shabaab’s defense—that has not, to date, occurred.

Several cautionary points temper this otherwise good news on violent extremism. First, a weakened Al-Shabaab is in some ways a more dangerous movement. To date, it has been constrained from launching major terrorist attacks in Kenya by the fact that powerful Somali interests have heavily invested in that country, and many hundreds of thousands of Somalis have taken up residency in Kenya. An attack on Kenya by Al-Shabaab would be self-defeating and risk a dangerous backlash from the Somali business community. But a weakened Al-Shabaab is more likely to launch an attack in Kenya out of desperation, in a bid to polarize Christian-Muslim relations there and win over new support.

In addition, an East African unit that has flown under the banner of Al-Shabaab remains a serious threat to security in Kenya and Uganda. This group of non-Somali East Africans, many recent converts, is now under the command of Sheikh Ahmed Iman Ali. It was primarily responsible of the Kampala World Cup bombings in 2010, and its fortunes are not necessarily tethered to those of Al-Shabaab.

Finally, many of the underlying grievances among regional Muslim populations that Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda temporarily tapped remain in place, even if direct support or sympathy for Al-Shabaab has waned. The roots of radicalization among small sections of the region’s Muslim population include a variety of causes, but not all are “push” factors—that is, frustrations at unemployment, political marginalization, or Kenyan and Ethiopian military operations inside Somalia. Some observers point to equally important “pull factors”—the ability of radical Muslim mosques and movements to provide a sense of identity and purpose in their lives. This is an especially intriguing claim applied to the hundreds of thousands of long-term refugees across the region.

### 4.2 Conflict, Instability and Regional Mineral Trade

No other border region of the world has produced war-related fatality levels matching those that have beset the Great Lakes region since the early 1990s. The region’s multiple armed conflicts have had many causes, but conflict minerals are a pivotal driver. Specifically, certain high-value minerals, the mine sites, and the control of trade of these minerals are an important source of financing for government-affiliated militias and violent non-state actors that are responsible for the horrific levels of physical violence and coercion in eastern DRC. The instability and insecurity this breeds is felt primarily within the borders of the DRC, but the actors, interests, trade, and spillover effects span the entire Great Lakes region.

Most of the findings in existing research on the Great Lakes’ conflict minerals highlight the intractability of instability and violence spawned by the mineral extraction and trade. Existing analyses emphasize the fact that a powerful array of local, regional, and global actors benefit from the illegal extraction and trade in high-value minerals—gold, tin, tantalum, and tungsten—out of eastern DRC. The political economy of mineral extraction and trade in the Great Lakes has thrived in conditions of “durable disorder” and lawlessness that are essential for
armed groups and others to capture and control artisanal mines, coerce or tax mine labor, and smuggle the high-value minerals across the border. From this perspective, the main beneficiaries of the trade in minerals constitute a powerful network of stakeholders in perpetuating instability in the border areas. This line of analysis provides a compelling explanation for the long duration and extreme violence of the crisis in eastern DRC and the Great Lakes.

The impact of Great Lakes’ conflict minerals is still the subject of debate, but existing research points to the following claims, which we tested in our fieldwork:

- Chronic insecurity in eastern DRC, weak local governance in remote border areas, and the presence of foreign and domestic armed groups is an especially powerful impediment to a solution to Great Lake transborder violence and instability.
- Some elements within the DRC government and military are beneficiaries of the existing crisis and trade in conflict minerals, and will resist efforts to bring governance and stability to eastern DRC.
- The governments sharing a border with eastern DRC continue to enjoy benefits accruing from the mineral trade and are in varying degrees complicit in the crisis, including their involvement in proxy wars inside DRC.
- Failed demobilization programs and high unemployment continue to drive youth into predatory militia involved in the trade of conflict minerals.
- The violence associated with militia tactics to control mines and mine labor is the source of some of the worst human rights abuses in the world, and has had an especially devastating impact on women.
- Violence associated with clashes over control of mineral areas has been a critical driver of the region’s very high levels of internal displacement, which in turn exacerbates communal tensions and insecurity.
- A culture of impunity has developed among the region’s armed groups and their leaders and this is perpetuated by weak national and regional systems of security, extradition, and justice.
- A solution to the Great Lakes crisis must include a regional regime to stop the illegal trade in conflict minerals. One internationally recognized approach is to establish an effective certification system to ensure legally exported minerals are conflict free to protect trade and livelihoods in the region.

This latter argument helped to advance important recent legislation in the United States, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, which requires American companies to ensure the raw materials they use to make their products are not tied to the conflict in DRC, by auditing the mineral supply chains from the DRC and surrounding countries in the Great Lakes region. Despite a daunting array of circumstances under which armed actors in the region access conflict minerals and engage in illegal trade and exploitation, evidence suggests that regional and national interests are starting to shift based on careful political and economic considerations relating to conflict minerals.

First, international pressure and sanctions are becoming more effective at detailing publically significant abuses in mineral smuggling, human rights infractions, and crimes against humanity. For example, regional and international extraditions, arrests, and sanctions of key rebel leaders have weakened rebel groups and alliances that have been implicated in illicit mineral trade and human rights abuses. In early October 2010, French authorities arrested the executive secretary of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda DRC (FDLR), Callixte Mbarushimana. The ICC stated that Mr. Mbarushimana is wanted for five counts of crimes against humanity and six counts of war crimes committed in the DRC in 2009. On December 1, 2010, the United Nations Sanctions Committee for DRC added three FDLR members and one other individual to its sanction list. In February 2011, a DRC court sentenced Lt. Col. Kibibi Mutware to 20 years in jail in a mass rape case in eastern DRC. This was the first conviction of a commanding officer for rape in eastern DRC. In May 2011, Rwandan Hutu rebel, Ignace Murwanashyaka, went on trial in Germany for alleged crimes against humanity in DRC. These extraditions are putting real pressure on regional state and non-state actors complicit in crimes related to conflict minerals, and are changing the political environment in which regional governments and others calculate their interests.

Second, pressure from industry, reduction in international interest in exploration, and a significant drop in concessions is driving states in the Great Lakes to reconsider the regional nature of illegal mineral exploitation,
transit, and trade. The DRC government’s imposition of a temporary mining embargo (October 2010 to March 2011) on North and South Kivu provinces, was in response to the Dobb-Frank legislation, and essentially stopped all mineral shipments out of eastern DRC.

Finally, country governments in the region have reacted by revising mining codes, frameworks, and laws to adhere to some of these new systems, showing greater political will in the region than has existed in decades. Burundi, CAR, DRC, and Rwanda have all revised mining codes in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act. All but Burundi have recently (in the past 18 months) reorganized provincial and national staffing within their Ministries of Mines. These reorganizations are being put into place in anticipation of national and regional pressure to conform to certification, due diligence, and auditing procedures.

4.2.1 FINDINGS

Our field research confirmed that significant challenges remain in the region to mitigate illegal trade. There is ample evidence that the political economy of conflict mineral trade still remains a powerful force across the region and will resist initiatives to regulate mineral trade and improve governance and conflict mitigation in the border areas. But it also confirmed that shifts in regional political will and international interests to address the conflict mineral trade constitute an opportunity to mitigate dimensions of a conflict that clearly requires regional ownership and resiliencies to be supported.

First, there is a greater commitment on the part of regional states to empower a regional body—the ICGLR—to play a lead role in supporting host country governments to stem illegal mineral trade, partially due to international pressure to conform to industry and international standards. ICGLR’s RINR has been working to promote harmonized regional approaches to curb the illegal exploitation of conflict minerals, by creating tools to increase member state accountability for responsible mineral trade.

Second, our fieldwork found that the shift in the strategies of regional governments—from complicity in conflict mineral trade and associated violence, to greater willingness to explore a new, legitimate, and peaceful mineral trade regime in the Great Lakes is real, but fragile. Independent auditing and harmonized standards for conflict-free mining is essential in pressuring country governments to mitigate exploitation of minerals by armed groups and in signifying to conflict-affected communities that human rights infractions matter to central and regional governments. These governments, and some powerful circles of interests within these governments, are calculating how they can continue to profit from the mineral trade without incurring costs associated with violation of proposed certification schemes. Smuggling is on the rise and it is likely that some criminal networks and armed groups will move to the exploitation of other resources. Those calculations can and will be shaped in large part by emerging international and regional norms regarding certification schemes, and associated penalties for illegal trade and transit of conflict minerals.

This latter point is already clearly in evidence. We found that much of the shift in government positions on conflict mineral trade is being driven by the current and anticipated costs of trading in conflict minerals. For example, in September 2010, the DRC government initiated a “temporary 6 month ban” on mineral exports emanating from the Kivus, creating unanticipated negative impacts across the region. In an interview held in December 2011, a DRC mining official said that this ban had “dire impacts in the Kivus affecting both the formal and informal economy reliant on mineral trade and extraction.” In some areas, he argued, school enrollment rates have dropped by 30% due to the collapse of the local economy that relied 80-95% on mining activity for income. The “temporary mining ban” as it is known in the region, has had the unintended effect of damaging the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Congolese citizens.

Significantly, though the mining embargo has now been lifted, companies are reluctant to commence mining, fearing the consequences of accusations they are dealing in conflict minerals. This unintended consequence has impacted regional traders and buyers in neighboring countries. Private sector mining industry officials in Rwanda and Burundi we interviewed observed that the ban had impacted exploration concessions as well as industry expansion in their areas of operation. Along transit and supply routes as well, traders, transistors, and processing partners in the region were impacted. Although some Chinese traders are still operating in eastern DRC, their rates have driven down the value of minerals. This increases incentives for smuggling to obscure the origin of
minerals so that they can be processed and traded in neighboring countries. For example, there is evidence that during periods of conflict in eastern DRC, Rwanda has unexplained increases in exports that do not correlate with current national mineral projections. There is continued concern and suspicion that illegal trade networks and smuggling channels exist between Rwanda and DRC.

The impact of the temporary ban and its longer-term reverberations in the mining sector appears to be a major factor in the decision by regional government to rethink their role in the mineral trade and to support regional initiatives to create a certification scheme. This will not only allow countries like Rwanda to engage in transit trade of the certified minerals from the DRC, but also to export its own minerals without accusations that it is brokering in conflict minerals. As one Rwandan mining official put it, “Dodd-Frank is positive to the GMD (Geology and Mines Division) as legal trade and accountability may remove suspicions regarding Rwanda exports.”

Finally, we also found that a new commitment exists in the region to revise national mining codes, mining oversight bodies, and ministries in the Great Lakes Region. Since July 2010, Burundi, CAR, Rwanda, and DRC have all revised their mining laws and codes. In the case of Burundi, this had not been done since the early 1970s. Mining codes are being revised to address issues of supply chain control, and to ensure that mining regulations reflect international norms for transparency and mineral sourcing. Burundi and CAR have revised mining laws that have adopted policies to address issues of child labor and human rights, and are incorporating standards for national accountability and transparency of mineral resources. Three mine sites in Rwanda—Rutongo, Nyakabingo, and Gifurwe—will be pioneering the ICGLR RCM. In field interviews, a mining staff member in CAR stated that reorganizations were done in direct response to some of the recommendations of ICGLR and that he suspected more countries would seek to harmonize oversight of the industry to ensure more secure routes of trade.
PART II: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS

The two strategic program recommendations made here—one on crossborder conflict management in the Horn of Africa, the other on promoting responsible regional mineral trade and access—both seek to seize windows of opportunity now presenting themselves on these issues. In consequence, both are relatively time-sensitive, requiring support and assistance to local conflict mitigation coalitions within the near future if they are to have maximum impact. Both seek to strengthen and build on existing local, state, and regional institutions and their resilience to conflict drivers, and to improve their capacity to work with one another. In this sense, the recommendations correspond closely to the main finding of the World Development Report 2011 on Conflict, Security, and Development: “strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to break cycles of violence.”

5.0 BUILDING A THREE-PILLAR APPROACH TO REGIONAL CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MITIGATION

The combined findings of this fieldwork and existing research suggest that the most resilient systems deterring or managing conflict and instability involve three pillars of authority working in cooperation: (1) regional institutions and bodies, 2) sub national governmental authorities in distinct conflict zones (district, county, provincial), and (3) legitimate and committed civil society. Building the response capability of these three key pillars has the greatest potential to mitigate regional and cross-border conflict.

Local communities, district or provincial authorities, and interstate regional institutions play a vital role in managing a range of regional crossborder conflict issues. They are chiefly responsible for variable and sometimes dramatic improvements in borderland security across parts of the East African region in the past 15 years. Their capacity—both as stand-alone actors and as part of an integrated, three-pillar approach to conflict-management—is a critical source of resilience in the face of mounting conflict pressures across the region’s troubled border areas. Regional institutions and bodies can serve as platforms for intergovernmental cooperation on transborder conflict issues. These institutions and their technical and strategic response capacities are often critical in preventing and responding to potential and protracted crossborder and transnational issues such as crime, violent extremism, smuggling, and displacement as a result of humanitarian emergencies or the impact of civil conflict. Subnational governmental authorities in distinct conflict zones, whose area of jurisdiction are in border areas, are often the first responders to regional conflict and are at the front lines for monitoring and management of crises that spillover from and into neighboring states. Weak capacity of local and national government is often magnified or mitigated by legitimate and committed civil society, often a hybrid coalition of civil society leadership, traditional leaders, religious leaders, women’s groups, business interests, and professionals.

The recommendations for both of the priority issues identified by this assessment address the need for greater emphasis on programming support to these three pillars of authority, and we feel have the greatest potential to transform regional and cross-border conflict dynamics.

5.1 REGIONAL AND TRANSBORDER CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Recommendations in this section were informed by the fieldwork conducted in Kenya and Ethiopia looking at issues relating to CVE, and supplemented by follow-up interviews with representatives from Uganda, Somalia, and South Sudan. Both our preliminary research and subsequent fieldwork reinforced our conclusion that transborder crime constitutes a serious and growing threat to borderland peace and stability. We concluded that modest levels of funding for mitigating transborder violent extremism, however, would not be likely to have a significant impact, given the relatively weak results of the recent civil affairs “hearts and minds” outreach in the
region and the costs of large-scale media programs to counter radical narratives. Fieldwork reaffirmed that local, national, and regional mechanisms are in place which are responding to criminal threats in border areas—but with calibrated support, these entities could improve their capacity still further. It was determined that recent and pending changes in local governance systems in border areas would significantly benefit from increased capacity-building programs focused on conflict management and mitigation.

Recommendations in this section call for the regional mission to build on its current support of transborder conflict mitigation mechanisms in East Africa via the following three integrated projects:

- The first recommendation is continued, though carefully calibrated, support to the CEWARN mechanism in IGAD, to improve interstate cooperation in conflict early warning, prevention, and management.
- The second recommendation advocates expansion of USAID’s successful Peace II program on the Somali-Kenya border into other suitable border areas in the region (while maintaining support for the current work on the Somali-Kenya border). Many transborder “corridors” in the region merit attention, but feedback from government officials in the region pointed to several locations as top priority areas, including the contested Sudan-South Sudan border; portions of the South Sudan-Ethiopia border near Gambella; portions of the “Karamoja cluster” especially in the Uganda-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Kenya border area; and the Moyale border area of Ethiopia and Kenya.
- The third recommendation envisions a new project involving peace building and diplomatic training and support to local government authorities in the region. Major changes in the composition and nature of local government are occurring now in Kenya, South Sudan, and southern Somalia; these changes constitute a critical window of opportunity for borderland conflict prevention.

Over the past 15 years, a number of initiatives, some grassroots, others governmental have sought to build and strengthen borderland conflict management systems in the Horn of Africa. Most of the focus has been on two of these three pillars. First, community-level peace building in border areas has been the object of considerable attention, and has yielded excellent, though predictably uneven, results across the Horn of Africa. Kenya’s Peace and Development Committees embody this approach to enfranchising local non-state actors in peace building and building partnerships between local community authorities and local governments in border management; USAID’s “Peace II” program exemplifies donor support to this pillar of borderland peace building (discussed below). Second, regional states have, with substantial donor support, sought to routinize intergovernmental cooperation in the prevention and mitigation of border conflicts. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) Conflict and Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) (see below) is an example of this commitment.

The following section provides the analytic background to the recommended approach and elaborates on programmatic alternatives.

### 5.1.1 LOCAL COMMUNITY MECHANISMS

The evolution of community policing and governance in border areas of parts of the Horn in recent years has been remarkable, and constitutes one of the most compelling examples of how quickly local communities can develop resilience to conflict pressures under the right circumstances. Examples of this trend have been documented in a number of locations, but the most powerful case, with the broadest regional impact, was the Wajir peace movement in northeast Kenya in 1995. There, a local women’s market group reacted to violence and lawlessness spilling over from neighboring Somalia by mobilizing a coalition of community leaders—elders, businesspeople, youth groups, professionals, and clerics—to build a system of conflict management and rule of law that eventually included crossborder diplomacy with groups in Somalia. The initiative was embraced by local Kenyan government officials, formalized as a hybrid community-government partnership called the Peace and

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Development Committee, and replicated in other regions of Kenya. Most of northeast Kenya became a zone of relatively low crime and violence over the ensuing decade. Key to the success of the Wajir movement was the openness of local government to partnership with civic peace builders. The Wajir story is also a reminder of the pivotal role women have played in some (though not all) local-level border conflict management.

There are many variations in local community peace building in violent border areas of East Africa, and a wide array of actors. They tend to fall into one of two categories. Some are part of the formal CEWARN Local Peace Committees that have been formed in almost all IGAD countries. The LPCs comprise a combination of state and non-state actors. Others operate outside of a formal arrangement with the state, although they may liaise with government authorities. In the Karamoja cluster, for instance, church groups have been enlisted as crossborder facilitators of dialogue and conflict management. In the disputed border area of Abyei in Sudan and on parts of the eastern DRC border, business and commercial actors have been tapped as part of a “peace market” strategy. Along the Somali-Kenya border, adjacent border towns purposely work to share crossborder services such as schools and health posts to ensure that communities are stakeholders in one another’s stability and security, and to routinize cooperation on functional issues, in what is called a “peace dividend strategy.” The particular combination of local actors, and the particular combination of shared interests that bring them together in pursuit of border peace, is context specific. But the broader principle—that conditions can and do exist for local communities to prevent or mitigate crossborder conflict, despite the presence of powerful spoilers—is relevant across the entire East African region.

Even so, community efforts to manage crossborder violence and instability have faced significant problems. In Kenya, the formalization of PDCs has allowed for the model to be replicated across much of the country, but has an uneven record. Some PDCs have been used as political platforms for aspiring politicians; in the process, the PDCs have been politicized, and their neutrality damaged. In southern Somalia, community-based governance is well developed thanks to 21 years of state collapse, but in recent years has had to contend with the violent and intimidating presence of Al-Shabaab. Local civic leaders have been able to negotiate terms with Al-Shabaab, but at great risk, and as a result have been constrained by the threat of assassination from acting autonomously. In Ethiopia, the government’s recent restrictive laws on civil society (the Charities and Societies Proclamation) has reduced formal roles for CSOs in peace building and conflict management in border areas, though civil society representatives are represented in LPCs. In some war-torn areas of East Africa, CSOs in remote border areas are weak or in disarray. Capacity and leadership quality are critical, and vary tremendously from place to place. Finally, in some conflict areas of East Africa, local community leadership is simply not committed to peace building. Years of clashes have hardened ethnic animosities and deepened distrust; competing narratives are jarringly at odds, and appear to offer only modest prospects for negotiation and mediation. Our research encountered this in the Turkana border area of Kenya and Ethiopia, where the Turkana and Dassenesh communities are locked in spiraling violence over land and the fisheries of the shrinking Lake Turkana.

Border communities typically take on a broad portfolio of roles in maintaining peace. At their best, they serve as eyes and ears for early warning systems; create deterrence, by placing social pressure on would-be criminals and armed militia; mobilize the community for both conflict prevention and management; are a source of customary or religious law within their group; and serve as diplomats in managing tensions with neighboring groups. They also face serious constraints, and are especially limited in effectiveness when deprived of a strong partnership with local and national governments. Some of the factors constraining community peace building include ineffective or hostile local government in some locations, poor communication systems with crossborder groups, increasingly complex new conflict drivers and fatality levels which can overwhelm customary systems of justice and conflict management, powerful spoilers, and organizational challenges of keeping hybrid governance coalitions working together.

5.1.2 INTERSTATE REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND MECHANISMS

Regional bodies and institutions in East Africa are playing a more significant role as platforms for interstate collaboration on security issues and conflict management. Protracted conflicts, regional insurgencies, and crossborder criminality stress border and national-level response systems, and regional organizations are becoming more essential for monitoring, prevention, and crossborder response mechanisms. In recent years,
intergovernmental relations have improved across much of the region, particularly between Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, providing new opportunities for conflict management. IGAD’s aspirations to build more effective conflict early warning and mitigation capacity are institutionalized in CEWARN, operational since 2003.

Despite its growing pains (discussed in Section 3.1), CEWARN remains an essential pillar in border conflict management. It routinizes intergovernmental response to conflicts; it remains the main generator of and repository for early warning reporting; and enjoys the strong support of key regional states, most notably Ethiopia. Without CEWARN, Ethiopia would be unlikely to invest in any other form of regional conflict early warning.

The most important aspect of regional conflict mitigation mechanisms in East Africa is the growing region-wide commitment to managing conflict and instability along borders. This, combined with some hopeful signs of improved levels of trust and cooperation between regional states, is reason to maintain support for existing regional institutions engaged in conflict early warning and mitigation.

5.1.3 DISTRICT OR PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES

Local government officials—the third pillar of crossborder diplomacy—play a part in both LPCs and CEWERUs. As discussed in Section 3, the evolving role of local government offices is important, but national and international support to this set of actors has been modest to date. Local government structures are changing across large portions of East Africa. Kenya, which shares some of the most volatile and strategic borders in all of East Africa—with Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania, and which shares boundaries in Lake Victoria with Uganda and Tanzania—is undergoing historic change. The new constitution is advancing a new form of political decentralization, by replacing the old system of provinces and districts with a new system of counties. The county boundaries have been drawn to correspond, roughly, to ethnic territories. In this sense, the new Kenyan system is a variation on the theme of ethno-federalism first introduced in the region in Ethiopia in 1994. The new county system will be led by governors elected from the county’s population, in contrast to the old provincial/district system, in which governors and commissioners were appointed by the central government. The counties will also be governed by an elected county assembly, and will have one senator for the new upper house or senate.

These changes are set to occur in late 2012 or early 2013, and could have a dramatic impact on crossborder conflict prevention and management. County leaders will now come from the local community and be expected to represent the interests of the local community. Because the counties have generally been drawn along ethnic lines, this means in essence that the county governor and other elected officials will be advancing ethnic interests in their crossborder management. This may or may not coincide with Kenyan national interests, and may or may not result in better borderland conflict management. The obvious danger is the parochialization of local government services. This could also complicate the governors’ coordinating role with central government entities such as the security sector which will be present and at times active on borderland conflict issues.

The imminent transformation of local government in Kenya is likely to have a major impact on borderland management across a critical part of East Africa. Ensuring that these new governors are trained in conflict prevention and management; socialized to work for the advancement of peace and not the narrow interests of their ethnic group; and encouraged to partner with CEWERU, local community leaders, and central government agencies is critical. This is a unique window of opportunity to establish and routinize responsible local government management of border conflict issues. If the window is not seized, an important pillar of crossborder conflict prevention and management in East Africa could become part of the problem rather than solution, and local administrations in Kenya will devote most of their energies to power struggles with groups they should be viewing as partners.

Related changes are occurring in two other regional states. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab is rapidly losing control of most of the country’s border areas, opening up space for local administrations to enjoy more autonomy, or for new local administrations to be set up. This is a pivotal moment and a window of opportunity for Somali
borderland governance. Likewise, in South Sudan, the new government is setting up local administration; these authorities will have had no experience in borderland diplomacy and conflict management, and would stand to benefit greatly from training and support.

5.1.4 LOCAL, REGIONAL, AND NATIONAL INTERESTS

Strengthening the three pillars in the Horn of Africa requires not only sound project design but a close understanding of the local, regional, and external interests in borderland conflict management. Those interests vary by actor and location, resulting in a predictable mix of motives to promote or undermine borderland governance and conflict management.

Central Governments

State interests in borderland conflict mitigation have shifted in recent years, a change that constitutes an important window of opportunity for regional transborder conflict management. Though some state rivalries continue to generate proxy wars in East Africa, governments have much greater interests today in resolving long-running sources of borderland conflicts, as was noted in Section 1.2.1. This observation is context specific—central government interests in borderland governance vary by actor and location. We have strong reason to believe that most of the governments across the Horn of Africa now have a strong commitment to borderland governance, and would be enthusiastic supporters of programs designed to strengthen the three pillars. A high degree of local ownership of this initiative would be the result. Even so, ensuring that key government actors buy in to the quest to understand and strengthen crossborder conflict management and prevention programs is critical, and will require tailored strategies in each location.

Ethiopian officials are openly concerned about the impending changes to local governance systems in its neighboring states, and expressed a strong interest in programs designed to help them understand and routinize relations with these new actors. In Somali border areas, the Ethiopian security sector has already forged close relations with crossborder administrations and militias, some of whom are Ethiopian proxies. Borderland conflict prevention programming on the Ethiopia-Somalia border would need to be done in very close coordination with the Ethiopian government.

The evolution in the Kenyan government’s attitude toward borderland conflict management has been dramatic; Kenya now devotes considerable political energies toward governance in its border areas. As noted earlier, the Lamu port project is placing a premium on security and development all along Kenya’s troubled northeast and northern border areas. The Kenyan government has demonstrated an especially strong interest in improving crossborder security along its border with Somalia, reflected in its unprecedented deployment of armed forces across the border to purge the southern Somali border area of Al-Shabaab. In the short term, Kenyan officials are likely to be preoccupied with the changes brought by the new constitution in 2012 and 2013, but are unlikely to object to any form of support and training to its new county authorities. It is also important to point out that some agencies of the central government—especially the security sector—will likely have a contested and possibly tense relation with new county governments as they work out their new division of labor, and powers struggles between the two over borderland issues are not out of the question. Any programming in border areas of Kenya will need to be attentive to this issue.

Both Ugandan and South Sudanese government officials interviewed for this study were not only enthusiastic about programming to strengthen conflict mitigation capacity in border areas, but urged USAID to prioritize the Karamoja and Sudan-South Sudan border areas.

Finally, the TFG in Somalia is difficult to predict as it will be ending its transition in mid-2012. What kind of government will succeed the TFG is as yet unknown, but presumably will maintain many of the same inclinations of the current government. The TFG has sent mixed messages about any effort to empower local government in its hinterlands. On the one hand, it is a federal system and embraces decentralization in theory. On the other hand, it has viewed almost every effort to strengthen local government as a threat to its power, seeing them—with some justification—as platforms for rival political groups. In consequence, the TFG is likely to be more jealously protective of prerogatives of a sovereign state—like crossborder diplomacy—and less enthusiastic about
programs intended to strengthen local governments’ capacity to manage crossborder conflict. At the same time the TFG is so weak that it is unlikely to be willing or able to block any such project.

The biggest obstacles related to states’ interests in the region are:

- **Intergovernmental distrust.** Regional governments are sometimes reluctant to share sensitive border intelligence with one another, and sometimes suspect that neighboring governments are colluding with local, violent, non-state actors rather than pursuing them;
- **Ethiopia’s discomfort with community-based organizations (CBOs) in neighboring countries.** The Ethiopian government works closely with CBOs on development issues but places restrictions on its own civic groups engaging directly in sensitive political and conflict issues, yet CBOs in some neighboring countries are principal partners in conflict early warning systems, creating difficulties in terms of lines of communication and protocol;
- **Entanglement of and subordination of borderland conflict management with broader diplomatic priorities between two neighboring states; and**
- **In a few instances, internal spoilers within state agencies—i.e., corrupt customs officials or security forces engaged in some form of crossborder criminality.**

**Local Government Authorities**

This is the “known-unknown” aspect of the project, especially with regard to the new county authorities in Kenya that will take positions of power at some point in late 2012. Presumably, local government authorities in border states will be keen to establish good working relations with these new county governors. But the Kenyan county governors may or may not view borderland conflict prevention and management as a top priority, at least initially. They are certain to be preoccupied with the major task of establishing an entirely new system of local governance, so their time will be limited. As newly minted local authorities overseeing a new and untested form of local government, they may be insecure and hence sensitive to external initiatives designed to provide them with training and guidance. In a worst-case scenario, new county governors will embark on parochial crossborder foreign policies designed to advance the interests of their ethnic group, fomenting conflict rather than building peace—exactly the scenario this program recommendation is designed to prevent.

**Local Civic Leadership and Communities**

Here again, the configuration of interests in pursuing borderland conflict prevention and mitigation programming is context specific. We can surmise that most border area communities and their civic leaders are stakeholders in strengthening crossborder security and peace. But program designers need to be attentive to the fact that in some border areas, community leaders are actively mobilizing for war as part of a cycle of communal violence or for access to water or land. There are also armed criminal elements which have no desire to see improvements in borderland governance and stability. These elements include a wide array of non-state actors, from smugglers of drugs, minerals, and guns to armed insurgencies such as the jihadi group Al-Shabaab.

### 5.1.5 PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that USAID’s regional mission take advantage of the unique window of opportunity in the Horn of Africa to expand its existing crossborder peace-building program along the Somali-Kenya border (currently known as Peace II). Specifically envisioned in this recommendation is a program with components designed to strengthen all three pillars of borderland governance and conflict mitigation in the Horn of Africa to actively foster and routinize cooperation between these three pillars.

The Peace II model along the Somali-Kenya border builds on the highly successful work of USAID in northern Kenya since the late 1990s, in support of local civic peace builders. Peace II has effectively expanded and refined that model and has built a strong network of civic conflict management along the border. It has also advanced a “peace dividend” approach along the border, encouraging shared use of valuable services (schools, health posts, markets) across the border. Southern Somalia is now in the midst of major political changes: the rollback of Al-Shabaab in border areas, and the end of the transitional government. This is a period when effective borderland
governance needs continued support. We recommend, as a result, that the Peace II project be extended along the Somali–Kenya border.

We also recommend that the Peace II model be extended across other parts of the northern Kenyan borderlands and possibly along the Ethiopia-South Sudan and the Sudan-South Sudan borders wherever local and central governments are amenable and as far as budgetary constraints will allow. The model may require adaptation in Ethiopian border areas due to restrictions on Ethiopian civic organizations, but this has already been managed with the CEWERUs. There are powerful reasons to believe that the Peace II model can improve border stability and security in these troubled border zones. This is especially true in the volatile Turkana border areas, an area we treat separately in an annex to this report (see Annex 2).

We further propose that the USAID regional mission fund training and support to local government authorities in border zones of the Horn of Africa where new types of local government systems are being put in place. This is especially important for borderlands of Kenya and of South Sudan. This program should include training and support for new local governments, opportunities for liaison with local government counterparts across the border, and partnership building with local civic groups and regional central governments.

Finally, we recommend continued and carefully calibrated support to the CEWARN system mechanism in IGAD. Despite frustration with some aspects of CEWARN’s performance, it remains an essential pillar of borderland peace building, and continued support to CEWARN is important to regional states such as Ethiopia. We suggest more attention and resources on specific capacity-building initiatives to strengthen monitoring and reporting mechanisms as well as systematic dissemination of this information to key stakeholders and groups responsible for border conflict prevention and management.

5.2 PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE REGIONAL MINERAL TRADE

For years, high-value, illicit, crossborder mineral trade emanating from DRC has been a major driver of conflict and instability, a source of funding for militias and regional criminal networks, and a driver of interventions by neighboring states in DRC. But today, conditions are changing as a confluence of factors is reshaping regional government interests. There is now a greater commitment to weakening or defeating armed groups, and to advancing systems of certification of conflict-free mineral exports. Livelihoods that rely on mineral trade are under great stress as armed actors look for new paths to foment their lucrative trade and smuggling networks. Donor strategies that seek bilateral solutions are unlikely to mitigate illicit trade and incentives for civilian predation as mineral trade and livelihoods are regional in nature. It is important that regional approaches, coordinated strategies, and security sector reform initiatives start creating policies and programs that parallel the path of trade and migration in the DRC sub-region. A sustainable and credible solution is to seek stronger host country partnerships and strengthen key regional bodies to act as interlocutors to monitor host country reform policies.

Mineral trade is an essential livelihood in the Great Lakes, and sustains over one million people in the region. These livelihoods are essential as they provide a lifeline to youth, women, and conflict-affected populations in areas often underserved by central governments. But the illegal extraction and trade of these minerals has been a powerful driver of conflict and instability across the Great Lakes border areas. Effective certification schemes to reduce mineral smuggling has the potential to advance multiple goals: conflict mitigation, human rights promotion, improved livelihoods, anti-corruption, and strengthening of government capacity and legitimacy.

Recommendations in this section suggest a program of support for regional initiatives to combat the illegal exploitation of conflict minerals. The following summarizes the proposed program components:

- First it is recommended that the mission provide support to the ICGLR Secretariat. Specifically, the mission should provide technical assistance and capacity building to the secretariat, with a focus on training technical staff and strengthening coordination with member states and among donors.
- Second, it is recommended that a mission program develop a strategic partnership with the ICGLR technical unit, the Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
(RINR), to ensure effective implementation of regional tools and frameworks, designed to formalize and harmonize mineral trade in the Great Lakes region.

- Third, it is recommended to strengthen **regional CSO networks** in collaboration with the ICGLR and its RIRN unit by promoting tripartite fora (government private sector and civil society) that build the capacity of these networks to actively participate in mining audits, verify the status of “conflict-free” mines, and provide more effective national and regional coordination on mineral trade issues that have the potential to prevent and mitigate conflict.

### 5.2.1 RESPONSIBLE MINERAL TRADE

All of our proposals and recommendations are aimed at strengthening the capacity of regional actors to build and sustain an effective regional certification system to promote responsible mineral trade that does not perpetuate and finance armed conflict. To ensure raw and processed minerals do not come from conflict-affected areas or are mined under conditions of conflict, regional and international actors are working to produce a comprehensive mineral tracking system. To ensure minerals do not originate in conflict areas, and that minerals have not been illegally transferred from one country to another, these in-country mineral tracking systems must be able to accurately track each sack or load of minerals from the mine or dig site through to the point of export. DRC authorities are already in the process of creating a tracking system capable of fulfilling this task. *Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small Scale Mining* (SAESSCAM), the DRC artisanal mining agency, uses paper forms to register and track bags of ore as they exit the mine site and travel to the trading center. From the trading center to the comptoir (buyer), the Division de Mines and SAESSCAM use a more comprehensive system of paper forms to track bags of ore (raw minerals) as they travel from the trading center to the buyer. During the export process, several DRC agencies examine the comptoir’s chain of documents to ensure that all the material being exported can be traced back to a known and approved mine site. Currently, DRC authorities signify their approval of these documents by issuing an export permit and a certificate of origin. Once the ICGLR system is in place, the certificate of origin can be replaced with an ICGLR regional certificate.

In reprocessing countries such as Rwanda, authorities may have to expand their tracking systems so that all minerals that exit a mine or artisanal dig can be tracked to a reprocessing center. Before allowing an export, Rwanda authorities will have to review these chain of custody documents for domestic production, as well as the ICGLR certificates for imported material, to ensure that the volume of material imported or bought locally matches the volume of material to be exported (taking processing losses into account). If all is in order, Rwandan authorities would then issue their own ICGLR regional certificate for the export. An intermediate country such as Rwanda would only issue its own ICGLR regional certificates in cases where an incoming shipment has been opened and the material reprocessed or combined, either with domestic production or with imported material from another shipment. For shipments that merely transit the country and are never opened, the certificate from the producing country will suffice.

The ICGLR regional certificates will serve as a recognized guarantee for states in the region that minerals were mined under acceptable conditions, in areas free of conflict, and have exited their country of origin in a legal chain with all dues and taxes paid. The ICGLR certificate will serve as the sole acceptable document for intra-regional mineral shipments—if a shipment has an ICGLR certificate, it can legally be imported, processed, and later re-exported. If a mineral shipment does not have an accompanying ICGLR certificate, it has not been legally exported, and cannot be legally processed, re-exported, or otherwise incorporated into the transit country’s mineral stream. A database at the ICGLR will track of mineral flows within the region, and exports to destinations outside Africa. At regular intervals, the flows in and out of producer areas, comptoirs, and countries will be balanced and reconciled, to account for all mineral flows within and from the region. Providing full public access to this data will serve as a guarantee to member governments—and to the wider consuming public—that all is well with Great Lakes mineral flows, and all minerals have been tracked and accounted for.

Independent third party audits are one of the key innovations in the ICGLR mineral tracking system. Conducted independently, the audits will provide a regular check that the sourcing and chain of custody procedures demanded by the system are being adequately followed by all actors in the mineral chain. The regular performance
of audits, and the publication of audit results, will cement the legitimacy of the ICGLR system in the eyes of end-users, consumers, civil society, and the international community. These audits and their transparency are an important part of the regional certification process as it will allow local and regional organizations, external auditors, and independent verification to ensure that standards are locally driven and national systems are transparent to stakeholders concerned with the access of minerals by armed actors and other belligerents.

5.2.2 BUILDING REGIONAL RESPONSE CAPACITY

ICGLR has been leading efforts in the Great Lakes region to address the illegal exploitation of minerals from a regional perspective and in collaboration with member states through legally binding protocols. This regional organization is essential for collaboration, accountability, and host country ownership. ICGLR has worked since 2006 to strengthen host country and regional awareness of the connection between illicit and illegal exploitation of minerals by armed actors, and human rights abuses and SGBV. Through member state collaboration, bilateral donor support, and interregional cooperation with other African regional partners, this organization is working to provide new governance tools for regional harmonization and technical capacity building for member states on due diligence and mineral trade accountability and tracking in the region.

The ICGLR is a relatively new organization with an ambitious mandate in a troubled region. The ICGLR effectively came into existence on 15 December 2006 when the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region was signed in Nairobi by the heads of state of Angola, Burundi, CAR, Republic of Congo, DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.

The ICGLR Secretariat has limited resources compared to its extensive mandate. Established in Bujumbura in 2007, the secretariat is primarily funded by membership fees (modeled after the African Union), and headed by an Executive Secretary assisted by a Deputy Executive Secretary and Senior Program Officer. This leadership team is supported by an administrative staff of 15 people and nine program officers covering the issues of peace and security, democracy and good governance, economic development and regional integration, social issues, and crosscutting programs. The secretariat is therefore the technical day-to-day body of the ICGLR.

Capacity for fulfilling technical functions for the RINR unit is weak within the ICGLR, and rotational assignments by staff also make movement on key initiatives difficult. The RINR initiative is very new, so strong regional vision and partnership are essential. In theory, at least part of the capacity problem is solved by the national coordinating mechanisms in the member countries. These are the national counterparts to the secretariat, and are therefore the bodies responsible for implementation of action. In most cases, these mechanisms are integral units of the respective member countries’ foreign ministries. Two technical advisers are provided by the GIZ (for the Regional Project on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resource Exploitation) and by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Our research concluded that additional technical and training support to the ICGLR and RINR has the potential to strengthen a critical set of institutions at a pivotal moment in the quest to regulate conflict minerals.

5.2.3 COORDINATION AND NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL MECHANISMS

Recent changes in national-level policies relating to mining provide indications that there are increased incentives for national-level governments to create tools for more accountable and transparent trade in the region. In the past two years, several countries in the Great Lakes region have revised their mining codes and policies; this shows increased regional and national-level collaboration on these issues, as policy frameworks seek to formalize trade and extraction issues. External pressure to conform to international as well as national standards adopted by other African countries with mineral extraction accountability issues is also on the rise. In areas of a country such as eastern DRC, where mining areas are as large as neighboring countries (Rwanda and Burundi combined), the monitoring of mines and their extraction conditions can be a daunting task to local and national government officials.

National and local government officials play a vital role in supporting more responsible mineral trade and severing the links between armed groups, human rights abuses, and control of conflict minerals. Regional organizations are
only effective when national-level collaboration is supported by clear implementation strategies and effective national policy by member states. Often there is political will, but capacity, resources, and transparent systems of collaboration take time to establish, especially when member states may require internal advocacy as well as external support to fully adopt harmonized frameworks and approaches.

To ensure implementation of its projects and protocols, the ICGLR brings together experts and authorities from its member states to meet on a regular basis. Twice every year, the Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee (RIMC) and the Executive Board of the ICGLR assess the progress made among member states. On the national level, each of the member states has put in place a national coordination mechanism, which includes technical mining experts as well as representatives of civil society, women, and youth, to ensure the follow up and implementation of decisions made by heads of state and the RIMC. This allows a structure to monitor and hold member states accountable on the implementation of tools supported by the RINR initiative and creates internal constituencies that can further pressure national governments to adhere to more responsible and conflict-free mineral trade.

5.2.4 STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT

Civil society is an essential part of creating more responsible mineral trade in the Great Lakes region. An important function of mine certification is independent third party auditing, which is essential to ensure equitable, system-wide effectiveness and credibility. It is proposed that this auditing committee be comprised of government, industry representatives, and civil society to ensure independence and credibility for established rating systems for mines. One of the most critical elements of the ICGLR mineral tracking and certification scheme is transparency. Transparency is essential for the system to have legitimacy with member governments, civil society, end users, consumers, and the public. As part of the RCM, data and mineral flows as well as third party audits will be made public via the ICGLR database. This information will be accessible to civil society groups and networks to ensure that accountability and advocacy is built into the RCM system for national and regional stakeholders.

5.2.5 PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS

Our recommendations call for the regional mission to expand its programming into the Great Lakes region by providing support for regional responses working to combat the negative impacts of illegal exploitation of conflict minerals:

- First, our study points to opportunities for USAID/EA to support institutional strengthening of ICGLR, which is playing a critical role as a source of accountability and implementation monitoring of regional states’ agreements addressing trade of conflict minerals. In particular, we see opportunities to provide support to the ICGLR Secretariat to improve donor coordination, and the RINR technical unit to ensure effective implementation of regional tools and frameworks, designed to formalize and harmonize mineral trade in the Great Lakes region. In addition, this program could include training and capacity building for members of the Regional Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee to ensure that harmonized approaches and tools comply with regional and international standards regarding conflict-free mining.

- Second, it is recommended that the mission support country-level pilot initiatives utilizing the RCM or other tools of the RINR that promote accountability and transparency between citizens and government. This component could include assistance with the development of the third party auditing system to strengthen collaboration between civil society, industry, and local governments in conflict-affected mining areas. This would include technical support and training for local government officials and CSO networks to participate in mining audits to verify the status of “conflict-free” mines. This will support local and national initiatives that encourage regional replication of best mining practices and approaches that mitigate conflict, prevent human rights abuses, and increase employment.

- Third, we recommend that a component of this program strengthen national CSOs and their regional networks to promote increased citizen engagement in public campaigns supporting conflict-free mining practices. This could include support for watchdog approaches, community-based monitoring systems, or early warning systems that allow citizens to report abuses in conflict-affected mining areas and in
exploitive mining practices. Working to support CSOs and their networks can contribute to regional awareness campaigns (by CSOs and local media) on improved mining practices and standards at the local and national levels, particularly in conflict-affected and high risk border areas.

The following are some specific project activity level recommendations geared to training and support of youth and women in order of priority. These suggestions were made by several civil society groups during the field work and interviews as well as by staff and stakeholders of the ICGLR.

- **Support regional fora that highlight the role of civil society collaboration.** Significant mistrust and prejudice exists across ethnic and diaspora groups in the Great Lakes region. Supporting shared fora with civil society activists and leaders from the region to exchange tools, approaches, and ideas is essential in increasing regional accountability and building strong models that encourage regional stability and peace. Human rights abuses, mineral exploitation, and massive displacement has created an environment of weak civil society in eastern DRC, but the value of their experience is a lesson for the region. Creating safe spaces and regional exchange networks to ensure greater peer collaboration and alliances may help to strengthen transparency between civil society and national governments and create regional pressure to sustain reform and change in the region.

- **Establish a fund for women and youth.** A principal problem impeding the ability of youth to participate in advocacy and national and regional efforts on mineral conflict issues is a lack of resources in which to implement program ideas and to take part in regional and national exchanges with other youth. A large number of women and youth are eager to learn about, undertake training in, and implement activities related to promoting their participation in policy debates, mineral sector reform issues, and civil society monitoring of illegal and illicit trade and human rights infractions by negative forces in the region. A special fund that would award grants on a competitive basis to support the most innovative and realistic projects in the region and link women and youth more distinctly in mineral trade and conflict issues would not only benefit the youth and women involved, but also regional policymakers.

- **Media targeted for women and youth.** One useful way to mainstream women and youth is to create greater understanding and recognition of the role they play in creating change and working across national and regional differences. Support could be provided to media to cover, interpret, and explain activities by women and youth groups. Women and youth could also be the beneficiaries of training on how to work with the media to articulate their interests, as well as how to create their own media through social networking, and participate in the mainstream media with an emphasis on regional sharing of initiatives, interethnic collaboration, and civil society initiatives aimed at supporting more responsible mineral trade and access.
ANNEX 1: LESSONS LEARNED

Regional transboundary conflict assessments (hereafter RCAs) are intrinsically difficult and more complex than conventional country-based conflict assessments. The team found that they had to consider community dynamics, the role of government at both local and national levels, transborder influences, and regional actors. The multiple levels of analysis challenges were handled in the document by the three pillar approach that was used to link the analysis and recommendations.

SUMMARY

- Regional assessments may require more time for the desk study period and the prioritization of key issues than do country assessments.
- USAID may want to consider developing a system to weight a basket of indicators of conflict issues (scale, scope, trajectory, etc.) for the critical process of comparing conflict issues and determining which are of greatest importance in a region. This eliminates the need to reinvent the wheel on a complex methodological exercise each time a regional assessment is conducted.
- Our findings suggested that future emphasis could be placed on programming options that transcend specific conflict issues and that provide a means of strengthening local resilience across multiple conflict issues.
- Researchers should treat USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF 2.0) as a tool, not as doctrine. The framework has great utility, but also significant limitations when applied to regions as opposed to countries.
- We found that annexes were valuable tools to capture good program recommendations regarding conflict issues which were explored but did not make the final cut. This was how the team treated the water conflict issue area.

1.0 LEVEL OF EFFORT AND TIME CONSTRAINTS

- Adequate time and knowledge is needed for completion of the early phase of the assessment—logistical planning and desk study. Many critical decisions have to be made at the outset of the assessment, at a time when the research team is least equipped to make an informed decision. Ensuring that adequate time is provided to make informed decisions in early phases of the project is critical. This type of study involves multiple teams of researchers traveling to multiple sites in multiple countries and considerable time is needed to make the logistical arrangements as far in advance as possible.
- Some tasks in the first phase of the study could be done simultaneously, but others were unavoidably sequential. This created bottlenecks which at times forced us to rush decisions. For instance, prioritization of conflict issues could not be done until a short-list of conflict issues was established; selection of the top three conflict issues could not be done until we completed the process of weighing and prioritizing the short-list; and much of the logistical and planning work had to wait until the final three conflict issues were selected, teams assembled, and sites for fieldwork identified. This was a lot to accomplish in a short period of time.

2.0 METHODOLOGY CHALLENGES

The study contained a number of challenging methodological problems.

1. **Definitional challenges.** The study was tasked with assessing both conflict and instability issues. Violent conflict was adequately defined, but instability is a very broad term, which raised the question of whether the assessment was essentially a conflict analysis or a democracy and governance assessment.
“Transborder” versus domestic conflict and instability also proved complex, since almost all domestic instability in the region spilled over into neighboring countries. The focus on conflict issues left unanswered whether we were to focus on the actual conflicts (the dependent variable) or the drivers of those conflicts (the independent variables). As a result, some team members proposed actual transborder conflicts for our short-list (such as the LRA, or the Darfur conflict) while others proposed drivers of conflict and instability (such as water control, land access, conflict minerals, and crime).


- The task of devising a means for weighing and comparing the impact and severity of very different types of transborder conflict and sources of instability was fraught with methodological problems. The team handled this by producing a weighted basket of indicators for criteria to measure the impact and import of each conflict issue, but we were well aware that the process involved a certain element of “false precision.” It would be helpful if USAID developed a standard suggested template (stressing that each team can and should customize the template as they see fit) for weighing a basket of indicators to help RCAs compare the relative importance and impact of conflict issues.
- Because we had so many conflict issues to consider and little time, the team divided the issues up to research and weigh. That was time-efficient but produced results which were predictably skewed by different interpretations of the weighing of indicators.
- Quantitative methods of weighing conflict issues should be used as the point of departure for ranking of the issues, but ultimately the group should render an informed, qualitative judgment about which conflict issues merit further exploration.

3.0 APPLICATION OF A CONFLICT ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The CAF 2.0 is primarily designed for country assessments. It presumes that the assessment can produce generalizations about certain issues (governance, society, etc.) that vary far too much across a wider region. Governance trends in Ethiopia, for instance, have little to do with governance trends in Somalia. The team struggled with the fact that the CAF 2.0 was one of only three relevant frameworks for our study; we were also dealing with instability related to governance issues (so various democracy and governance frameworks came into play) and instability and conflict produced from violent extremism (bringing the Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism into the picture). The Inter-agency Conflict Assessment Framework was also of use. All four were helpful, but used together were not fully consistent as a framework for analysis.

All agreed that the emphasis of the CAF 2.0 on local resilience was helpful in identifying programming opportunities, but some found the emphasis on resilience a bit disconcerting in a region where too often local communities and their coping mechanisms have been overwhelmed by powerful forces of violence. The greater emphasis in the CAF 1.0 on political economy conflict drivers (spoilers, “greed-based” violence) was in some parts of East Africa of greater analytic utility. It may be helpful to consider some conditions under which elements from CAF 1.0 could mitigate some of this tension between the two frameworks.

4.0 FIELDWORK

Site selection is a critical decision in an RCA, as regions are vast and so only a small sample of sites can be visited. Site selection could not be considered until the final three conflict issues were selected, so this decision had to be made toward the end of the desk study and before the fieldwork, in our case a narrow period of time. Selection bias or sample bias is a serious risk in this context, especially across large regions with significant variation in conditions. In a three-week fieldwork period, with at least one week devoted to “bookend” meetings at the outset and the end of the research, teams can realistically visit only a few sites. Otherwise too much time is lost to travel days. Longer periods of time for fieldwork should be considered for future RCAs.

5.0 PRIORITIZATION OF ISSUES

A critical part of the process is the request for the research team to reduce the number of conflict issues to prioritize from three to two, a decision made by the group at the end of the fieldwork. It may be that this request
was unique to East Africa and may not be replicated elsewhere, but if it is, it raises some important questions that we had to address as a group. First, on the basis of what criteria is one conflict issue dropped? We ended up dropping water conflict on the advice of the team tasked with that topic, but were acutely aware that we could have faced a difficult situation in which the three research teams all returned from their fieldwork as strong advocates for prioritizing their conflict issue. We ended up privileging two conflict issues based in large measure on the feasibility of the programming recommendations we came up with during the fieldwork. This was entirely justifiable, but it again underscored how the “feasibility” criteria ultimately trumped other criteria in the conflict assessment.

The dropping of one conflict issue also raised the vexing question of what to do with all of the fieldwork and other research that had been conducted on the topic, and what to do with the time of two members of the team whose topic had been eliminated after weeks of fieldwork and research. Our solution was twofold. First, we decided to post in an annex to the main report a series of short, two to three page program options and ideas from water that did not make the final cut but which we believed had merit and might be of use for USAID or other donors now or in the future. For example, we included in the annex a short proposal for a conflict mitigation project in Lake Turkana, where two communities are engaged in increasingly lethal crossborder clashes over a shrinking lake and its fisheries. This approach proved to be an easy and useful innovation we think could be replicated in other RCAs. It also gave the regional mission some fallback proposals for programming in the event that our two program recommendations were, for whatever reason, not possible or advisable.
ANNEX 2: WATER TEAM
NOTES

This paper captures insights on water stresses and conflict in East Africa. The analysis is based on desk study and fieldwork conducted on the topic as part of the RCA conducted in November and December 2011. Water-related conflict was one of three issue areas identified for in-depth exploration, but water conflict was subsequently dropped as part of a process by which only two conflict issues were proposed for USAID programming. This annex is meant to ensure valuable field observations on water conflicts were captured for future use by USAID or other water- or natural resource management (NRM)-related programming in regional bilateral missions.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Water is an unusual conflict issue in that it often flows across local and international borders, and when it presents itself in large quantities in lakes, seas and rivers, is treated as a public good rather than as private property. Access to water is also extraordinarily time-sensitive for most plant and animal life, and certainly to human survival. Finally, water access is essential in creating or increasing the value and utility of farmland and rangeland, so that it is difficult to disaggregate conflict over land and conflict over water. These features alone create powerful incentives for adjacent communities and states to develop routinized cooperation over water access, rights, and management. The consequences of a breakdown in water management—denial of water access—are immediately catastrophic for livelihoods. Consequently, water has generally functioned as a convening element, promoting systems of collaboration for management purposes.

Local and crossborder systems of water management can and do break down under certain circumstances. These include rapid shortages produced by severe drought; long-term reduction of water sources produced by climate change; sudden diversion of water for alternative usage, typically in the form of dams, irrigation, or urban consumption; increased demand caused by growth in human and animal populations; privatization of previously public water supplies; and large-scale population displacement, migration, or occupation which introduce new communities and new demands for access to water. All of these factors are at play in parts of East Africa, straining the capacity of local communities and states to maintain cooperative management of crossborder water supplies. This highlighted the need for close understanding of the resilience of existing water management systems in East African border areas. Are they durable enough to withstand the mounting pressures of reduced water supplies, growing demand, and an increase in diversion? Or could some be approaching a tipping point at which local systems of water conflict management are overwhelmed? These questions both informed our field research and underscore the importance of context-specific knowledge of each water conflict area.

Our desk study established that, while a vibrant debate exists over the likelihood of water becoming a source of conflict and instability, most analysts concur that water stress is more likely to serve as a contributing rather than sole driver of conflict; that the threat of interstate water wars has to date been overstated; and water is generally a source of routinized cooperation or managed conflict; and that institutions and agreements around water use and management are primary, though not exclusive, reasons for successful conflict management over crossborder water sources.

A survey of existing tensions and in some instances actual conflicts over borderland water sources in East Africa produced the following inventory:

- Increase in water flow over the Owen Falls Dams, reducing the water levels of Lake Victoria;
- Upstream farming runoff in the upper Mara River polluting downstream Mara River and Lake Victoria;
Disputes over fishing rights around Lake Victoria islands;
- Significant shrinkage of Lake Turkana, reducing access to fish and creating violent communal clashes over rights and access as the lake’s valuable marshlands move southward into Kenya;
- Cattle destroying farming land near water sources, especially during dry spells;
- Reduced water levels affecting wildlife and therefore those whose livelihoods depend on the national parks and tourism;
- Big upstream interests siphoning off or polluting water, such as large flower growers or gold mines;
- Damming of rivers in Ethiopia for hydro-electricity and irrigated agriculture, creating fears on the part of downstream users of reduced access;
- Clear cutting in the Mau Forest, polluting and affecting the runoff of the Mara River;
- Pollution into Lake Victoria from multiplying and unregulated human habitation along the lake’s edge;
- Timber harvesting near riverbanks for charcoal, destroying water retention capacity and increasing runoff;
- Lack of adherence to regulations (such as net size) allowing violators to take fish illegally, skewing both current and future productivity; and
- Unresolved interstate disputes over allocation of Nile waters.

The team’s findings include these points:

1. **Grievances are about threats to livelihoods.** Disputes over water are largely about threats to livelihoods, not identity related to ethnicity, tribal affiliation, or nationality.

2. **Transboundary grievances are largely not based on national identity.** Where water conflicts cross borders, it is more an accident of geography and the nature of water as a transboundary entity than a specific harboring of grievances based on national identity. But when water conflicts happen to break out along ethnic lines and produce large-scale loss of life, ethnic mobilization exacerbates the conflict and “hardens” identity politics.

3. **Serious imminent threat of regional instability or interstate conflict over water is not foreseen.** Though interstate tensions are chronic over usage and control of the Nile River and several of the East African Great Lakes, regional governments appear committed to managing these peacefully, and possess capable regional institutions to reinforce cooperation. This is also true of bilateral relations over crossborder water sources.

4. **Several local water conflicts do, however, threaten the stability of critical border areas and merit attention.** One such volatile area subject to localized violence over resource competition is around Lake Turkana, a case accorded separate treatment in Annex 3. Lake Albert offers a similar case where reduced fish stock combined with new developments around exploitation of oil reserves could conceivably agitate relations between Ugandans and Congolese.

5. **Institutions are fundamental to conflict mitigation.** Whether water or other stresses ultimately descend into conflict depends a great deal on the presence of effective institutions at the local and national levels to address the issues. As posited, institutions serve as a moderating force that engenders cooperation over conflict. Existing regional, sub-regional, and local institutions appear able to address near-term water-related conflicts within their purview. Where such institutions exist in the region, violence over water is rare. The converse also seems true: in watersheds such as Lake Turkana, Lake Albert, and the Shabelle and Juba Rivers that have no agreement over water use, conflict and the risk of violence appear to be greater.

6. **Water-related institutions are deemed legitimate and effective.** Institutional strategies and trajectories appear valid at both the transboundary and regional levels. Most are still largely in the development phase and are growing in extant, capacity, and legitimacy: The Lake Victoria Basin Commission in particular, used naming and shaming among peers as a prime motivator for engagement and cooperation. Most interviewees believe that the institutions are legitimate, represent their interests, and are largely effective at managing water issues. While water-related institutions mitigate water disputes, they do not help to mitigate other problems, with the possible exception of related natural resources or...
land management issues. Some socio-political institutions such as tribal fora may also variously address specific water conflicts.

7. **Information sharing and participation is critical.** Institutional sharing of information is viewed as an essential ingredient to successful conflict mitigation at all levels. This includes collection of critical data, such as the placement of scientific measuring instruments in Lake Victoria, the multitude of independent studies conducted by the Lake Victoria Basin Commission to garner member agreement over technical issues, or investigations into allegations of poisoning and pollution (e.g., Barrick Gold Mine contamination of the Mara River and runoff from upstream farmers silting the river basin). It also entails full disclosure and equal dissemination of collected data to all interests. The transmission of the gold mine investigation results, for example, did not include allow for public review and thus was discredited. Members’ shared access to the latest data, on the other hand, is recognized as one of the uniting factors within the Lake Victoria Basin Commission. The corollary to data collection is the participation of local stakeholders in all levels of discussion. This is admittedly lacking within the Lake Victoria Basin Commission, which acknowledges complaints about the dearth of public involvement at the lowest levels.

8. **Serious economic impact of environmental degradation and climate change could prompt incentive to act on existing water conflicts.** Increasing regional environmental pressures could have serious implications on the economy and on livelihoods. These include climate change, lake level reduction, overfishing, lake and river pollution, hyacinths in Lake Victoria, and diversion of water necessary for wildlife. The general consensus is that governments and elite interests will be compelled to act when the economic impact is felt at the highest levels.

9. **Obstacles remain to effective transboundary water-based conflict mitigation.** A number of impediments constrain the region’s ability to manage crossborder water conflicts. First, the lack of transboundary agreements in some areas obviously deters conflict mitigation. Lake Turkana, as mentioned, is one example, as is the Shabelle-Jubba River Basins and Lake Albert. Second, the lack of common standards and policies between neighboring states creates disparity in approaches. All adjoining and regional water institutions struggle with the lack of “harmonization” in water laws and practices between states. This is a topic of much discussion among members in the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and the LVBC and between government entities. Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have relatively new catchment-based water legislation that each is in the midst of developing and implementing. Efforts between them are coordinated but are not joint, in part because the variances in the new institutions alone often make it difficult to find common ground. For example, Kenya’s political devolution is empowering a lower institutional authority level (counties) that will seek to collaborate across borders with state agencies of higher stature. Another example is the gap between neighboring countries’ human and animal activity restriction zones along all water sources—Kenya and Tanzania’s is 60-meters, Uganda’s is 200 meters, and DRC has none at all. Third, even given sound, harmonized regional policies, lack of implementation capacity due to poor governance (capacity, abuse, will) is a major impediment to addressing water issues effectively. Fourth, the ability of violators or those engaged in a dispute to retreat across the border can hinder dispute resolution. This is a factor around Lake Turkana and was a serious issue on Lake Victoria at one point until the LVBC convened the states involved who agreed to forswear impunity. Finally, as member organizations, the structure of the multi-lateral water institutions requires all relationships with water users and subsequent complaints to go through high level ministerial, policy-centrist national focal points to subsidiary operational bodies. This removes the public from direct participation, is cumbersome, and extends the time required to solve disputes.

**RESILIENCIES**

Our research confirms that effective regional institutions are critical in successful management of water conflicts. Water institutions have expanded to address rising needs and new issues in two ways. First, the membership within institutions continues to grow. South Sudan is assertively seeking membership in the EAC, Rwanda and Burundi will become members of the LVBC this year, water user associations are proliferating in Tanzania and Kenya, and new water user groups are continuing to spring up. Second, the capacity of the institutions to address
arising issues is growing, which, in turn, increases the credibility and reach of the collective institutional ability to tackle grievances. What is not clear is, whether these budding institutions will increase their capacities and presence quickly enough to manage rising water stresses. For example, the Transboundary Water Resources Users Forum (formulated under USAID/EA REGI’s transboundary water program) still needs to situate itself firmly within the LVBC, and planned water user associations in Tanzania have been slow to develop due to lack of funds within the Ministry of Water. Making matters worse, some donor funding, especially from Sweden, is ending. It is also unclear how areas without credible institutions will be able to develop agreements and arrangements to address future water stresses.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR USAID PROGRAMMING

The following are potential areas for USAID regional programming resulting from this study on water:

Regional Conflict Management and Governance (RCMG)

- **Support for Water-based Institutions and Basin Initiatives.** Given the pivotal role institutions play in reducing the potential for an escalation of conflict, RCMG might play a supporting role in the development of such organizations where they do not exist and offer minimal but timely capacity assistance to those that do. The largest forum is the basin initiative that convenes stakeholders around a particular watershed. Lake Turkana, Lake Albert, and the Shebelle/Jubba Rivers are prime locations where USAID might leverage diplomatic resources to catalyze such efforts and then provide opportunistic support drawing on the examples of other successful basin agreements.

- **Conflict Mitigation around Lake Turkana.** This area warrants monitoring for water-related violence and further investigation. Programmatically, the team has suggested an RCMG project under the annex that would help local institutions engage more effectively across the border.

Democracy and Governance

- **Government Capacity Building at the Local Level.** Capable local institutions can be a major contributor to both conflict mitigation and water management. In Tanzania, for example, the water authorities appeared to have exceptional will but limited budgets with which to work. Interviewees at all levels repeatedly identified fraud and corruption as factors undermining their ability to address water issues.

- **Support for Harmonization.** The lack of synchronization of national laws and policies across borders was one of the prime obstacles to water-related conflict mitigation. Small, surgical projects aimed at garnering agreement between regional members (as in the LVBC) or across national boundaries to standardize approaches could reap vital rewards ahead of periods of even greater water stress.

REGI

- **Continued Support for TWB-MRB.** The REGI-supported Transboundary Water for Biodiversity and Human Health in the Mara River Basin program between Tanzania and Kenya has set transboundary water management in motion. The Transboundary Water Resources Users Forum, in particular, is in its infancy under the LVBC and, although in good hands, is at risk of losing its momentum while LVBC tries to determine where it best fits in its structure. Relatively short-term continued capacity building support might be all it needs to establish it permanently as a locus for cross-boundary water management.

- **Water Trade.** As attention to water use becomes the focus of increased international attention, support to governments to better assess and deal with their larger water economy, water budgeting, and the concept of virtual water could offer significant longer-term solutions with relatively minimal input (within the Nile Basin alone, 90% of trade is with countries outside the Basin). This would likely take the form of capacity building on a government, joint, or regional level.

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• **Payment for Environmental Services (PES).** The concept of downstream users paying upstream users for water conservation is new and building momentum within natural resources management discourse. On a smaller scale, REGI (or bilateral Missions) could support this through community arrangements; on a more ambitious level, it might be a solution to some of the contention over the Mara River or even the Nile water.

**Bilateral Missions**

• **Rainwater Harvesting.** Given the problematic issues with ground water and river water collection, rainwater harvesting is the new buzzword in many areas and has become the hoped-for regional solution to water shortages. Assuming it has environmental and fiscal sustainability, it could encourage regional economic growth.
ANNEX 3: LAKE TURKANA BORDER CONFLICT

This section represents an additional point of analysis that came out of the Water Team’s research in the field. This analysis is presented as additional information USAID/EA as it seemed important to capture the current state of conflict in the Lake Turkana border area.

Communal clashes in the Lake Turkana area have constituted one of the most lethal, intractable, and complex border conflicts in the Karamoja cluster. The conflict involves multiple borders—a contested and overlapping communal boundary between the Turkana and Dessenes people; the poorly demarcated state border between Kenya and Ethiopia, which is roughly but not entirely co-terminus with the Turkana-Dessenes boundary; and a livelihoods boundary involving valuable fishing areas in the marshlands where the River Omo flows into Lake Turkana. This latter boundary is the most complex. In the past, the Dessenes were the primary if not sole group engaged in fishing in northern Lake Turkana, which has historically been located in the southernmost border areas of Ethiopia. However, the shrinking of Lake Turkana in recent years has meant that the marshlands are now located almost entirely on what most people believe to be the Kenyan side of the border. Meanwhile, the Turkana people have since the 1970s become increasingly involved in fishing as a livelihood.

This combination of factors makes the Lake Turkana conflict a “critical case”—one which involves contested state, ethnic, and livelihood borders, and a shrinking water source access to which is a matter of existential importance to local actors. Successful conflict mitigation programming in Lake Turkana would not only yield immediate benefits to local communities and eliminate a source of tension between Kenya and Ethiopia; it could also serve as a model for other instances of water conflict management where standing bodies of water are shrinking due to overuse, upstream diversion, or climate change. For that reason we include this case in the annex to the report, as a background paper and potential project proposal for future use to USAID or another donor agency.

The grievance narratives of the two groups, and their respective governments, offer little room for compromise at present. For the Turkana, they believe they have every right to fish the marshlands, and invoke citizenship and sovereignty to make the claim that the Dessenes are Ethiopians illegally fishing in Kenyan waters and engaging in crossborder attacks on Kenyan fishermen. On the lake, the Turkana accuse the Dessenes of cutting the fishing nets, attacking fishing boats, and killing Turkana fishermen. They argue as well that the Dessenes launch land-based raids on the Turkana not only to steal their cattle and drive them out of valuable rangeland, but also to kill a Turkana as part of a rite of passage for young Dessenes men. Both the Turkana and the Kenyan security forces on the border complain that the Dessenes have even raided the Kenyan police stations near the border. Both the Kenyan authorities and the local Turkana community are convinced that the Dessenes are armed and backed by the Ethiopian military as a “local protection force.” As a result, they argue, the Ethiopian government is not so much seeking to control and manage border conflict, but is indirectly a party to the dispute. Finally, Kenyan authorities complain that their Ethiopian counterparts have consistently postponed final demarcation of the border at Lake Turkana. This latter claim is disputed by Ethiopian authorities in Addis Ababa, but if true fits

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54 Most of the fisheries in the Lake are concentrated in these marshlands; fishing is poor in the rest of the Lake.
55 The obligation for a young Dessenes man to kill a member of a rival ethnic group as a rite of passage is contested. The Ethiopian anthropologist interviewed in this research argued that it is no longer is required and is not common, but concede that such a skillling does bestow special honor on the perpetrator.
into a much bigger pattern of “intentional ambiguity” on border demarcation that is a practice many regional
governments have employed.

The Dessenesh grievance narrative is, predictably, quite different.\textsuperscript{56} They argue that the marshlands are theirs,
regardless of the ebb and flow of Lake Turkana. They—as well as some Ethiopian officials—are unwilling to
concede that the lake’s northern end has actually shrunk into Kenyan territory. Dessenesh also argue that they live
on both sides of the border, and cannot be depicted only as Ethiopians; some have Kenyan ID cards to prove this
(though such cards are relatively easy to procure from corrupt officials). They see the Turkana as aggressors, a
larger and more powerful group pushing them out of an essential livelihood. Making matters worse, the
Dessenesh are also under growing pressure along parts of the Omo River in Ethiopia, thanks to the alienation of
tens of thousands of hectares of riverine land for irrigated agricultural schemes. The Dessenesh see themselves as
a small and endangered community, facing much stronger and larger forces on all their flanks, and question how
they could in these circumstances be the aggressors. The Ethiopian government is sympathetic to their cause. Its
officials argue that conflict management in the border area has been made more difficult because Kenyan security
forces are actively complicit in commercialized cattle raiding, and hence unwilling to return stolen livestock.
Ethiopian officials also argue that the dominance of Kenyan community-based organizations in local conflict
management makes for an unreliable crossborder partner, as these local are, in Ethiopia’s view, corrupt and
sometimes led by individuals who have a vested interest in fomenting conflict. They are, in one official’s words, in
the “conflict business.” Finally, the Ethiopian government concedes that it provides support to local protection
forces in areas like Lake Turkana, because the Ethiopian military is deployed in other, higher priority borders. But
they claim that the local protection force in Dessenesh areas is under the control of local government, and is at
any rate outgunned by the much larger Turkana group, which forms part of vibrant small-arms trade through
northern Kenya, south Sudan, and northern Uganda.

The two ethnic groups also clash over pasture, watering holes, rite of passage killings, and cattle raiding across the
entire stretch of communal borders in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia. These clashes have a much longer
history than the dispute over Lake Turkana fishing, but at present the violence over Lake Turkana is the main
preoccupation of both groups, even those who live a considerable distance from the Lake.

For both communities, maintaining rights to the rangeland and the fisheries is increasingly a matter of existential
importance, as population levels rise and livelihoods come under increasing stress.

The actual fatalities in these clashes tend to be concentrated in carefully planned, periodic raids. In August 2011,
for instance, at least 13 people were killed in an ambush on the Kenyan side of the border area at Todanyang.
CEWERU field staff report and investigate these incidents, and encounter very different interpretations of the
attacks in the two communities.

The chronic insecurity in the border area has resulted in both communities abandoning large stretches of valuable
pasture land in contested zones. In Lake Turkana, an entire community of Turkana in Todanyang has been
displaced and is temporarily living to the south.

In the past, the two communities enjoyed better relations. Elders recall a time when the two negotiated access to
common rangeland, engaged in small-scale trade, and intermarried. Today, relations are much more estranged,
and virtually no opportunities exist to communicate on a routine basis. Unlike the Kenyan border areas with
Ethiopia and Somalia to the east (Moyale, Mandera, El Wak, Dadaab, etc.), there are few settlements near the
Turkana border where the two communities can meet. This deprives the two communities of an opportunity to
share border resources such as health posts and markets—a tool that has been used with some success in peace
building in other borderlands in the region. The border areas are also “out of network” for Kenyan or Somali cell
phone services, further reducing the ability of community leaders to communicate. High frequency radios have
been provided to these communities but in at least one site were not in useable condition at the time of our visit.

\textsuperscript{56} The team was unable to travel into southern Ethiopia; this summary of the Dassenesh narrative is derived from interviews with
Ethiopian government officials who worked in the area and an Ethiopian anthropologist who has done extensive fieldwork among the
Dessenesh.
In the aftermath of communal violence, peace accords have been brokered, but community leaders complain that they often lasted only for days or weeks before a new incident occurred. Very high level of distrust and low levels of confidence in one another’s commitment to peace is a major constraint. During our fieldwork, Turkana community leaders were so aggrieved that they expressed no interest in talks with a group that they have concluded, rightly or wrongly, has no interest in peace.

The most active agent for conflict management in the area at present is the Kenyan district commissioner and his Ethiopian counterparts at both the woreda and state levels. They routinely meet at the border to discuss conflicts and maintain communication, and coordinate with state security forces in the areas (Kenyan security forces are currently in the area in large numbers, including the police, army, and General Service Unit). The district commissioner of North Turkana expressed genuine concern that the impending administrative changes to a county system could produce an elected local government that was captured by Turkana interests and hence could lose its role as an honest broker of borderland disputes.

We concluded that the Lake Turkana conflict is likely to grow much worse in coming years unless a sustained solution is brokered. The combination of shrinking, vital water resources, rising populations, cycles of communal violence, breakdown of trust and communication, and changes in the nature of Kenyan local administration all point to more, not less, conflict in the near future.

This makes the Lake Turkana conflict a potentially important stand-alone peace building project for either the USAID regional mission or another donor. Both the Kenyan and Ethiopian governments are keen to manage this conflict—especially Ethiopia, which seeks to avoid any negative fallout from its upstream Gibe III dam project on the Omo river, which will temporary reduce water flow into Lake Turkana even further. Successful management of this conflict would not only be of enormous benefit to the regional population, but could serve as a model of other borderland water conflicts as they emerge across the region.
ANNEX 4: PERSONS INTERVIEWED - CVE

ETHIOPIA INTERVIEWS

ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

- Abdeta Beyene, former Director of African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia (currently on leave)
- Wardimu Asamarew, Director for African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia
- Yelibu Lijilam, Nile Basin States Director, Government of Ethiopia
- Ato Getachew, Director-General for Public Diplomacy and Communication, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia
- Ato Teferra Beyene, Head, Boundary and Transboundary River Affairs Department, Ministry of Water Resources, Ethiopia
- Kalaya Gebre Hiwot, Director of Conflict Management, Ministry of Federal Affairs
- Workeneh Gebeyeyehu, Director, Federal Police, Ethiopia

ACADEMICS/ CIVIL SOCIETY

- Abdi Hussein, Director, Pastoralist Concern, Addis Ababa
- Berouk Mesfin, Senior Researcher, African Conflict Prevention Programme (ACPP), Addis Ababa
- Yntiso Gebre Deko, Social Anthropologist, University of Addis Ababa
- Terrence Lyons, Professor, George Mason University, USA
- Kjetil Tronvoll, Managing Partner, International law and Policy Institute, Oslo

INTERNATIONAL NGOS

- Dominique Graham, Country Director, Mercy Corps Ethiopia
- Claudia Roos, GIZ Ethiopia

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

- Bizusew Mersha, Country Director Ethiopia, IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)
- Jalal Abdul Latif, Chief of Section, Civil Society and Post-Conflict Governance, Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
- Amb. Aguibou S. Diarrah, Director, African Union Border Programme, Addis Ababa

DONOR AGENCIES, EMBASSIES, AND UN

- Pernille Mortensen, First Secretary, Danish Embassy, Addis Ababa
- Suzi Bessant, UK Department for International Development , Addis Ababa
- Christopher Hull, Counsellor & Consul, Canadian Embassy
US GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

- Carol Wilson, DG Office Chief, USAID/Addis
- Brian Gilchrist, DG Deputy Office Chief, USAID/Ethiopia
- Jeffrey D. Graham, Deputy Political/Economic Counselor, U.S. Embassy Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
- Casey Schmidt, DOS US Embassy Addis Ababa
- Peter Lord, Deputy Chief of Mission, African Union Mission,
- Thomas Staal, USAID Country Mission Director, Addis Ababa

GROUP INTERVIEWS

- Africa Union Border Programme team, Addis Ababa
- USAID Country Mission team, Ethiopia
- African Affairs Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia

DJIBOUTI INTERVIEWS

- Eng. Mahboub Maalim, Executive Secretary, IGAD
- Mr. Maina Karaba, Agriculture Department, IGAD

KENYA INTERVIEWS

KENYAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

- Geoffrey E. Kaituko, Drought Management Officer (DMO) for Arid Lands Resource Management Project II (ALRMP II) Turkana District, Ministry of State for Special Programmes
- S.K. Maina, National Co-ordinator, Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC) Secretariat, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration Internal Security
- David Kimaiyo, Director, Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons
- Jack O. Obuo, District Commissioner, Lokitaung, Turkana
- Humphrey Nakitare, District Commissioner, Turkana-North

ACADEMICS/ CIVIL SOCIETY

- Brooke Sterns Lawson, Consultant
- Phyllis Dininio, Technical Director, Management Systems International (MSI)
- Ahmed Sheikh Mohamed, Senior Program Manager, Crossborder Peace Program, Act!
- Joakim Gundel, Consultant, Nairobi
- Sami Ekal, CEWERU monitor, Turkana
- Alex Losikia, CEWERU monitor, Turkana
- Daniel Epuyo Nanok, Program Manager, Turkana Pastoralists Development Association (TOPADO)
- J. Alex, Program Coordinator, Adakar Peace and Development Initiative (APEDI)

INTERNATIONAL NGOS AND DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTORS

- Nikolai Hutchinson, Deputy Chief of Party, PACT
- Jebiwot Sunbeiywo, Chief of Party, PACT
- Emmanuel Rinck, Programme Manager, NGO Safety Programme—Somalia
- Matthew Lovick, Africa Director, Mercy Corps
- Abdirakdir Mohamed, Country Director Somalia, Mercy Corps
- Rashid Abdi, International Crisis Group
- Marleen Renders, Research Advisor, Life and Peace Institute
- Eveline Roojimans, Somalia Policy Lead, Oxfam International-Somalia
• Vishalini Lawrence, Development Alternatives Inc.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
• Fred Ngoga Gateretse, Advisor to the African Union Special Representative to Somalia
• Richard Barno, Senior Research and Policy Advisor, IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP)
• Dr. Martin Kimani, Director, IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)

DONOR AGENCIES, EMBASSIES, AND UN AGENCIES
• Matt Baugh, UK Senior Representative, British Office for Somalia
• Tariq Chaudhry, Acting Head of Political Affairs, U.N. Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS)
• Bruno Geddo, Representative, UNHCR Somalia
• Jarat Chopra, President, Peace Maintenance International, and Advisor, World Bank Somalia
• Matt Bryden, Coordinator, UN Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia
• David Bax, Programme Manager, Somalia Mine Action

US GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
• Andrei M. Cotton, Regional Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, DOS U.S. Embassy Nairobi
• Angela Yoder-Maina, TIS Program Manager, LPC/Somalia Program, USAID
• Andre Le Sage, National Defense University
• Galeeb Kachra, OTI Deputy Country Representative, USAID Kenya
• Hodan Hassan, Somali Program Advisor, USAID
• Khashayar Ghashghai, Political-Military Officer, Somalia Affairs Unit, US Embassy Nairobi
• Amb. James Swan, US Special Envoy to Somalia

GROUP INTERVIEWS
• PACT Peace II Northeast Kenya field teams and partners—Ahmed Sheikh, Sheikh Mohamed Abdi Nur, Abdiaziz Bashir “Jack,” And Artah Mohamed Hassan
• District Peace Committee, Lokituang, Turkana
• Displaced persons from Todanyang, Loaengak, Lake Turkana
• Village elders, Kokuro town, Turkana
ANNEX 5: PERSONS INTERVIEWED - MRC

RWANDA STAKEHOLDERS

- Paul Kaiser, USAID/Rwanda, DG Team Leader
- Guillaume Bucyana, USAID/Rwanda, DG Officer
- Joe Palombo, State Department, Economic and Commercial Officer, Rwanda
- Joseph Mbaya, Pact Rwanda Director, iTSCi Project
- Jean Malic, Vice President, Wolfram Mines, Rwanda and Vice President of Mining Association of Rwanda
- Michael Biryabarema, Deputy Director, Ministry of Mines, Rwanda
- Dr. Naasson Munyandamutsa, Deputy Director, Institute for Research and Dialogue for Peace, Rwanda
- Gloria Bazigaga, Country Manager for Rwanda and Burundi, International Alert

DRC STAKEHOLDERS

- Aloys Tegera, Senior Analyst, Pole Institute, North Kivu, DRC
- Vincent Songe, Program Director, Kivus, Pact Worldwide, DRC
- Guillaume Bucyana, USAID/Rwanda, DG Officer
- Emmanuel Ndimubanzi, Provincial Chief Ministry of Mines, North Kivu, DRC
- Mwana Diunba, Chef CEEC for North Kivu, DRC
- Isaac Minemere, CREDDHO, North Kivu, DRC
- Janvier Murairi, ASODIP, North and South Kivu, DRC
- Bliase, Former Commander, CNDP, UNCOE, DRC
- Richard Robinson, Senior Mineral Advisor, State Department, DRC
- Sarjait Sardar, Chief, Eastern Congo Unit, U.S. Embassy, DRC
- Fidel Bafulembe, Enough Project, Eastern DRC
- Christian Mambu, EITI Representative, Kinshasa, DRC
- M. Baudoin Kabarhuza, ICGLR Coordinator for DRC
- John Kanyoni, Head of Metachem Comptoir, President of Local Federation of Comptoirs, Eastern DRC
- Maria Lange, International Alert, Eastern DRC
- Rosemary Kioni, UN MONUC, Office of the Eastern Coordinator, Goma
- Christol Mastuki, UN Habitat, Goma
- Honorable Bariyanga Rutuye Leon, President, Provincial Assembly, North Kivu
- Muluz‘ajirwa n’owabo Katoto Christian, First Counselor- Commercial & Economic Attaché, Embassy of DRC

BURUNDI STAKEHOLDERS

- James Anderson, USAID/Burundi Country Representative
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• Eddy Mbona, Senior RINR Governance Officer, ICGLR, Burundi
• Claude Bernard Manirambona, COMEBU Mines
• Catherine McFarland, Economic Officer, U.S. Embassy, Burundi

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• Ambassador Honore Nzessiwe, ICGLR National Coordinator for CAR
• Sebastian Pennes, Chief of Party, USAID Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development (PRADD)
• Mathurin Momet, Director, of Le Confident, Independent Media, CAR
• Ambassador Akendengue, Head of MICOPAX, The Military and Peacekeeping Mission to CAR
• Laurent Szyster, African Diamond Resources
• Dominique Youan, Kimberly Process Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Mines, CAR
• Maxine Kazagui, Carat Investment

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• Bridgett Boucom, Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), World Bank
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• Dr. Philip Schütte, Economic Geologist, Project Manager “Mineral Certification” (CTC, ICGLR) Rwanda & Burundi, Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR)
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• Bryce Campbell, IDP Specialist, Great Lakes Region, Brookings Institute
• Andrew Westbury, Mineral Specialist, Brookings Institute
• Zania Lewis, Research and Conflict Analyst, Brookings Institute
• Anne Hollingford, Africa Analyst, ICG
• Jon Temin, African Analyst, USIP

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• Mr. Amol Mehra, International Corporate Accountability Roundtable
• Stephen Snook, Senior DG Specialist, Mineral Resources and Conflict, LTPR Unit, Tetra Tech ARD
• Biova Kabine, Program Manager for Member Services, The Corporate Council on Africa
• Daniel F. Persico, Ph.D., Vice President, Strategic Marketing & Business Development, KEMET Electronics

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• Sophia Pickles, Regional Capacity Specialist, Global Witness
• Annie Dunnebackle, Senior Conflict Minerals Researcher, Global Witness

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• Kate Schwarm, East Africa Director, PACT Worldwide
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• Shawn Biore, Partnership Africa Canada (PAC)
• Joanne Lebert, Great Lakes Director, PAC

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• Michael Ronning, USAID/Uganda, Conflict and Governance Team Leader
• Brad Brooks-Rubin, Special Advisor on Conflict Diamonds/Minerals, State Department
• Catherine Picard, Africa Bureau, State Department
• Karen O'Donnell, USAID/AFR/SD
• Donna Kerner, DDR Specialist, USAID/AFR/SD
• Tim Fella, Land Tenure Property Rights Specialist, USAID/EGAT

GROUP INTERVIEWS
• Artisanal Mining Cooperative Members, Central African Republic
• Civil Society Representatives from Rwanda, DRC and Burundi, ICGLR SGBV Summit, Kampala, Uganda
• Women Miners, Wolfram Mines, Rwanda
• Military and Mining Officials, Mining Day Celebration, Rwanda
• Youth Miners, Central African Republic
ANNEX 6: SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


KEY CAF 2.0 QUESTIONS—MINERAL AND RESOURCE CONFLICT

1. What do you see as the most destabilizing activities relating to mineral trade that are evident in EA today?
2. How and why are they destabilizing?
3. What kinds of armed conflict are they producing?
4. What are the main grievances driving mineral resource conflicts in this area?
5. To what extent do ideas, identity, or belief systems drive the conflict?
6. What is the trajectory of this conflict, in your view? Is it self-reinforcing, or self-extinguishing?
7. What are the main economic or political incentives to MRC? Are these interests changing over time, and if so how?
8. In what ways do these conflicts reinforce interests in perpetuation of instability/state failure/armed violence?
9. To what extent are they producing secondary obstacles to good governance, development, and investment?
10. What are the main organizational, financial, and recruiting capacities of the groups engaging in MRC?
11. What are current government policies to address this issue across the region?
12. How committed and capable are regional governments to addressing this? Are neighboring states cooperating on this issue or do they have divergent interests?
13. Is this conflict issue susceptible to specific triggers or precipitating causes, or is it endemic?
14. How are wider (global) actors and interests contributing to the problem or to management of the problem? To what extent do they control outcomes regardless of local efforts?
15. Where do you see points of local resilience to the conflict — sources of prevention or mitigation?
16. What crossborder norms exist in the local communities that can be called on as sources of conflict management or prevention?
17. What role do women and women’s groups play in this type of armed conflict?
18. What foreign aid projects currently address this problem?
19. What gaps do you see in programming to address this problem?
20. What MRC activities are emerging on the horizon as new and potentially destabilizing forces?
21. What government and donor policies and programs could help prevent this emerging threat from worsening?

KEY CAF 2.0 QUESTIONS—WATER RESOURCE CONFLICT

1. What do you see as the most destabilizing transborder water disputes in East Africa today?
2. How and why are they destabilizing?
3. What kinds of armed conflict are they producing?
4. What are the main grievances related to water access and flow in this area?
5. To what extent do ideas, identity, or belief systems shape competing claims on water?
6. What is the trajectory of this conflict, in your view? Is it self-reinforcing, or self-extinguishing?
7. What are the main economic or political incentives driving water conflicts? Are these interests changing over time, and if so how?
8. In what ways do these conflicts reinforce interests in perpetuation of instability/state failure/armed violence?
9. To what extent are they producing secondary obstacles to good governance, development, and investment?
10. What are the main organizational, financial, and recruiting capacities of the groups engaged in disputes over water sources?
11. What are current government policies to address this issue across the region?
12. How committed and capable are regional governments to addressing this? Are neighboring states cooperating on this issue or do they have divergent interests?
13. What is the state of local, regional, and transregional institutions to manage water conflicts?
14. Is this conflict issue susceptible to specific triggers or precipitating causes, or is it endemic?
15. How are wider (global) actors and interests contributing to the problem or to management of the problem? To what extent do they control outcomes regardless of local efforts?
16. Where do you see points of local resilience to the conflict—sources of effective management or mitigation?
17. What crossborder norms exist in the local communities that can be called on as sources of conflict management or prevention over water?
18. What role do women and women’s groups play in this?
19. What foreign aid projects currently address this problem?
20. What gaps do you see in programming to address this problem?
21. What transborder water issues are emerging on the horizon as new and potentially destabilizing forces?
22. What government and donor policies and programs could help prevent this emerging threat from worsening?

KEY CAF 2.0 QUESTIONS—TRANSBORDER CRIME AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

1. What do you see as the most destabilizing transborder criminal or violent extremist (CVE) activities in East Africa today?
2. How and why are they destabilizing?
3. What kinds of armed conflict are they producing?
4. What are the main grievances driving CVE in this area?
5. To what extent do ideas, identity, or belief systems drive the conflict?
6. What is the trajectory of this conflict, in your view? Is it self-reinforcing, or self-extinguishing?
7. What are the main economic or political incentives to CVE? Are these interests changing over time, and if so how?
8. In what ways do these conflicts reinforce interests in perpetuation of instability/state failure/armed violence?
9. To what extent are they producing secondary obstacles to good governance, development, and investment?
10. What are the main organizational, financial, and recruiting capacities of the groups engaging in CVE?
11. What are current government policies to address this issue across the region?
12. How committed and capable are regional governments to addressing this? Are neighboring states cooperating on this issue or do they have divergent interests?
13. Is this conflict issue susceptible to specific triggers or precipitating causes, or is it endemic?
14. How are wider (global) actors and interests contributing to the problem or to management of the problem? To what extent do they control outcomes regardless of local efforts?
15. Where do you see points of local resilience to the conflict—sources of prevention or mitigation?
16. What crossborder norms exist in the local communities that can be called on as sources of conflict management or prevention?
17. What role do women and women’s groups play in this type of armed conflict?
18. What foreign aid projects currently address this problem?
19. What gaps do you see in programming to address this problem?
20. What transborder CVE activities are emerging on the horizon as new and potentially destabilizing forces?
21. What government and donor policies and programs could help prevent this emerging CVE threat from worsening?
# ANNEX 8: DATA CAPTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Others Present and/or Interview Note</th>
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## Collection Method

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<th>Interviewer</th>
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<td>CAF Questions</td>
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<td>Focus Group/ Group Interview</td>
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<td>Informal Observation/ Interview</td>
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## CAF Framework Issues Identified

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<th>Context</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Inst. Performance</th>
<th>Societal Pattern</th>
<th>Grievance</th>
<th>Key Actors</th>
<th>Resilience</th>
<th>Trends</th>
<th>Triggers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

## Cross Cutting Issues

In this section please note crosscutting issues relevant to a regional program that could impact strategy or program design:

## USAID FORWARD

Note CSOs, regional, local organizations and networks etc for host country and/or regional partnership

## Summary of Interview

Insert information on CAF Relevance as well as other relevant data extracted from interview.

## Interview Quotes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribution (Yes/No):</th>
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## ANNEX 9: EAST AFRICA REGION INSTABILITY MATRIX

**East Africa Region Instability Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Conflict Issue:</th>
<th>1. Geographic Spread/Scale (Score 1-10)</th>
<th>2. Development Impact (Score 1-10)</th>
<th>3. USAID/USG Resources/Interventions (Score 1-10)</th>
<th>4. Local/Other Resources (Score 1-10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cross border/transnational Scale and Scope</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID/USG Interest (Policy, Political, Economic etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID ability to affect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
- Weighted add 3 points to final score
- Weighted add 3 points to final score

**Identified by:**
- Desk Study Research
- Expert Opinion
- Think Tank Analysis
- USG Political Priorities (USG Policy Analysis)
- Other Donors/

**Criteria analysis attached to matrix (pgs 17-20)**

**These categories 1 and 2 were weighted to ensure that programming and conflict potential and impact was scored more than category 3 and 4.**
### Land Use Issues

To include tenure, ownership, property rights, land use conflicts, migration/settlement issues and legal issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Spread and Scale</th>
<th>All countries affected: Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, ROSS, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, CAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uneven geographic impact – more densely populated areas and areas of heavy competition for land much more affected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large-scale displacement – IDPs and refugees -- across the region as added source of tension over land.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Impact on regional instability**

- Land rights and disputes at the heart of many of the region’s worst armed conflicts – including Rwandan genocide, Darfur crisis, Somali civil war of 1991-92, Kenyan post-election violence of 2009, Gambella insurgency in Ethiopia, coastal Kenyan tensions, etc. Most of these crises began as internal clashes over land but spilled over across borders. This issue is also an excellent grievance for extremist groups (usually ethno-extremists) and insurgencies to exploit. User rights to land are not only a matter of life or death for farmers and pastoralists; it is also a critical component of contemporary politics, as a base for politicians and their ethnic groups. The increased use of ethno-federalism and decentralization along ethnic lines across much of the region has exacerbated tensions over land by inadvertently creating politically sanctioned zones of exclusive ethnic claims on land. Worsening drought and climate change, and rapid growth in populations, is worsening land disputes as well, increasing “land hunger” that is partially responsible for some ongoing cross-border conflicts, including instability in eastern DRC. Land-grabbing and land banking is a major source of tensions as well. Concerns over long-term leasing of land to foreign governments are also an increasing source of tension, though the scale of this type of land alienation is still small. Even urban areas are affected, especially in contested peri-urban zones where deeded private property regimes collide with traditional, communal control over rangeland. Most aspects of land disputes do not spill across borders, but some do. If internal borders (such as Ethiopia’s ethno-federal states) are considered borders, then many more of these land disputes constitute cross-border conflicts.

- Land access issues raise the question of citizenship across the region. In many border zones, pastoral populations move across borders, or communities are located on both sides of a border. East Africa residents frequently claim user rights in second countries on the basis of pre-existing customary law and usage; some land-holders are disenfranchised with charges they are “foreigners” and hence cannot own land in a country.

- another land related conflict issue across East Africa are international borders, which are contested in many places – all of Somalia’s borders, the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, the Eritrea-Djibouti border, the borders of the Great Lakes (Uganda-DRC, Uganda-Kenya), South Sudan-Sudan, and South Sudan and Kenya. These have generally been contained, but have occasionally triggered major interstate wars. Where high value energy reserves or other natural resources are discovered in these contested border areas, stakes rise and the risk of serious armed conflict increases. At present by far the worst instance of armed conflict and displacement over a contested border is occurring in South Sudan and Sudan’s borders areas, where well over 200,000 people have been displaced and hundreds killed in recent fighting.

**Number of people affected**

- If only land use conflicts which have some cross-border feature are considered, an estimated 50 million residents of East Africa are affected.

**Trajectory: Current and future projections**

- Certain to worsen, like water, land are a fixed asset in face of rapid population growth and heightened demands. Increased attempts to improve per hectare food

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production in the region via large-scale private or para-statal farming will alienate still more land, especially along river valleys, generating even greater clashes with pastoralists and small farmers. In this sense, development progress will at least in the short to medium term worsen rather than improve land use conflicts. To the extent that land use and ownership is tied up with rights to resources beneath the surface (oil, natural gas, precious metals), new discoveries of mineral and energy deposits in the region exacerbates land rights conflicts still further, highlighting unresolved disputes over what constitutes a national asset versus an asset of a local ethnic group or community. The insurgency and counter-insurgency in eastern Ethiopia at Daghabuur, unresolved land disputes along the Sudan-South Sudan border, and unresolved border dispute between Puntland and Somaliland in northern Somalia are all animated by rights to energy resources beneath the surface (treated in a separate part of the matrix).

### Development Impact

- Disputes over land rights and use in the context of development have been an enduring issue since the colonial era, when valuable land was alienated for use in large-scale cash cropping schemes. As noted above, there is every reason to expect this will remain a conflict issues into the indefinite future.

#### Projected Impact over 5 years

- with rapid population growth, new initiatives by governments across the region to increase large-scale, commercial farming and irrigated agriculture, dramatic growth in cities, and rapid growth in the value of all types of land, land use and ownership issues are explosive as a source of conflict, and every year they are left unresolved increases the likelihood of more Rwanda and Rift valley type communal violence.

#### Economic

- Unresolved land use and ownership is a major deterrent to most private investment.

#### Political

- Land use and rights issues across the region beg a fundamental question of identity and rights – blood rights, birth rights, or rights by citizenship as the criteria for determining who may reside, own land, and exploit the land in what areas of the country. In most parts of East Africa, this remains an unresolved and politically charged question.

#### Social

- No other issue is used to mobilize ethnic conflict as powerfully as land rights. Land use and ownership disputes also lay bare the tension between customary tenure systems and communal control of land versus modern land tenure and the treatment of land as a private commodity to be bought and sold.

### USAID/USG Resources/Interventions

USAID has exceptionally long and extensive experience in building expertise on land tenure systems both generally and in East Africa, dating back to the early 1960s. Much of that expertise is housed today in universities and consultancy firms. This means that start-up costs in terms of research and analysis would be very low on this issue.

#### Current Programs

- The most important global USG initiative related to land is the “Feed the Future” global food security program. Interestingly, the initiative’s strategy focuses almost entirely on technological innovations and makes little mention of land tenure and usage systems.\(^{60}\)

#### Stakeholders, partners

- Land issues are generally the narrow domain of USAID and international NGOs working on agriculture and pastoral livelihoods or conflict issues. This is not an issue with broad inter-agency commitment or interest.

#### Political and Diplomatic will

- As a general rule, land issues have generally been treated in diplomatic circles as “low politics” or local matters, of less immediate appeal than conflict mediation at the

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national level. That said, there is widespread and growing appreciation that land is an underlying source of conflict and ethnic mobilization across East Africa.

Economic variables (Funding etc)
- unknown – need help with this

Stakeholders (local, regional, economic and political)
- Locally, almost all communities are major stakeholders in land use and ownership systems. But not all are stakeholders in compromise. Some groups – those with superior force of arms or in possession of political power in the capital – may prefer to use political or coercive measures to appropriate land and shape land access and control outcomes to lay claim to newly acquired land at another group’s expense. Who constitutes a stakeholder and who constitutes a spoiler in land issues is entirely situational. Nationally, most regional governments prefer policy outcomes that favor modern land tenure systems and in some cases long-lease systems in which the government ultimately retains ownership over the land. Private agro-industries strongly prefer reliable modern land tenure and deeded property rights as a precondition for investment, though some are willing to risk more ambiguous arrangements. Land rights are viewed as generally a domestic rather than regional concern and so region-wide mechanisms to address land issues are underdeveloped. Importantly, women may constitute the single greatest stakeholders, as changes in land rights laws and practices can either protect or undermine their claims to land.61

Local will and capacity
- As noted above, the political will locally to address land issues varies according to interest. Some political figures and their constituencies stand to benefit from land access arrangements favoring those with the political or military means to acquire land through extra-legal means, and will resist efforts to build rule of law programs designed to reduce or eliminate land disputes.

Resolutions and actions taken (peace negotiations, diplomatic tools, force, military intervention etc)
- For contested borders, regional states have at times opted for negotiations, at other times have engaged in warfare or military occupation of land as a means of creating a fait accompli. Faced with cross border land usage by pastoralists, states have generally lacked the capacity to enforce border even if they so desired, and generally tolerate seasonal movements of pastoralists and their herds. When pastoral groups seek to permanently claim new rangeland across borders at another group’s expense – a chronic problem along Kenya’s northern borders with Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia – some states have sought to intervene militarily or have armed local paramilitaries to protect the interests of their local clients.

Current programs
- Regional states have committed to agricultural production in general, through the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program (CAADP), but there are no region-wide initiatives to address land use and land conflict.

Projected funding
- None for cross-border land conflict issues.

2. Crime and Extremism

To include piracy, terrorism, organized crime, recruitment, transborder crime, illicit trade and trafficking and influence

Geographic Spread and Scale

- All countries are affected—Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, ROSS, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, CAR. But considerable variation exists by country, within countries, and by type of crime. Somalia is hardest hit by these problems, especially by extremism, piracy, and illicit trade, including drug and smuggling and human trafficking. Organized crime disproportionately affects DRC, Kenya. Transborder crime is a major problem in Kenya, Uganda, DRC, South Sudan, Sudan, Burundi, and Ethiopia. Illicit trade and trafficking is a major problem in Kenya, Uganda, and south Sudan. Terrorism has hit Kenya and Uganda especially hard in recent years; Tanzania in earlier years. Recruitment into criminal gangs and extremist groups has been a particular problem in Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, and DRC. Violent crimes committed by gangs and autonomous militia or paramilitary have been especially severe in DRC, Republic of Congo, south Sudan, Sudan, Kenya, and Tanzania. Most of this criminal violence occurs within states, but cross-border criminality is endemic along poorly policed borders, especially in the Karamoja cluster (Uganda-Sudan-Ethiopia-Kenya border), the Kenya-Somali border, and South Sudan-DRC-CAR border area. The impact of each of these types of criminality varies considerably by location within countries.

- Importantly, this problem has global reach, as the region’s large Diasporas are sometimes heavily involved in the criminal or terrorist activities. When this Diaspora resides and operates inside the US, it becomes a domestic law enforcement concern as well.

Impact on regional instability

- Piracy: limited. Its destabilizing affects are mainly felt in the Somali region of Puntland; otherwise, impact is mainly economic in the region.

- Terrorism: exceptionally high in Somalia; very high in Kenya and Somaliland; moderately high in Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Djibouti. Most terrorism acts and credible threats of terrorism in recent years have come from the jihadist group al-shabaab, out of Somalia but with physical presence in Kenya. Shabaab’s threats and actual cross-border attacks (into Kenya and Uganda) have prompted two major cross-border military campaigns – Ethiopia’s two year intervention into southern Somalia in 2007-08, and Kenya’s current military incursion into southern Somalia in October 2011. It is also the rationale for the presence of 10,000 regional peacekeeping forces from Uganda and Burundi (and soon Djibouti) in Somalia, where they are engaged in direct armed combat with shabaab. Other terrorist groups in the region include the Lord’s Resistance Army (treated separately in this assessment) and a number of armed groups that have engaged in terror tactics (such as the Janjaweed, various militias in eastern DRC, and ONLF, and arguably the Mungiki sect in Kenya). Most groups engaging in terrorist tactics in East Africa are informed by extremist ethno-chauvinism.

- Cross border insurgencies: very high in much of the region; occasionally exceptionally high. Armed insurgencies against regional governments that cross borders and become regional security threats are ubiquitous in East Africa, and often involve external sponsorship by regional governments in proxy wars against one another. Over twenty armed insurgencies involving external patrons have occurred in the region since 2000. At present cross border insurgencies are most destabilizing in south Sudan and Sudan; in the recent past, destabilizing insurgencies and counter-insurgencies which crossed borders in East Africa include the Darfur crisis, the Congolese civil war, the Rwandan genocide and war, the Lord’s Resistance Army, the SPLA and the Sudanese civil war, and the Burundian civil war.

- Recruitment: moderately high in selected locations. Recruitment into shabaab is a source of regional instability in Kenya and Uganda; the latter was targeted by a shabaab cell composed of East African recruits in a terrorist attack in July 2010, killing 74. Cross-border recruitment of youth into violent criminal groups and insurgencies considered terrorist by some regional governments occurs across much of the region, especially where aggrieved ethnic groups form insurgencies and are located across borders. This is a particular problem along the Burundi-DRC border, the Kenya-Somali border, the Kenya-Ethiopia border (producing occasional cross-border police actions by Ethiopian military into Kenya, against Kenyan citizens); the Sudan-Ethiopia border, and Sudan-Chad border.

- Organized crime: ubiquitous in the region, moderately destabilizing in some areas. Organized criminal rackets usually prefer predictable operating environments, but work to produce conditions of chronic lawlessness and state weakness in which their activities can flourish. Organized crime is closely linked to illicit trade and trafficking,
discussed below. In parts of East Africa, organized crime is closely associated with existing local or national authorities. Piracy in Somalia’s Puntland region implicates local authorities; drug trafficking through Kenya is believed to involve government officials at high levels. The Mungiki sector movement in Kenya is viewed by some as an ethnic mafia using extreme violence in pursuit of its interests.

- **Illicit trade and trafficking:** very high. Small arms trafficking through the region – mainly moving in whatever direction the market dictates across a belt through southern Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Sudan – is a major contributing factor to regional instability. Most of this trade is decentralized, but major arms traffickers such as Victor Bout have been active in the region. Transnational drug trafficking is rapidly becoming a growing source of destabilization inside Kenya. Smuggling of high value minerals is a major problem in eastern DRC and major driver of armed conflict there.

- **Cross-border criminality:** chronic, destabilizing locally but generally manageable for regional instability. Most of the poorly policed border areas of the region are plagued by cross-border criminal raids, most often in the form of cattle rustling. These are producing casualty levels akin to those of civil wars in some places. Cross-border kidnappings were the trigger for Kenyan military incursion into Somalia.

**Number of people affected.**

- Excluding victims of violent criminality that is strictly domestic in nature, an estimated 10 to 20 million residents of East Africa are directly affected by cross-border criminality or terrorism. These are mainly populations in the most volatile border regions.

**Trajectory: Current and future projections.**

- Divergent trends are occurring in extremism and criminal violence across east Africa. Islamic extremism appears to have peaked and is in a state of crisis in Sudan and Somalia, but is rising in Kenya and Ethiopia. Ethnic extremism remains extraordinarily dangerous in the south Sudan-Sudan border area and the Rwanda-DRC border area. Transnational criminality across borders is on the rise in Kenya and remains high elsewhere.

### Development Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of Issue</th>
<th>Projected Impact over 5 years</th>
<th>Economic.</th>
<th>Political</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border criminality has worsened significantly across the entire region since the late 1980s. Criminality is regularly cited as a major impediment to development in the region, but most of this concern is over crime and domestic corruption that is not cross-border in nature, and hence beyond the purview of this project.</td>
<td>Crime and extremism are long-term challenges of governance, legitimacy, and rule of law that are unlikely to improve quickly. Progress on this score will be measured in decades, not years.</td>
<td>Recent cross-border kidnappings by Somalis in northern Kenya (not clear yet if criminal or terrorist in nature) has had a devastating effect on coastal tourism in Kenya.</td>
<td>Organized crime has had a devastating effect on political development across much of the region, co-opting and compromising government officials at high levels and...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross border criminality has been a major development setback locally, where insecurity is so high that production is hurt or internal displacement occurs. Because most of the border areas are remote and far from economic centers, the impact on the wider economies of regional states has been limited. Periodic terrorist attacks have caused sharp but temporary collapses in tourism and business investments in Kenya and Uganda. The chronic insecurity associated with insurgencies, terrorism, and organized crime does some harm to efforts to attract business investments.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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undermining rule of law. Governments or groups within governments are often complicit in organized crime, smuggling, and fomenting of cross border armed violence.

Social
- A culture of criminal violence in parts of the region is held responsible for a “lost generation” of young men from DRC to Somalia, creating conditions of easy recruitment into gangs, militias, or radical armed groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expert Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The USG has devoted tremendous assets to analyze extremism, criminal violence, and terrorism in East Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Too many to list in this format. A sample includes: DOD civil affairs and USAID programs designed to address roots of radicalism; public affairs and psy-ops campaigns to create alternative narratives to violent extremism; a host of training and support programs to strengthen policing and security sector capacity; anti-corruption pressure and programs; employment generation projects; kinetic operations out of Camp Lemonnier and offshore, targeting terrorist leaders; operations to monitor and block financial transactions which channel assets to terrorist groups; and domestic law enforcement surveillance and investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders, partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A wide array of internal stakeholders in the USG have a powerful interest in advancing successful programming to combat extremism and transnational crime in East Africa. These include USAID, Defense, State, Treasury, DEA, Homeland Security, the FBI, and others in the executive branch; Congress is also strongly committed to the goal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and Diplomatic will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The USG has made its commitment to combating extremism amply clear, especially since 9/11. This is a top priority for the US in East Africa. It has also made its commitment to combating crime, especially corruption, a high priority, as evidenced by the Millennium Challenge Fund requirements. The DEA is active in East Africa in combating drug trafficking, and the US has taken a lead in anti-piracy naval task forces at sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic variables (Funding etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- USAID is a minor source of funding on this issue compared to the assets of other US agencies, which are devoting significant funding to the problem.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local/Other Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders (local, regional, economic and political)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- This is an extremely complex calculation, as many actors in the region at the local and national level have some interests in aspects of criminal operations and so will be spoilers to efforts to address crime. Governments in the region have been uneven in their regional cooperation on anti-crime and anti-terrorism intelligence sharing for fear of the information being misused or leaked, reflecting powerful level of distrust in the region at the inter-governmental level. Some local ethnic or religious groups empathize with extremist groups and would dispute the label of “extremism.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local will and capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Variable. Some regional governments are complicit in the transnational criminality and will support efforts to address, but not resolve, the problem. Others may fear retribution from powerful non-state actors and refuse to cooperate. Still others will seek to redirect US counter-terrorist concerns toward domestic rivals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolutions and actions taken (peace negotiations, diplomatic tools, force, military intervention etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- States in the region have taken vigorous unilateral steps to address cross-border criminal and terrorism threats – from Rwanda’s interventions into eastern DRC to Ethiopia’s interventions into Somalia. Multilateral steps to address criminal and terrorist threats have been less in evidence, the main exception</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
being the regionally-led African Union peacekeeping operation in Somalia.

Current programs
- AMISOM peacekeeping operation; Kenyan military incursion into Somalia.

Projected funding
- UN support of Amisom forces in Somalia is likely to continue.

### 3. Water Conflict
To include issues of pastoral and ethnic conflict over water, access, rights, and management of trans boundary water access

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Spread and Scale</th>
<th>Countries affected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, ROSS, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, CAR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Types of water conflicts:
- **Local** water disputes are endemic throughout all countries of EA; but in some regions local water conflict are manageable, in others disputes are serious and fatal. Most of these disputes involve pastoral and agricultural communities, but there is growing concern about conflicts between rapidly growing municipalities over underground water sources. A number of cities in EA are increasingly short of water (Harrar, Dire Dawa, Hargeisa, and Nairobi). **Intra-state** water disputes over river usage and flow affect several of Ethiopia’s federal states and Kenyan Provinces, and is likely to become an increasing issue for ROSS and Somalia. **Regional** conflict over water focuses mainly on control of Nile water flow and usage. Unresolved disputes over Nile river water and challenges to existing treaties governing water use affects all states in the region except Djibouti, Somalia/Somaliland, CAR, and Congo-B. **Bi-lateral** tensions over river flow and usage effects Ethiopia-Kenya (the Gibe III Dam, blocking flow of the Omo River into Lake Turkana) and Ethiopia-Somalia. Bilateral interstate conflict also exists over Lake boundaries and usage—including fisheries (Migingu Island, Lake Victoria, pitting Kenya vs. Uganda) and energy resources (Lake Albert, pitting Uganda vs. DRC).

Impact on regional instability
- exceptionally high, as the stakes for downstream countries (Sudan, Egypt) are literally existential, while the stakes for upriver watershed states for development and hydro-electric needs are very high, as existing treaty allocation of water use heavily favors Egypt and Sudan. The two most populous and powerful states in the region, Ethiopia and Egypt, have threatened to go to war over the flow of the Blue Nile, and a 2010 accord reached by watershed states—the “River Nile Basin Co-operative Framework”—without Egyptian or Sudanese involvement further poisoned regional relations. Watershed states are already unilaterally abrogating the 1929 Treaty. The additional of a new state—South Sudan—adds to the urgency of addressing Nile water usage. Some communal wars that have spilled across borders have had water shortages as a major driver of conflict—the Darfur crisis included.

Number of people affected
- (not counting Egypt, at 82 million): 190 to 200 million people for Nile; 6-7 million for river disputes between Ethiopia and Kenya or Somalia; all 381.2 million East Africa residents for general disputes over rural or urban local water sources
- “affected” in this context means deprived or potentially deprived of water access or energy from hydro-electric dams. Actual conflict-related deaths due to water across the region are almost entirely local, estimated in the tens of thousands in the past decade (more if the war in Darfur is attributed in part to the drying out of northern pastoral

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63 Some countries entire population would be affected by war over Nile resources; in other cases only some regions of individual countries are affected.
areas), and hundreds of thousands displaced.

Trajectory: Current and future projections.

- all projections point to water shortage disputes at both local and interstate levels becoming a major source of armed conflict. This is driven by reduced water supply (climate change, drought, growing use of water for hydroelectricity); rapidly growing populations (annual growth rates ranging from 2.0% to 3.6% by country); privatization of previously communal water sources; rapid urbanization and heavily urban water usage and energy demands. Many think tanks and conflict early warning groups consider "water wars" to be the single greatest threat to peace and stability in regions like East Africa in coming years. Egyptian officials have described calls to renego the 1929 Nile Water Agreement an "act of war."

- Shrinkage of some of East Africa’s largest lakes is direct evidence of reduced water resources – Lake Turkana’s shores have now receded so far south the Lake is no longer in Ethiopia, producing growing communal clashes there, and Lake Victoria – the world’s second largest freshwater lake, on which 30 million East Africans depend for water or livelihoods – is at its lowest levels in 40 years.

### Development Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As a development issue, water access and conflicts generated by it have been a central problem since the colonial era, especially in more arid zones of East Africa. Local level water conflicts over water even predate the colonial era. Into the future, this issue will be a permanent source of tensions and perhaps armed conflict, as local and inter-state competition for water worsens.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projected Impact over 5 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>this is a pivotal period for water management in East Africa, as the watershed states make moves to re-negotiate Nile usage allocation via the River Nile Basin Cooperative Framework, the creation of a new riparian state South Sudan throws into question water usage allocation, Ethiopia completes construction of a series of dams and irrigation schemes along its rivers affecting flow into neighboring countries, and other watershed states unilaterally abrogate the 1929 treaty. The projected impact of local level water shortages is harder to predict because seasonal rainfall plays such an important part of this equation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economic

- Worsening water access and supplies today are a major constraint on development across the region. Development trade-offs pitting livelihoods versus hydro-electric power, irrigated agriculture versus pastoralism. Many of the poorest countries in the world are in East Africa and are Nile watershed states, and will increasingly insist on the right to use more water for development. Ironically, in parts of the region enjoying greater development levels, per capita water demands are spiking due to private consumption, higher energy demands, and greater industrial water use. Water scarcity is thus a constraint on development and development exacerbates water scarcity.

### Political

- Weak water management systems nationally and regionally are a symptom of political underdevelopment, not a factor caused by water shortages.

### Social

- Water shortages at the local level place a special burden on women, who are usually responsible for procurement of water.

### USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expert Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water conflicts in East Africa do not appear to be a major topic of research for the USG. Several defense studies looking ahead at water wars have been published in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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64 [http://www.ntz.info/gen/n01799.html](http://www.ntz.info/gen/n01799.html)
65 "When the Water Ends: Africa’s Climate Conflicts" [http://e360.yale.edu/feature/when_the_water_ends_africas_climate_conflicts/2331/](http://e360.yale.edu/feature/when_the_water_ends_africas_climate_conflicts/2331/)
defense journals.

Current Programs

- US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in March 2011 that the US would make water as “a top foreign policy priority”\(^{67}\) According to the US Department of State, “since the 2005 passage of the Senator Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act, the U.S. government has provided a total of $3.4 billion for the water sector and sanitation to developing countries around the globe. We also contribute to UN organizations and multilateral development banks through our annual dues and through special multi-donor trust funds related to water projects. . . , USG financial institutions such as the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), USAID’s Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade Bureau and its Development Credit Office and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) are working to leverage and mobilize additional private capital for the water sector. . . . Moreover, to access small and medium-scale financing, the USG is partnering with NGOs, microfinance institutions and private banks to catalyze micro- and meso-finance projects that often benefit difficult-to-reach communities – women and their families, small entrepreneurs, community-based organizations.”\(^{68}\) In East Africa, the USG provides support to the Nile Basin initiative.

Stakeholders, partners

- see above.

Political and Diplomatic will

- Given the relatively low level of commitment of USAID funds to water-related conflict and development issues in East Africa, it can be presumed that this is not a high priority at this time. Yet from a diplomatic and defense perspective, the prospect of several key regional allies falling into conflict or even war over water is a major concern.

Economic variables (Funding etc)

- Local level water projects are not high cost, but only address conflict at the local level. Wider, trans-regional water issues – falling lake levels, diverted river, river valley management – involves a much greater investment of expertise and money.

Local/Other Resources

Stakeholders (local, regional, economic and political)

- all Nile riparian states are major stakeholders in the Nile river dispute. The Nile Basin Initiative, created in 1999, brings together all Nile basin states and is dedicated to “achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of and benefit from the common Nile Basin water resources.”\(^{69}\) Locally, political officials in areas of water scarcity are under tremendous pressure from constituencies to guarantee water access. Irrigated agricultural schemes throughout the region – parastatals and private – are major stakeholders in river water allocation. Industries throughout the region are stakeholders in both access to water and hydro-electric power. Consumers – urban, pastoral, and agricultural – are also stakeholders in access to well water, river water, and piped water.

Local will and capacity

- Very high interest at all levels in addressing problem, but seen by many pivotal actors as a zero-sum game with few opportunities for negotiated settlement. The problem is exacerbated with regard to river water by the fact that watershed countries or populations have essentially veto control over water flow if negotiations break down.

Resolutions and actions taken (peace negotiations, diplomatic tools, force, military intervention etc)

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\(^{67}\) [http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/other/2011/158419.htm](http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/other/2011/158419.htm)

\(^{68}\) Ibid.

\(^{69}\) [http://www.nilebasin.org/newsite/](http://www.nilebasin.org/newsite/)
The Nile water is regulated by the 1929 Treaty, but that treaty is under attack by upstream states. The Nile Basin Initiative is the regional organization tasked with managing water usage and other cooperation between riparian states. The World Bank has the mandate to serve as lead donor for the NBI. The Nile River Basin Co-operative Framework was an accord of five upstream states, without the consent of Egypt or Sudan.

Current programs
- Under the NBI, the “Shared Vision Program” involves regional cooperation on a wide range of water usage and management issues. The Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program is based in Addis Ababa and focuses on facilitation of fast-track development and multi-purpose projects in watershed management, energy, irrigation and drainage, and flood preparedness. The Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program is another NBI program, focusing on poverty reduction and power generation in the Lakes area. These initiatives are funded through the Nile Basin Multi-Donor Trust Fund. Funding for some water projects in the region is controversial. Ethiopia’s Gibe III dam was ineligible for World Bank funding because of concerns about lack of adequate environmental and socio-economic impact assessments. Programs to provide communal water security are numerous, and very diverse, ranging from piped water systems in municipalities to borehole drilling in rural areas.

Projected funding
- current funding for water related issues in EA encompasses an enormous range of aid interventions, government-funded projects, and private investments. It is impossible to estimate how much is devoted to water related development across the region, but it is a major target of investment at all levels. The Gibe III dam in Ethiopia alone is a $1.7 billion dollar project funded with commercial loans and bilateral aid loans, and is the biggest single infrastructure project in Ethiopia.

4. Mineral Resource Conflict – To include displacement, abuse, government collusion/ corruption etc

| Geographic Spread and Scale | DRC: 67,758,000, Rwanda 10,716,379, Burundi 8,575,000, Sudan 30,894,000, South Sudan 8,260,490, Uganda 32,939,800, Kenya 38,610,097 = 243,600,000
| DRC formal economy dominated by mining sector
| Oil comprises 98% of South Sudan government’s income 2009

Regional Impact
- Links to E Kivus proxy wars
- Trans-regional armed movements and insurgencies (LRA etc)
- Link to EA integration
- Minerals: minerals, metals, diamonds, oil, gas.
- DRC: conflict mainly about access, control & trade of 5 key mineral resources: coltan, diamonds, copper, cobalt & gold.
- Others: tin, Niobium, tungsten, pyrochlore, germanium, cassiterite.
- Dodd-Frank bill just address 3Ts & gold (tin, tungsten, tantalum) Tin ore = cassiterite; Tantalum ore = coltan or columbite-tantalite; Tungsten ore = wolframite
- Involvement in mining comes from US, Australia, Canada, S Africa, France, add China, Malaysia for oil
- Timber in south Sudan not considered conflict factor

Development Impact
- DRC: serious environmental impact; network of extractors, armed movements & authorities, regional governments, regional & internat air transporters & MNCs.
- Reliance on mineral export → lower standard of living, lower ranking the Human Development Index between 1991-98, smaller share of income that accrues to the poorest 20% of the population, more vulnerable to economic shocks as prices have grown more volatile since 1970, high rates of child mortality & life expectancy, income inequality,
- Mineral dependent states have unusually high rates of: Corruption; Authoritarian government; Government ineffectiveness; military spending; Civil war.
- Draws labor & capital away from other sectors.
- Oil dependence (though not mineral dependence) is also associated with high rates of child malnutrition; low spending levels on health care; low enrollment rates in primary &
secondary schools; & low rates of adult literacy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• USG strongly behind the Cardin-Lugar 1504 rules provision in the 1502 Dodd-Frank SEC bill that requires companies buying tin, tantalum, tungsten (3Ts), &amp; gold, must report whether these minerals originated in Congo or a neighboring country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• USAID/USG funding to support transparency, good mining/extraction processes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• State Department is producing a map that shows which mines in North &amp; South Kivu are controlled by armed groups, &amp; the legislation mandates that this map be updated every six months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The new bill requires the Secretary of State &amp; USAID, to develop a plan to address the link between human rights abuses, armed conflict in Congo.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local/Other Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• UN Security council recognized “the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade in such resources &amp; the proliferation &amp; trafficking of arms as one of the major factors fueling &amp; exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• G8 recognizes link between illicit mineral trade &amp; violence &amp; encourages private sector to avoid trading in conflict materials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• OECD helping to develop due diligence guidelines for “managing the supply chain of key minerals from conflict-affected &amp; high-risk areas, with particular regard to the Democratic Republic of Congo.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Darfur - Proxy Wars
To include the impact of movements involved in the Darfur conflict on the emergence of South Sudan, the stability of the region (Chad etc), migration and other spillover effects from international influence and intervention (ICC etc).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Spread and Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countries affected:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Currently 30K refugees in Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ethiopia borders Unity State and border region is used as training/staging ground for Sudanese rebel forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional implication: if conflict increases, regional countries will be asked to take a stand (re hum assistance or other support). There is not a lot of regional goodwill towards Khartoum (Bashir +5 generals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Khartoum supports LRA (rumored to be in GOSS, CAR, Darfur), also supports militias in SS. Juba supports SPLM-N and other rebel groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Uganda will support whomever is against Bashir (political opinion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Money is a major issue – hyper inflation in Sudan currently – GOS is running out of money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increased weapons and currency flows from Libya to Darfur as Darfuris working as Kaddafi’s mercenaries return</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration: Darfur since 2003; North/South over 20 years (1983 civil war began)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recently: Sudan proper at war including South Kordofan, Blue Nile states → increased tensions and potential violence in Darfur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Economic:** OIL – GOSS and GOS are overly dependent on oil. If pipeline is turned off for a month, implications for 6 months of repairs. Oil production is peaking now, and will plateau soon. Turning off pipes would bankrupt Sudan and South Sudan.

**Political:** If Khartoum collapses (estimates anywhere from 6 months to a few years from now), who will control resource? Chaos as to who takes over post NCP environment and fills power vacuum (Darfuris, SPLM N…)

**Social:** Food crises expected to worsen in BN and SK states. SS is lacking infrastructure for humanitarian corridor. Famine to be used as a weapon of war in Nuba region.

**USDA/ USG Resources/Interventions**

Current USAID portfolio for Sudan:
- FY11 Sudan approx. $20m
- FY11 SS: approx. $241m
- (no humanitarian assistance included in abovementioned figures)
- Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation Program (AECOM) – ceiling $50m split between North and South
- Grant to UNFPA for training police on preventing GBV in Darfur (approx. $1-2m)
- Bridge Mercy Corps in 3 areas in South (huge contract closing soon)
- Youth Engagement/Civil Society Program (award tbd)
- Wildlife Conservation Society (a couple million for SS)
- Internships
- DG has a civic education program with NDI, IRI is working with political parties.
- GOSS Gov: technical embedding to central ministries
- US Gov’t can only work in 3 areas and Darfur b/c of sanctions. Starting to do some work in Khartoum, b/c exceptions are promoting Peace and Stability and Democracy promotion
- S/CRS stabilization teams only in the south
- Little happening in Darfur except for humanitarian; OFDA doing some early recovery work. GOK does not want anything other than humanitarian.

**Local/Other Resources**

Political Will/Stakeholders:
- Khartoum (no political will on the part of Bashir and five generals-nothing will shift if they remain in power)
- AU
- ICC
- Chad – (supposedly Khartoum is channeling money to the LRA via the GOC)
- IGAD – Ethiopia is running the table on this with the first chair; however, weak.
- Khartoum is developing alliances with China, Iran.
- Ban Ki Moon tried to raise issues with Chinese re financing Khartoum, but didn’t get very far with them.
6. East Kivu - Proxy Wars

To include the impact of movements involved in the conflict on stability of the region, migration and other spillover effects from international influence and intervention as well as regional country conflicts and nation engagement (Rwanda/ RDC etc)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Spread and Scale</th>
<th>Countries Affected: DRC, also Uganda, Rwanda, ROC, and Angola</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Porous borders allow rebel groups to operate in DRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Foreign armed groups remain active in north and South Kivu including: FDLR, LRA, Allied Democratic Forces (Uganda led rebel group) and Forces nationales de liberation. Angolan forced entered DRC during a military operation against Angolan rebel group FLEC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Militias and Rebel forces get money by pillaging mineral wealth from DRC and smuggling it to neighboring countries. Also gain control of timber, charcoal, land, fishing and poaching.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• DDR programs have had limited impact on disarming and reintegrating armed factions into Congolese society, or collapsing them into the DRC armed forces (FARDC). There is no national DDR program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• There is also a large presence of Congolese armed groups: Mai Mai Yakutumba and Sheka, PARECO, LaFontaine, APCLS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Upcoming elections, voter registration is also national id card, so rebels are getting IDs allowing them to travel freely regionally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Few actors will individually benefit from stability, as the status quo allows individuals to personally benefit, thanks to corruption etc…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• From 2011 UNHCR report, approximately 1.7 IDPs; (including 128K displaced in 1st Quarter of 2011) approx. 500K refugees originating from DRC (2011 UNHCR figure)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Impact</th>
<th>Duration: 1994 Rwandan Genocide → Hutu Rebels entered DRC; 1998-2003 Civil war; 2008 joint Rwandan/Congolese operation to capture Nkunda of FDLR;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Economic: Many of these groups are receiving financing from illegal mining (not the LRA though).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Stability of Eastern Congo is always at risk, and this has had marked impact on the development of the region, economically, socially, and infrastructural.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rape has been used as a weapon of war, by all parties displacing villages. Women and girls are particularly vulnerable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Recruitment of youth – livelihoods issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Control of Mineral Resources by communities/local governments instead of by warlords</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions</th>
<th>Congress Passed Dodd Frank Act in July 2010, containing a provision US registered companies using minerals mined in DRC and neighboring countries to carry out due diligence on supply chains.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• FY11 USAID spent $72 m; $95m with PRM funds in DRC total. (Largely Humanitarian Assistance –IDFA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Local/Other Resources               | November 2010: 11 heads of state convened to endure a Minerals Tracking and Certification System from Great Lakes Region. |
- Foreign Consumers of Electronics, large mining corporations. Private sector (makers of electronics, PDAs, etc).
- MONUC – GODRC wants UN PK forces out of DRC by 2012.
- Oct 2010 Ministry of Mining and Finance produced traceability procedures manual for extraction and export.
- Other stakeholders: UNDP, NGOs, MSF, GBV-rights groups
- OECD due diligence framework - requiring companies to adhere to guidelines when using minerals from conflict-affected areas
- UN Security Council adopted similar framework in Nov 2010

7.

Food Security Issues

To include climate change, environmental degradation, migration, economic marginalization, policy and land use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Spread and Scale</th>
<th>42 million worldwide displaced by sudden onset natural disaster, 90% from climate change in 2010—double last 2 decades.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“East Africa is facing the worst food crisis of the 21st Century.” Shah “worst humanitarian crisis in the world”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current famine: 13.3 in Horn affected. 4.5 million Ethiopians, along w 3.6 million Kenyans, 3 million Somalis, &amp; according to the United Nations, well over 100,000 people in Djibouti. The combined effects of conflict &amp; drought have caused an estimated 7.5 million Somalis to flee their homes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. government officials &amp; others have suggested that the situation is expected to get worse before getting better.</td>
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<td>FEWS alerts on Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, East Africa.</td>
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<td>Chronic malnutrition in 30 – 40% stunting in EA, Severe Acute Malnutrition between 10k – 1m in EA countries. (AICF)</td>
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<td>72,804 displaced in Ethiopia in 2008 by natural disaster</td>
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<td>IPCC quotes estimates that, by 2050, 150 million people worldwide may be displaced as a result of the impacts of climate change, mainly the effects of coastal flooding, shoreline erosion &amp; agricultural disruption.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The potential consequences of climate change for water availability, food security, prevalence of disease, coastal boundaries, &amp; population distribution may aggravate existing tensions &amp; generate new conflicts (2009).</td>
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|                   | Prolonged severe weather conditions have led to considerably less food production for years |
|                   | Up to 76% rise in food prices in Horn → violent competition over land & cattle = 100 herdies in Kenya alone died |
|                   | “Much of East Africa could suffer a decline in the length of the growing period for key crops of up to 20 per cent by the end of the century, w the productivity of beans falling by nearly 50 per cent.” |

<p>| USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions | Feed the Future: US interagency lead by USAID, country based. Relevant potential twenty focus countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda. Phase I (of 2) foundational investments –technical, political, &amp; financial support to assist a country in developing its food security country investment plan. Devising policy reforms &amp; in building the capacity for successful implementation of the country-owned plan. Core investments in two key objectives of inclusive agriculture sector growth &amp; improved nutritional status. |
|                                    | President Obama’s pledge at L’Aquila at least $3.5 billion (global, not just USAID) over three years |
|                                    | FEWS |
|                                    | Food Security III Cooperative Agreement Projects |
|                                    | USAID together w 6 partners, is announcing a first-of-its-kind effort to invest $25 million in small- &amp; medium-sized enterprises. The African Agricultural Capital Fund (AACF) |
|                                    | $1b USAID for Ag 2010, $103m 2011 |
|                                    | Declining ag productivity, divestment in infrastructure, poor policies, also affected by significant population growth, climate change, water access &amp; land rights. Increasing food prices. How much of these are issues USAID can affect over 5 years w $20m? |
|                                    | World Dev Rep: to reduce conflict in fragile &amp; poor countries requires new investment in agriculture &amp; rural development. |
|                                    | FFP: Fragile states face a two-fold risk of food-related instability: 1) their govs tend to be riddled w corrupt patron-age politics &amp; w socioeconomic policies that don’t represent the community's interests, &amp; 2) they suffer from poverty, weak institutions, &amp; a lack of legal and social frameworks to address food security issues.” |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Local/Other Resources</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Many aid donors have shifted away from supporting agriculture.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Current?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The United States, Canada, Spain, the Republic of Korea &amp; the Bill &amp; Melinda Gates Foundation will together provide about $900 million in support of the Global Agriculture &amp; Food Security Program (GAFSP). The World Bank will serve as trustee &amp; host of a coordination unit for the fund.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The Horn of Africa received 34 percent of the total Central emergency Response Fund (UN) funding; of this, Somalia received some $60.5 million. So far this year, CERF has contributed to 6 of the 13 2010 Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) appeals: in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), it represents 35 percent of the total funding.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Over the next 5 years, Pearl Capital Partners (PCP), a specialized African agricultural investment fund manager based in Kampala, Uganda, will invest the AACF's $25 million in at least 20 agriculture-related businesses in East Africa.</td>
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8.
Regional Integration Issues

**IGAD, EAC, ICGLR, COMESA and others**

Regional conflicts over trade, border security, regional organizations/management (dealing with spillover effects of electoral violence, corruption issues, etc…)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Spread and Scale</th>
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<tr>
<td>• The realization of a large regional economic bloc encompassing Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda with a combined population of more than 130 million people (2010*), land area of 1.82 million sq kilometers and a combined Gross Domestic Product of $74.5 billion (2009*), bears strategic and geopolitical significance and prospects of a renewed and reinvigorated East African Community despite decades of conflict and anticipated regional instability.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, DRC, Somalia, CAR, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, Djibouti, Congo Brazzaville, and Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have had a history of co-operation dating back to the early 20th century. Inter territorial and transnational conflicts have been contained by cooperation of its members.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Peace and Security has been acknowledged as critical to creation of the right environment upon which regional integration in all aspects can be fostered. As the negotiations for the EAC Common Market progresses, strategies on the control of cross border crime and ensure security of persons and goods as they move within the region are continually being developed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The EAC aims at widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner States in, among others, political, economic and social fields for their mutual benefit. To this extent the EAC countries established a Customs Union in 2005 and a Common Market in 2010. The next phase of the integration will see the bloc enter into a Monetary Union and ultimately become a Political Federation of the East African States.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Is essentially a governance and political response to instability and could be a source for greater regional and economic cooperation.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Development Impact</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Tanzania supports the expansion of the East African Community. In 2010, Tanzanian officials expressed interest in inviting Malawi, DRC and Zambia to join the EAC.</td>
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<td>• Sudan has applied to join the EAC, but its membership is strongly opposed by Tanzania and Uganda, which contend that due to Sudan's lack of a direct border with the EAC, its allegedly discriminatory actions toward black Africans, its record of human rights violations, and its history of hostilities with both Uganda and candidate country South Sudan, it is ineligible to join and its application should be thrown out.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Soon after its formation the mandate of IGADD widened, becoming a vehicle for regional security and political dialogue. Its name was changed to IGAD, Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>• CEWARN is a part of IGADD with a focus on HOA early warning and conflict prevention needs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Impacts: trade, economic growth initiatives, and can be used as a political platform for more coherent policy coordination on border related conflicts and issues.</td>
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</table>
The presidents of Kenya and Rwanda invited South Sudan to apply. Analysts suggested that South Sudan's early efforts to integrate infrastructure, including rail links and oil pipelines, with systems in Kenya and Uganda indicated intention on the part of Juba to pivot away from dependence on Sudan and toward East Africa.

East African Region has adopted treaties to suppress the illicit traffic of drugs, and minerals, and cooperate in the prevention, control, and repression of the illicit traffic through the adoption of specific bilateral and multilateral programs.

On October 28, 2011 the dedicated session for the Sectoral Council of Ministers responsible for EAC Affairs and Planning approved the roadmap for full integration of Burundi and Rwanda in the Community.

Regional Impacts
- Recurring and severe droughts and other natural disasters between 1974 and 1984 caused widespread famine, ecological degradation and economic hardship in the HOA region.
- The six countries of the region took action through the UN to establish an intergovernmental body for development and drought control in their region. At a January 1986 assembly of heads of state and government, an agreement was signed which officially launched the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD).

USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions
- May 2011- USAID and Multi Donor efforts: The EAC’s efforts towards attaining seamless border operations gained new momentum with the commissioning of a resource document to facilitate the region’s journey towards actualizing the One Stop Border Post (OSBP) concept. The workshop organized jointly by the EAC Secretariat, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Trade Mark East Africa, USAID Compete and Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) brought together key stakeholders from EAC and other regional blocs to share ideas and experiences on One Stop Border Posts, a subject of growing importance as integration takes root on the African continent in general and the EAC in particular.
- COMESA (EGAT) and CEWARN (DG and Conflict Office) projects have done some work on EAC integration issues, but have been more targeted at the community level and not at the policy integration level. COMESA has looked at critical trade corridors as well as investment climate stability.
- Funding is moderate and consistent with key donors, USAID, DFID, JICA and the Chinese.
- Trade Mark East Africa a consortium of Private Sector interests in an important stakeholder and funder of the EAC. There is significant private sector potential and interest in strengthening the EAC.
- Several bilateral donor programs use indicators and benchmarks that encourage EAC recognition and strengthen representation and membership within the EAC. (i.e. Burundi and Rwanda)
- USAID/ EA has supported CEWARN and currently has links to programs that coordinate with IGADD and CEWARN.

Local/Other Resources
- EAC Protocol on Good Governance developed to increase regional stability.
- The draft Protocol is in line with the fundamental principles stipulated in the EAC Treaty under Article 6 (d) which emphasizes good governance, including adherence to the rule of law, accountability, transparency, respect for human rights and equal opportunities.
- Policy frameworks and cooperation in place to strengthen regional norms, performance and cooperation.
- The regional integration process is at a high pitch at the moment as reflected by the encouraging progress of the East African Customs Union and the establishment in 2010 of the Common Market.
- The negotiations for the East African Monetary Union, which commenced in 2011, and fast tracking the process towards East African Federation all underscore the serious determination of the East African leadership and citizens to construct a powerful and sustainable East African economic and political bloc.

IGAD Examples (Regional Security, HOA)
- October 26, 2011: At an event held at the United Nations Conference Centre in Addis Ababa and attended by delegates from Member State and diplomats, the Prime Minister of Somalia, Dr. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, launched today the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP).
- The ISSP outlines and integrates a wide range of initiatives around four mutually reinforcing result areas of; counter terrorism, organized crime; maritime security and security institutions capacity building.
- The IGAD Security Sector Program replaces the IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT) which achieved important milestones since its existence for six years.
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<th>9. LRA</th>
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<tr>
<td>To include displacement, human rights abuses, current and past efforts to stop LRA, international transgressions</td>
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</table>

**Geographic Spread and Scale**
- Most direct and impacted countries, Uganda, South Sudan, CAR and DRC.
- Impact on regional instability is severe and systemic. Human trafficking by the LRA is one of the worst situations in the world.
- Upwards of 350,000 impacted by displacement issues. IDP issues stemming from attacks in CAR, DRC and South Sudan are significant and ongoing and have been tracked by numerous international and bilateral organizations.
- Systemic and strategic attacks in neighboring nations threaten stability, effective and collaborative country level cooperation, and show a lack of political will by the Ugandan Government to commit to resolving these cross border incursions by rebel movement grown within its borders.

**Development Impact**
- The conflict continues to slow down Uganda’s development efforts, costing the poor country’s economy a cumulative total of at least $1.33 billion, which is equivalent to 3% of GDP, or $100 million annually.
- The impact now on South Sudan, DRC and CAR is significant and growing annually.
- The LRA conflict has a long history (1987 – present). Although diminished in numbers and influence in Northern Uganda, recent and systemic incursions into South Sudan, DRC and CAR have caused considerable regional instability.
- The most direct and immediate impact and issue is displacement in the border areas of the impacted countries. Displacement is most significant in remote and already conflict prone areas.
- The LRA mobilization and movements in remote border areas, has destabilized fragile and remote country government areas and also disrupted long standing social responses and systems to cross border and regional collaboration and movement.

**USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions**
- USAID Uganda and the USG have intervened consistently with strategies, programs and interventions, but these have been largely funded at the bilateral level and have been focused primarily on Northern Uganda.
- In May 2010, Congress enacted the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and North Uganda Recovery Act, following a long campaign from human rights groups.
- The legislation called on the White House to devise a comprehensive strategy to eliminate the LRA, although it did not commit any funds to do so.
- In late 2010, the White House announced its broad approach, which contained plans to apprehend Kony and his commanders, encourage defections, protect civilians, and increase humanitarian assistance to regions affected by the LRA.
- The October 14 troop announcement adds details to this general plan
- The anti-LRA mission falls firmly within the core remit of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), which is to improve the capacity, effectiveness, and professionalism of African militaries so that they can ultimately deal with their own security challenges.
- There has been less analysis of the regional responses necessary to support the AU and others in responding to the crisis of the LRA. This issue is rarely a top national priority, but rather seen as a political problem or a symptom of poor state control and weak national security apparatus.

**Local/Other Resources**
- Many local civil society organizations (CSOs) complain about a lack of consultation in the design of international aid programs, poor communication by international agencies and NGOs about their role and objectives and lack of accountability to the local population for their actions and policy messages.
- Local civil society actors and organizations are a potentially invaluable partner in humanitarian and development efforts to build up the resilience of communities to the LRA, for example through information dissemination to otherwise inaccessible areas.
- They also have a vital role to play in aiding reconciliation and reintegration of LRA returnees into communities.
- However, the predominance of short-term, international humanitarian funding programs attracts staff away from local CSOs and has also resulted in a proliferation of opportunistic local CSOs.
- Only civil society has so far in practice endorsed the importance of a regional approach to end the conflict by peaceful means. A Regional Civil Society Task Force, comprising a
number of religious and traditional leaders from across the conflict-affected countries, gathers at regular intervals to analyze the status of the conflict, provide mutual support and look for ways forward.

- Since they began, these interfaith meetings have come a long way in achieving consensus and provide evidence that civil society is playing a key role in bringing diverse and sometimes dissenting voices together through dialogue and thus laying the ground for coordinated action.

10.
Failed States/ Ungoverned Spaces

Regional insecurity and conflicts stemming from failed states, poorly governed regions, or countries in transition over central government authority

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Spread and Scale</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Somalia, Sudan, Chad, DRC, CAR and Kenya (top 20) are concerns. Somalia is ranked #1 for the 4th consecutive year.</td>
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<td>- Regional insecurity, mass displacement caused by insecurity and food shortages in border regions is causing political, economic and social tensions (i.e. Kenya and Somalia).</td>
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<td>- There are several regional areas where border management and security as well as displacement and migration areas are taxing government responses for containment. Somalia and the impact of its state failure is significant in the region and the impact economically and politically many feel is pushing regional governments to crisis.</td>
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<td>- There has been an argument that the impact of a failed state is largely a problem for its inhabitants and less one of regional instability, but in the case of Somalia this may need to be analyzed further.</td>
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<td>- The impact on displacement in Somalia alone in 2011 topped 560,000 people.</td>
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<td>- The trajectory for Somalia and its impact regionally on border countries and areas is significant and prolonged.</td>
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<td>- There is also evidence that recruitment for insurgency is high and systemic and that this problem is growing exponentially across the region.</td>
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<th>Development Impact</th>
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<td>- According to Oxford University economist Paul Collier and his colleague Lisa Chauvet, the total cost of a single country falling into the &quot;fragile state&quot; category, for itself and its neighbors, may reach $85 billion. This is a gargantuan sum, equivalent to 70 percent of worldwide official development assistance from international donors in 2009.</td>
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<td>- The economic and political impact of failed states in East Africa would be difficult to quantify, but is there a case to be made for looking at the vulnerability and risk of state failure in certain region states such as Somalia and/ or CAR. Is there an appropriate and reasonable approach for a $20 million USAID program?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Economic impacts from instability in Somalia are clearly critical to border nations, especially Kenya.</td>
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<td>- Social and diplomatic impacts of recent Kenya incursions and interventions in the border regions also bring regional relations and stability to question.</td>
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<tr>
<th>USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Indeed, the perceived need to counter the failed-state threat has transformed U.S. military, diplomatic, and development policy in the post-9/11 era.</td>
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<td>- Seeking to bolster the world's most vulnerable countries, police its &quot;ungoverned spaces,&quot; and mitigate negative &quot;spillovers&quot; from failed states, the Pentagon, the State Department, and USAID adopted new doctrines, reallocated budgets, and embraced new missions of conflict prevention and state-building.</td>
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<td>- Governments and international institutions from Britain to the World Bank followed suit. This flurry of activity reflects a shared conviction: In an interdependent world, our collective security is only as strong as its weakest link.</td>
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<td>- In the words of USAID: &quot;When development and governance fail in a country, the consequences engulf entire regions and leap around the world. Terrorism, political violence, civil wars, organized crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking, infectious diseases, environmental crises, refugee flows, and mass migration cascade across the borders of weak states more destructively than ever before.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<th>Local/Other Resources</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Regional bodies have been important in maintaining country level engagement even when significant border areas or considered ungoverned, or in control of non state actors (i.e. Somalia, parts of DRC, CAR etc).</td>
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<tr>
<td>- CSO and Regional network analysis is weak in some of these countries and regional entities need more funding and coordinated technical assistance (i.e. CEWARN, ICGLR, etc).</td>
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## 1. Land Use Issues
To include tenure, ownership, property rights, land use conflicts, migration/settlement issues and legal issues

### Geographic Spread and Scale

- All countries affected: Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, ROSS, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, CAR
- Uneven geographic impact – more densely populated areas and areas of heavy competition for land much more affected.
- Large-scale displacement – IDPs and refugees -- across the region as added source of tension over land.

### Pact on regional instability

- Land rights and disputes at the heart of many of the region’s worst armed conflicts – including Rwandan genocide, Darfur crisis, Somali civil war of 1991-92, Kenyan post-election violence of 2009, Gambella insurgency in Ethiopia, coastal Kenyan tensions, etc.\(^70\) Most of these crises began as internal clashes over land but spilled over across borders. This issue is also an excellent grievance for extremist groups (usually ethno-extremists) and insurgencies to exploit. User rights to land are not only a matter of life or death for farmers and pastoralists; it is also a critical component of contemporary politics, as a base for politicians and their ethnic groups. The increased use of ethno-federalism and decentralization along ethnic lines across much of the region has exacerbated tensions over land by inadvertently creating politically sanctioned zones of exclusive ethnic claims on land. Worsening drought and climate change, and rapid growth in populations, is worsening land disputes as well, increasing “land hunger” that is partially responsible for some ongoing cross-border conflicts, including instability in eastern DRC. Land-grabbing and land banking is a major source of tensions as well. Concerns over long-term leasing of land to foreign governments are also an increasing source of tension, though the scale of this type of land alienation is still small. Even urban areas are affected, especially in contested peri-urban zones where deeded private property regimes collide with traditional, communal control over rangeland. Most aspects of land disputes do not spill across borders, but some do. If internal borders (such as Ethiopia’s ethno-federal states) are considered borders, then many more of these land disputes constitute cross-border conflicts.

- Land access issues raise the question of citizenship across the region. In many border zones, pastoral populations move across borders, or communities are located on both sides of a border. East Africa residents frequently claim user rights in second countries on the basis of pre-existing customary law and usage; some land-holders are disenfranchised with charges they are “foreigners” and hence cannot own land in a country.

- Another land related conflict issue across East Africa are international borders, which are contested in many places – all of Somalia’s borders, the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, the Eritrea-Djibouti border, the borders of the Great Lakes (Uganda-DRC, Uganda-Kenya), South Sudan-Sudan, and South Sudan and Kenya. These have generally been contained, but have occasionally triggered major interstate wars. Where high value energy reserves or other natural resources are discovered in these contested border areas, stakes rise and the risk of serious armed conflict increases. At present by far the worst instance of armed conflict and displacement over a contested border is occurring in South Sudan and Sudan’s borders areas, where well over 200,000 people have been displaced and hundreds killed in recent fighting.

### Number of people affected

- If only land use conflicts which have some cross-border feature are considered, an estimated 50 million residents of East Africa are affected.

### Trajectory: Current and future projections

- Certain to worsen, like water, land are a fixed asset in face of rapid population growth and heightened demands. Increased attempts to improve

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per hectare food production in the region via large-scale private or para-statal farming will alienate still more land, especially along river valleys, generating even greater clashes with pastoralists and small farmers. In this sense, development progress will at least in the short to medium term worsen rather than improve land use conflicts. To the extent that land use and ownership is tied up with rights to resources beneath the surface (oil, natural gas, precious metals), new discoveries of mineral and energy deposits in the region exacerbates land rights conflicts still further, highlighting unresolved disputes over what constitutes a national asset versus an asset of a local ethnic group or community. The insurgency and counter-insurgency in eastern Ethiopia at Daghabuur, unresolved land disputes along the Sudan-South Sudan border, and unresolved border dispute between Puntland and Somaliland in northern Somalia are all animated by rights to energy resources beneath the surface (treated in a separate part of the matrix).

### Development Impact

- Disputes over land rights and use in the context of development have been an enduring issue since the colonial era, when valuable land was alienated for use in large-scale cash cropping schemes. As noted above, there is every reason to expect this will remain a conflict issues into the indefinite future.

- **Projected Impact over 5 years**
  - with rapid population growth, new initiatives by governments across the region to increase large-scale, commercial farming and irrigated agriculture, dramatic growth in cities, and rapid growth in the value of all types of land, land use and ownership issues are explosive as a source of conflict, and every year they are left unresolved increases the likelihood of more Rwanda and Rift valley type communal violence.

### Economic

- Unresolved land use and ownership is a major deterrent to most private investment.

### Political

- Land use and rights issues across the region beg a fundamental question of identity and rights – blood rights, birth rights, or rights by citizenship as the criteria for determining who may reside, own land, and exploit the land in what areas of the country. In most parts of East Africa, this remains an unresolved and politically charged question.

### Social

- No other issue is used to mobilize ethnic conflict as powerfully as land rights. Land use and ownership disputes also lay bare the tension between customary tenure systems and communal control of land versus modern land tenure and the treatment of land as a private commodity to be bought and sold.

### USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions

USAID has exceptionally long and extensive experience in building expertise on land tenure systems both generally and in East Africa, dating back to the early 1960s. Much of that expertise is housed today in universities and consultancy firms. This means that start-up costs in terms of research and analysis would be very low on this issue.

**Current Programs**

- The most important global USG initiative related to land is the “Feed the Future” global food security program. Interestingly, the initiative’s strategy focuses almost entirely on technological innovations and makes little mention of land tenure and usage systems.71

### Stakeholders, partners

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**Political and Diplomatic will**
- As a general rule, land issues have generally been treated in diplomatic circles as “low politics” or local matters, of less immediate appeal than conflict mediation at the national level. That said, there is widespread and growing appreciation that land is an underlying source of conflict and ethnic mobilization across East Africa.

**Economic variables (Funding etc)**
- unknown – need help with this

### Local/Other Resources

**Stakeholders (local, regional, economic and political)**
- Locally, almost all communities are major stakeholders in land use and ownership systems. But not all are stakeholders in compromise. Some groups – those with superior force of arms or in possession of political power in the capital – may prefer to use political or coercive measures to appropriate land and shape land access and control outcomes to lay claim to newly acquired land at another group’s expense. Who constitutes a stakeholder and who constitutes a spoiler in land issues is entirely situational. Nationally, most regional governments prefer policy outcomes that favor modern land tenure systems and in some cases long-lease systems in which the government ultimately retains ownership over the land. Private agro-industries strongly prefer reliable modern land tenure and deeded property rights as a precondition for investment, though some are willing to risk more ambiguous arrangements. Land rights are viewed as generally a domestic rather than regional concern and so region-wide mechanisms to address land issues are underdeveloped. Importantly, women may constitute the single greatest stakeholders, as changes in land rights laws and practices can either protect or undermine their claims to land.\(^{72}\)

**Local will and capacity**
- As noted above, the political will locally to address land issues varies according to interest. Some political figures and their constituencies stand to benefit from land access arrangements favoring those with the political or military means to acquire land through extra-legal means, and will resist efforts to build rule of law programs designed to reduce or eliminate land disputes.

**Resolutions and actions taken (peace negotiations, diplomatic tools, force, military intervention etc)**
- For contested borders, regional states have at times opted for negotiations, at other times have engaged in warfare or military occupation of land as a means of creating a fait accompli. Faced with cross border land usage by pastoralists, states have generally lacked the capacity to enforce border even if they so desired, and generally tolerate seasonal movements of pastoralists and their herds. When pastoral groups seek to permanently claim new rangeland across borders at another group’s expense – a chronic problem along Kenya’s northern borders with Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia – some states have sought to intervene militarily or have armed local paramilitaries to protect the interests of their local clients.

**Current programs**
- Regional states have committed to agricultural production in general, through the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program (CAADP), but there are no region-wide initiatives to address land use and land conflict.

**Projected funding**

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\(^{72}\) Aili Marie Tripp, “Women’s Movements, Customary Law, and Land Rights in Africa: The Case of Uganda,” African Studies Quarterly 7, no.4: [online] URL: [http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v74a1.htm](http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v74a1.htm)
2. Crime and Extremism

Include piracy, terrorism, organized crime, recruitment, transborder crime, illicit trade and trafficking and influence.

- All countries are affected—Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, ROSS, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, CAR. But considerable variation exists by country, within countries, and by type of crime. Somalia is hardest hit by these problems, especially by extremism, piracy, and illicit trade, including drug and smuggling and human trafficking. Organized crime disproportionately affects DRC, Kenya. Transborder crime is a major problem in Kenya, Uganda, DRC, South Sudan, Sudan, Burundi, and Ethiopia. Illicit trade and trafficking is a major problem in Kenya, Uganda, and south Sudan. Terrorism has hit Kenya and Uganda especially hard in recent years; Tanzania in earlier years. Recruitment into criminal gangs and extremist groups has been a particular problem in Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, and DRC. Violent crimes committed by gangs and autonomous militia or paramilitary have been especially severe in DRC, Republic of Congo, south Sudan, Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia. Most of this criminal violence occurs within states, but cross-border criminality is endemic along poorly policed borders, especially in the Karamoja cluster (Uganda-Sudan-Ethiopia-Kenya border), the Kenya-Somali border, and South Sudan-DRC-CAR border area. The impact of each of these types of criminality varies considerably by location within countries.

- Importantly, this problem has global reach, as the region’s large Diasporas are sometimes heavily involved in the criminal or terrorist activities. When this Diaspora resides and operates inside the US, it becomes a domestic law enforcement concern as well.

Geographic Spread and Scale

- Piracy: limited. Its destabilizing affects are mainly felt in the Somali region of Puntland; otherwise, impact is mainly economic in the region.

- Terrorism: exceptionally high in Somalia; very high in Kenya and Somaliland; moderately high in Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Djibouti. Most terrorism acts and credible threats of terrorism in recent years have come from the jihadist group al-shabaab, out of Somalia but with physical presence in Kenya. Shabaab’s threats and actual cross-border attacks (into Kenya and Uganda) have prompted two major cross-border military campaigns—Ethiopia’s two year intervention into southern Somalia in 2007-08, and Kenya’s current military incursion into southern Somalia in October 2011. It is also the rationale for the presence of 10,000 regional peacekeeping forces from Uganda and Burundi (and soon Djibouti) in Somalia, where they are engaged in direct armed combat with shabaab. Other terrorist groups in the region include the Lord’s Resistance Army (treated separately in this assessment) and a number of armed groups that have engaged in terror tactics (such as the Janjaweed, various militias in eastern DRC, and ONLF, and arguably the Mungiki sect in Kenya). Most groups engaging in terrorist tactics in East Africa are informed by extremist ethno-chauvinism.

- Cross border insurgencies: very high in much of the region; occasionally exceptionally high. Armed insurgencies against regional governments that cross borders and become regional security threats are ubiquitous in East Africa, and often involve external sponsorship by regional governments in proxy wars against one another. Over twenty armed insurgencies involving external patrons have occurred in the region since 2000. At present cross border insurgencies are most destabilizing in south Sudan and Sudan; in the recent past, destabilizing insurgencies and counter-insurgencies which crossed borders in East Africa include the Darfur crisis, the Congolese civil war, the Rwandan genocide and war, the Lord’s Resistance Army, the SPLA and the Sudanese civil war, and the Burundian civil war.

- Recruitment: moderately high in selected locations. Recruitment into shabaab is a source of regional instability in Kenya and Uganda; the latter was targeted by a shabaab cell composed of East African recruits in a terrorist attack in July 2010, killing 74. Cross-border recruitment of youth into violent criminal groups and insurgencies considered terrorist by some regional governments occurs across much of the region, especially where aggrieved ethnic groups form insurgencies and are located across borders. This is a particular problem along the Burundi-DRC border, the Kenya-Somali border, the Kenya-Ethiopia border (producing occasional cross-border police actions by Ethiopian military into Kenya, against Kenyan citizens); the Sudan-
Organized crime: ubiquitous in the region, moderately destabilizing in some areas. Organized criminal rackets usually prefer predictable operating environments, but work to produce conditions of chronic lawlessness and state weakness in which their activities can flourish. Organized crime is closely linked to illicit trade and trafficking, discussed below. In parts of East Africa, organized crime is closely associated with existing local or national authorities. Piracy in Somalia’s Puntland region implicates local authorities; drug trafficking through Kenya is believed to involve government officials at high levels. The Mungiki sector movement in Kenya is viewed by some as an ethnic mafia using extreme violence in pursuit of its interests.

Illicit trade and trafficking: very high. Small arms trafficking through the region – mainly moving in whatever direction the market dictates across a belt through southern Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Sudan – is a major contributing factor to regional instability. Most of this trade is decentralized, but major arms traffickers such as Victor Bout have been active in the region. Transnational drug trafficking is rapidly becoming a growing source of destabilization inside Kenya. Smuggling of high value minerals is a major problem in eastern DRC and major driver of armed conflict there.

Cross-border criminality: chronic, destabilizing locally but generally manageable for regional instability. Most of the poorly policed border areas of the region are plagued by cross-border criminal raids, most often in the form of cattle rustling. These are producing casualty levels akin to those of civil wars in some places. Cross-border kidnappings were the trigger for Kenyan military incursion into Somalia.

Number of people affected.

Excluding victims of violent criminality that is strictly domestic in nature, an estimated 10 to 20 million residents of East Africa are directly affected by cross-border criminality or terrorism. These are mainly populations in the most volatile border regions.

Development Impact

Duration of Issue

Cross-border criminality has worsened significantly across the entire region since the late 1980s. Criminality is regularly cited as a major impediment to development in the region, but most of this concern is over crime and domestic corruption that is not cross-border in nature, and hence beyond the purview of this project.

Projected Impact over 5 years

Crime and extremism are long-term challenges of governance, legitimacy, and rule of law that are unlikely to improve quickly. Progress on this score will be measured in decades, not years.

Economic.

Recent cross-border kidnappings by Somalis in northern Kenya (not clear yet if criminal or terrorist in nature) has had a devastating effect on coastal tourism in Kenya.

Cross border criminality has been a major development setback locally, where insecurity is so high that production is hurt or internal displacement occurs. Because most of the border areas are remote and far from economic centers, the impact on the wider economies of regional states has been limited. Periodic terrorist attacks have caused sharp but temporary collapses in tourism and business investments in Kenya and Uganda. The chronic...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local/Other Resources</th>
<th>USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td><strong>Expert Analysis</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The USG has devoted tremendous assets to analyze extremism, criminal violence, and terrorism in East Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current Programs</strong></td>
<td><strong>Current Programs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Too many to list in this format. A sample includes: DOD civil affairs and USAID programs designed to address roots of radicalism; public affairs and psy-ops campaigns to create alternative narratives to violent extremism; a host of training and support programs to strengthen policing and security sector capacity; anti-corruption pressure and programs; employment generation projects; kinetic operations out of Camp Lemonier and offshore, targeting terrorist leaders; operations to monitor and block financial transactions which channel assets to terrorist groups; and domestic law enforcement surveillance and investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stakeholders, partners</strong></td>
<td><strong>Stakeholders, partners</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A wide array of internal stakeholders in the USG have a powerful interest in advancing successful programming to combat extremism and transnational crime in East Africa. These include USAID, Defense, State, Treasury, DEA, Homeland Security, the FBI, and others in the executive branch; Congress is also strongly committed to the goal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political and Diplomatic will</strong></td>
<td><strong>Political and Diplomatic will</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The USG has made its commitment to combating extremism amply clear, especially since 9/11. This is a top priority for the US in East Africa. It has also made its commitment to combating crime, especially corruption, a high priority, as evidenced by the Millennium Challenge Fund requirements. The DEA is active in East Africa in combating drug trafficking, and the US has taken a lead in anti-piracy naval task forces at sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic variables (Funding etc)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Economic variables (Funding etc)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• USAID is a minor source of funding on this issue compared to the assets of other US agencies, which are devoting significant funding to the problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stakeholders (local, regional, economic and political)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Stakeholders (local, regional, economic and political)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• This is an extremely complex calculation, as many actors in the region at the local and national level have some interests in aspects of criminal operations and so will be spoilers to efforts to address crime. Governments in the region have been uneven in their regional cooperation on anti-crime and anti-terrorism intelligence sharing for fear of the information being misused or leaked, reflecting powerful level of distrust in the region at the inter-governmental level. Some local ethnic or religious groups empathize with extremist groups and would dispute the label of “extremism.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local will and capacity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Local will and capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Variable. Some regional governments are complicit in the transnational criminality and will support efforts to address, but not resolve, the problem.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Others may fear retribution from powerful non-state actors and refuse to cooperate. Still others will seek to redirect US counter-terrorist concerns toward domestic rivals.

Resolutions and actions taken (peace negotiations, diplomatic tools, force, military intervention etc)
- States in the region have taken vigorous unilateral steps to address cross-border criminal and terrorism threats – from Rwanda’s interventions into eastern DRC to Ethiopia’s interventions into Somalia. Multilateral steps to address criminal and terrorist threats have been less in evidence, the main exception being the regionally-led African Union peacekeeping operation in Somalia.

Current programs
- AMISOM peacekeeping operation; Kenyan military incursion into Somalia.

Projected funding
- UN support of Amisom forces in Somalia is likely to continue.

3. Water Conflict

Water Conflict
include issues of pastoral and ethnic conflict over water, access, rights, and management of trans boundary water access

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Spread and Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Countries affected</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, ROSS, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, CAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Types of water conflicts</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Local water disputes are endemic throughout all countries of EA; but in some regions local water conflict are manageable, in others disputes are serious and fatal. Most of these disputes involve pastoral and agricultural communities, but there is growing concern about conflicts between rapidly growing municipalities over underground water sources – a number of cities in EA are increasingly short of water (Harar, Dire Dawa, Hargeisa, and Nairobi).  <strong>Intra-state regional</strong> water disputes over river usage and flow affects several of Ethiopia’s federal states and Kenyan Provinces, and is likely to become a growing issue for ROSS and Somalia. <strong>Regional Inter-state</strong> conflict over water focuses mainly on control of Nile river flow and usage. Unresolved disputes over Nile river water and challenges to existing treaties governing water use affects all states in the region except Djibouti, Somalia/Somaliland, CAR, and Congo-B. <strong>Bi-lateral interstate</strong> tensions over river flow and usage effects Ethiopia-Kenya (the Gibe III Dam, blocking flow of the Omo River into Lake Turkana) and Ethiopia-Somalia. Bilateral interstate conflict also exists over Lake boundaries and usage—including fisheries (Migingu Island, Lake Victoria, pitting Kenya vs. Uganda) and energy resources (Lake Albert, pitting Uganda vs. DRC).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Impact on regional instability
- Exceptionally high, as the stakes for downstream countries (Sudan, Egypt) are literally existential, while the stakes for upriver watershed states for development and hydro-electric needs are very high, as existing treaty allocation of water use heavily favors Egypt and Sudan. The two most populous and powerful states in the region, Ethiopia and Egypt, have threatened to go to war over the flow of the Blue Nile, and a 2010 accord reached by watershed states -- the “River Nile Basin Co-operative Framework” – without Egyptian or Sudanese involvement further poisoned regional relations. Watershed states are already unilaterally abrogating the 1929 Treaty. The additional of a new state – South Sudan – adds to the urgency of addressing Nile water usage. Some communal wars that have spilled across borders have had water shortages as a major driver of conflict – the Darfur crisis included.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of people affected</th>
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</table>
- (not counting Egypt, at 82 million): 190 to 200 million people for Nile;\(^ {74}\) 6-7 million for river disputes between Ethiopia and Kenya or Somalia; all 381.2 million East Africa residents for general disputes over rural or urban local water sources

- “Affected” in this context means deprived or potentially deprived of water access or energy from hydro-electric dams. Actual conflict-related deaths due to water across the region are almost entirely local, estimated in the tens of thousands in the past decade (more if the war in Darfur is attributed in part to the drying out of northern pastoral areas), and hundreds of thousands displaced.

Trajectory: Current and future projections.

- All projections point to water shortage disputes at both local and interstate levels becoming a major source of armed conflict. This is driven by reduced water supply (climate change, drought, growing use of water for hydroelectricity); rapidly growing populations (annual growth rates ranging from 2.0% to 3.6% by country); privatization of previously communal water sources; rapid urbanization and heavily urban water usage and energy demands. Many think tanks and conflict early warning groups consider “water wars” to be the single greatest threat to peace and stability in regions like East Africa in coming years. Egyptian officials have described calls to renege on the 1929 Nile Water Agreement an “act of war.”\(^ {75}\)

Shrinkage of some of East Africa’s largest lakes is direct evidence of reduced water resources – Lake Turkana’s shores have now receded so far south the Lake is no longer in Ethiopia, producing growing communal clashes there,\(^ {76}\) and Lake Victoria – the world’s second largest freshwater lake, on which 30 million East Africans depend for water or livelihoods -- is at its lowest levels in 40 years.\(^ {77}\)

### Development Impact

**Duration of Issue**

- As a development issue, water access and conflicts generated by it have been a central problem since the colonial era, especially in more arid zones of East Africa. Local level water conflicts over water even predate the colonial era. Into the future, this issue will be a permanent source of tensions and perhaps armed conflict, as local and inter-state competition for water worsens.

**Projected Impact over 5 years**

- This is a pivotal period for water management in East Africa, as the watershed states make moves to re-negotiate Nile usage allocation via the River Nile Basin Co-operative Framework, the creation of a new riparian state South Sudan throws into question water usage allocation, Ethiopia completes construction of a series of dams and irrigation schemes along its rivers affecting flow into neighboring countries, and other watershed states unilaterally abrogate the 1929 treaty. The projected impact of local level water shortages is harder to predict because seasonal rainfall plays such an important part of this equation.

**Economic**

- Worsening water access and supplies today are a major constraint on development across the region. Development trade-offs pitting livelihoods versus hydro-electric power, irrigated agriculture versus pastoralism. Many of the poorest countries in the world are in East Africa and are Nile watershed states, and will increasingly insist on the right to use more water for development. Ironically, in parts of the region enjoying greater development levels, per capita water demands are spiking due to private consumption, higher energy demands, and greater industrial water use. Water scarcity is thus a constraint on development and development exacerbates water scarcity.

**Political**

\(^ {74}\) Some countries entire population would be affected by war over Nile resources; in other cases only some regions of individual countries are affected.

\(^ {75}\) [http://www.ntz.info/gen/n01799.html](http://www.ntz.info/gen/n01799.html)

\(^ {76}\) “When the Water Ends: Africa’s Climate Conflicts” [http://e360.yale.edu/feature/when_the_water_ends_africas_climate_conflicts/2331/](http://e360.yale.edu/feature/when_the_water_ends_africas_climate_conflicts/2331/)

- Weak water management systems nationally and regionally are a symptom of political underdevelopment, not a factor caused by water shortages.

Social
- Water shortages at the local level place a special burden on women, who are usually responsible for procurement of water.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expert Analysis</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Water conflicts in East Africa do not appear to be a major topic of research for the USG. Several defense studies looking ahead at water wars have been published in defense journals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Current Programs
- US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in March 2011 that the US would make water as "a top foreign policy priority." According to the US Department of State, "since the 2005 passage of the Senator Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act, the U.S. government has provided a total of $3.4 billion for the water sector and sanitation to developing countries around the globe. We also contribute to UN organizations and multilateral development banks through our annual dues and through special multi-donor trust funds related to water projects. . . . USG financial institutions such as the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), USAID's Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade Bureau and its Development Credit Office and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) are working to leverage and mobilize additional private capital for the water sector. . . . Moreover, to access small and medium-scale financing, the USG is partnering with NGOs, microfinance institutions and private banks to catalyze micro- and meso-finance projects that often benefit difficult-to-reach communities – women and their families, small entrepreneurs, community-based organizations." In East Africa, the USG provides support to the Nile Basin initiative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local/Other Resources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stakeholders (local, regional, economic and political)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- all Nile riparian states are major stakeholders in the Nile river dispute. The Nile Basin Initiative, created in 1999, brings together all Nile basin states and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

78 [http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/other/2011/158419.htm](http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/other/2011/158419.htm)
79 Ibid.
is dedicated to “achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of and benefit from the common Nile Basin water resources.”

Locally, political officials in areas of water scarcity are under tremendous pressure from constituencies to guarantee water access. Irrigated agricultural schemes throughout the region – parastatals and private – are major stakeholders in river water allocation. Industries throughout the region are stakeholders in both access to water and hydro-electric power. Consumers – urban, pastoral, and agricultural – are also stakeholders in access to well water, river water, and piped water.

Local will and capacity

- Very high interest at all levels in addressing problem, but seen by many pivotal actors as a zero-sum game with few opportunities for negotiated settlement. The problem is exacerbated with regard to river water by the fact that watershed countries or populations have essentially veto control over water flow if negotiations break down.

Solutions and actions taken (peace negotiations, diplomatic tools, force, military intervention etc)

- The Nile water is regulated by the 1929 Treaty, but that treaty is under attack by upstream states. The Nile Basin Initiative is the regional organization tasked with managing water usage and other cooperation between riparian states. The World Bank has the mandate to serve as lead donor for the NBI. The Nile River Basin Co-operative Framework was an accord of five upstream states, without the consent of Egypt or Sudan.

Current programs

- Under the NBI, the “Shared Vision Program” involves regional cooperation on a wide range of water usage and management issues. The Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program is based in Addis Ababa and focuses on facilitation of fast-track development and multi-purpose projects in watershed management, energy, irrigation and drainage, and flood preparedness. The Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program is another NBI program, focusing on poverty reduction and power generation in the Lakes area. These initiatives are funded through the Nile Basin Multi-Donor Trust Fund. Funding for some water projects in the region is controversial. Ethiopia’s Gibe III dam was ineligible for World Bank funding because of concerns about lack of adequate environmental and socio-economic impact assessments. Programs to provide communal water security are numerous, and very diverse, ranging from piped water systems in municipalities to borehole drilling in rural areas.

Projected funding

- current funding for water related issues in EA encompasses an enormous range of aid interventions, government-funded projects, and private investments. It is impossible to estimate how much is devoted to water related development cross the region, but it is a major target of investment at all levels. The Gibe III dam in Ethiopia alone is a $1.7 billion dollar project funded with commercial loans and bilateral aid loans, and is the biggest single infrastructure project in Ethiopia.

### 4. Mineral Resource Conflict – To include displacement, abuse, government collusion/ corruption etc

**Geographic Spread and Scale**

- DRC 67,758,000, Rwanda 10,718,379, Burundi 8,575,000, Sudan 30,894,000, South Sudan 8,260,490, Uganda 32,939,800, Kenya 38,610,097 = 243,600,000
- DRC formal economy dominated by mining sector
- Oil comprises 98% of South Sudan government’s income 2009

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### Regional Impact
- Links to E Kivus proxy wars
- Trans-regional armed movements and insurgencies (LRA etc)
- Link to EA integration
- Minerals: minerals, metals, diamonds, oil, gas.
- DRC: conflict mainly about access, control & trade of 5 key mineral resources: coltan, diamonds, copper, cobalt & gold.
- Others: tin, Niobium, tungsten, pyrochlore, germanium, cassiterite.
- Dodd-Frank bill just address 3Ts & gold (tin, tungsten, tantalum) Tin ore = cassiterite; Tanatalum ore = coltan or columbite-tantalite; Tungsten ore = wolframite
- Involvement in mining comes from US, Australia, Canada, S Africa, France, add China, Malaysia for oil
- Timber in south Sudan not considered conflict factor

### Development Impact
- DRC: serious environmental impact; network of extractors, armed movements &/or authorities, regional governments, regional & internatl air transporters & MNCs.
- Reliance on mineral export → lower standard of living, lower ranking the Human Development Index between 1991-98, smaller share of income that accrues to the poorest 20% of the population, more vulnerable to economic shocks as prices have grown more volatile since 1970, high rates of child mortality & low life expectancy, income inequality.
- Mineral dependent states have unusually high rates of: Corruption; Authoritarian government; Government ineffectiveness; military spending; Civil war.
- Draws labor & capital away from other sectors.
- Oil dependence (though not mineral dependence) is also associated with high rates of child malnutrition; low spending levels on health care; low enrollment rates in primary & secondary schools; & low rates of adult literacy.

### USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions
- USG strongly behind the Cardin-Lugar 1504 rules provision in the 1502 Dodd-Frank SEC bill that requires companies buying tin, tantalum, tungsten (3Ts), & gold, must report whether these minerals originated in Congo or a neighboring country.
- USAID/USG funding to support transparency, good mining/extraction processes?
- State Department is producing a map that shows which mines in North & South Kivu are controlled by armed groups, & the legislation mandates that this map be updated every six months.
- The new bill requires the Secretary of State & USAID, to develop a plan to address the link between human rights abuses, armed conflict in Congo.

### Local/Other Resources
- UN Security council recognized “the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade in such resources & the proliferation & trafficking of arms as one of the major factors fueling & exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa.”
- G8 recognizes link between illicit mineral trade & violence & encourages private sector to avoid trading in conflict materials.
- OECD helping to develop due diligence guidelines for “managing the supply chain of key minerals from conflict-affected & high-risk areas, with particular regard to the Democratic Republic of Congo.”

### 5. Darfur - Proxy Wars
To include the impact of movements involved in the Darfur conflict on the emergence of South Sudan, the stability of the region (Chad etc), migration and other spillover effects from international influence and intervention (ICC etc).
### Geographic Spread and Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries affected:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- Currently 30K refugees in Ethiopia
- Ethiopia borders Unity State and border region is used as training/staging ground for Sudanese rebel forces.

Regional implication: if conflict increases, regional countries will be asked to take a stand (re hum assistance or other support). There is not a lot of regional goodwill towards Khartoum (Bashir +5 generals)
- Khartoum supports LRA (rumored to be in GOSS, CAR, Darfur), also supports militias in SS. Juba supports SPLM-N and other rebel groups.
- Uganda will support whomever is against Bashir (political opinion)
- Money is a major issue – hyper inflation in Sudan currently – GOS is running out of money
- Increased weapons and currency flows from Libya to Darfur as Darfuris working as Kaddafi’s mercenaries return

### Development Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Darfur since 2003; North/South over 20 years (1983 civil war began)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Recently: Sudan proper at war including South Kordofan, Blue Nile states → increased tensions and potential violence in Darfur

Economic: OIL – GOSS and GOS are overly dependent on oil. If pipeline is turned off for a month, implications for 6 months of repairs. Oil production is peaking now, and will plateau soon. Turning off pipes would bankrupt Sudan and South Sudan.

Political: If Khartoum collapses (estimates anywhere from 6 months to a few years from now), who will control resource? Chaos as to who takes over post NCP environment and fills power vacuum (Darfuris, SPLM N…)

Social: Food crises expected to worsen in BN and SK states. SS is lacking infrastructure for humanitarian corridor. Famine to be used as a weapon of war in Nuba region.

### USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources/Interventions</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Envoy Lyman. However, US influence not as high as before; sense of false promises after peaceful secession (i.e. state sponsors of terrorism list, sanctions, etc…)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Current USAID portfolio for Sudan:
- FY11 Sudan approx. $20m
- FY11 SS: approx. $241m
• (no humanitarian assistance included in abovementioned figures)
• Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation Program (AECOM) – ceiling $50m split between North and South
• Grant to UNFPA for training police on preventing GBV in Darfur (approx. $1-2m)
• Bridge Mercy Corps in 3 areas in South (huge contract closing soon)
• Youth Engagement/Civil Society Program (award tbd)
• Wildlife Conservation Society (a couple million for SS)
• Internews
• DG has a civic education program with NDI, IRI is working with political parties.
• GOSS Gov: technical embedding to central ministries
• US Gov’t can only work in 3 areas and Darfur b/c of sanctions. Starting to do some work in Khartoum, b/c exceptions are promoting Peace and Stability and Democracy promotion
• S/CRS stabilization teams only in the south
• Little happening in Darfur except for humanitarian; OFDA doing some early recovery work. GOK does not want anything other than humanitarian.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Will/Stakeholders:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum (no political will on the part of Bashir and five generals-nothing will shift if they remain in power)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad – (supposedly Khartoum is channeling money to the LRA via the GOC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD – Ethiopia is running the table on this with the first chair; however, weak.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Ban Ki Moon tried to raise issues with Chinese re financing Khartoum, but didn’t get very far with them.
- DFID (UKAID) Stabilization Advisor with large portfolio in SS. Support SSRF Recovery Fund including the rapid stabilization fund (SWIFT-like mechanism), Community Security and Small Arms Control Bureau (under ministry of interior), Security Sector development and transformation, Security and Access to Justice program
- UNDP, UNMISS, Pact (NGO), SNV

6. East Kivu - Proxy Wars

To include the impact of movements involved in the conflict on stability of the region, migration and other spillover effects from international influence and intervention as well as regional country conflicts and nation engagement (Rwanda/RDC etc)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Spread and Scale</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countries Affected: DRC, also Uganda, Rwanda, ROC, and Angola</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Porous borders allow rebel groups to operate in DRC.
- Foreign armed groups remain active in north and South Kivu including: FDLR, LRA, Allied Democratic Forces (Uganda led rebel group) and Forces nationales de liberation. Angolan forced entered DRC during a military operation against Angolan rebel group FLEC.
- Militias and Rebel forces get money by pillaging mineral wealth from DRC and smuggling it to neighboring countries. Also gain control of timber, charcoal, land, fishing and poaching.
- DDR programs have had limited impact on disarming and reintegrating armed factions into Congolese society, or collapsing them into the DRC armed forces (FARDC). There is no national DDR program.
- There is also a large presence of Congolese armed groups: Mai Mai Yakutumba and Sheka, PARECO, LaFontaine, APCLS.
- Upcoming elections, voter registration is also national id card, so rebels are getting IDs allowing them to travel freely regionally.
- Few actors will individually benefit from stability, as the status quo allows individuals to personally benefit, thanks to corruption etc…
- From 2011 UNHCR report, approximately 1.7 IDPs; (including 128K displaced in 1st Quarter of 2011) approx. 500K refugees originating from DRC (2011 UNHCR figure)

**Development Impact**

| --- | --- |
| Economic: | Many of these groups are receiving financing from illegal mining (not the LRA though).
- Stability of Eastern Congo is always at risk, and this has had marked impact on the development of the region, economically, socially, and infrastructural.
- Rape has been used as a weapon of war, by all parties displacing villages. Women and girls are particularly vulnerable.
- Recruitment of youth – livelihoods issues
- Control of Mineral Resources by communities/local governments instead of by warlords |

**Political:** Upcoming elections in November with high likelihood for destabilization and violence to spill over into neighboring countries

**USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions**

- Congress Passed Dodd Frank Act in July 2010, containing a provision US registered companies using minerals mined in DRC and neighboring countries to carry out due diligence on supply chains.
- FY11 USAID spent $72 m; $95m with PRM funds in DRC total. (Largely Humanitarian Assistance – IDFA)

**Local/Other Resources**

- November 2010: 11 heads of state convened to endure a Minerals Tracking and Certification System from Great Lakes Region.
- Foreign Consumers of Electronics, large mining corporations. Private sector (makers of electronics, PDAs, etc).
- MONUC – GODRC wants UN PK forces out of DRC by 2012.
- Oct 2010 Ministry of Mining and Finance produced traceability procedures manual for extraction and export.
- Other stakeholders: UNDP, NGOs, MSF, GBV-rights groups
- OECD due diligence framework - requiring companies to adhere to guidelines when using minerals from conflict-affected areas
- UN Security Council adopted similar framework in Nov 2010

**Food Security Issues**

To include climate change, environmental degradation, migration, economic marginalization, policy and land use

**Geographic Spread and Scale**

- 42 million worldwide displaced by sudden onset natural disaster, 90% from climate change in 2010—double last 2 decades.
- “East Africa is facing the worst food crisis of the 21st Century: ” Shah “worst humanitarian crisis in the world”
- Current famine: 13.3 in Horn affected. 4.5 million Ethiopians, along w 3.6 million Kenyans, 3 million Somalis, & according to the United Nations, well over 100,000 people in Djibouti. The combined effects of conflict & drought have caused an estimated 7.5 million Somalis to flee their homes.
- U.S. government officials & others have suggested that the situation is expected to get worse before getting better.
FEWS alerts on Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, East Africa.

Chronic malnutrition in 30 – 40% stunting in EA, Severe Acute Malnutrition between 10k – 1m in EA countries. (AICF)

72,804 displaced in Ethiopia in 2008 by natural disaster

IPCC quotes estimates that, by 2050, 150 million people worldwide may be displaced as a result of the impacts of climate change, mainly the effects of coastal flooding, shoreline erosion & agricultural disruption.

The potential consequences of climate change for water availability, food security, prevalence of disease, coastal boundaries, & population distribution may aggravate existing tensions & generate new conflicts (2009).

Development Impact


Prolonged severe weather conditions have led to considerably less food production for years

Up to 76% rise in food prices in Horn → violent competition over land & cattle = 100 herders in Kenya alone died

"Much of East Africa could suffer a decline in the length of the growing period for key crops of up to 20 per cent by the end of the century, w the productivity of beans falling by nearly 50 per cent."

USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions


Phase I (of 2) foundational investments –technical, political, & financial support to assist a country in developing its food security country investment plan. Devising policy reforms & in building the capacity for successful implementation of the country-owned plan. Core investments in two key objectives of inclusive agriculture sector growth & improved nutritional status.

President Obama’s pledge at L’Aquila at least $3.5 billion (global, not just USAID) over three years

FEWS

Food Security III Cooperative Agreement Projects

USAID together w 6 partners, is announcing a first-of-its-kind effort to invest $25 million in small- & medium-sized enterprises. The African Agricultural Capital Fund (AACF)

$1b USAID for Ag 2010, $103m 2011

Declining ag productivity, divestment in infrastructure, poor policies, also affected by significant population growth, climate change, water access & land rights. Increasing food prices. How much of these are issues USAID can affect over 5 years w $20m?

World Dev Rep: to reduce conflict in fragile & poor countries requires new investment in agriculture & rural development.

FFP: Fragile states face a two-fold risk of food-related instability: 1) their govs tend to be riddled w corrupt patron-age politics & w socioeconomic policies that don’t represent the interests of citizens equally → poor citizens that feel exploited. 2) fragile states usually cannot offer relief during food crises because they are poorer or plagued w corrupt officials that siphon off government funds. In short, fragile countries are less likely to deal w the conditions that lead to social unrest while the illegitimacy that corruption & unjust policies create makes them more prone to social unrest.

Oxfam: target building the resilience & boosting the productivity of pastoralists & smallholder food producers in the Horn of Africa, including long-term investment in livelihood support, disaster risk reduction, & climate change adaptation.

Drought cycle management, investment in dry lands & pastoral communities most affected improved access to markets, support to women & provision of financial services including savings, credit & insurance.

Obvious gender component

Local/Other Resources

Many aid donors have shifted away from supporting agriculture.


Current?

The United States, Canada, Spain, the Republic of Korea & the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation will together provide about $900 million in support of the Global Agriculture & Food Security Program (GAFSP). The World Bank will serve as trustee & host of a coordination unit for the fund.

The Horn of Africa received 34 percent of the total Central emergency Response Fund (UN) funding; of this, Somalia received some $60.5 million. So far this year, CERF has contributed to 6 of the 13 2010 Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) appeals: in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), it
8. Regional Integration Issues

### Geographic Spread and Scale
- The realization of a large regional economic bloc encompassing Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda with a combined population of more than 130 million people (2010*), land area of 1.82 million sq kilometers and a combined Gross Domestic Product of $74.5 billion (2009*), bears strategic and geopolitical significance and prospects of a renewed and reinvigorated East African Community despite decades of conflict and anticipated regional instability.
- Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, DRC, Somalia, CAR, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, Djibouti, Congo Brazzaville, and Ethiopia
- Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have had a history of co-operation dating back to the early 20th century. Inter territorial and transnational conflicts have been contained by cooperation of its members.
- Peace and Security has been acknowledged as critical to creation of the right environment upon which regional integration in all aspects can be fostered. As the negotiations for the EAC Common Market progresses, strategies on the control of cross border crime and ensure security of persons and goods as they move within the region are continually being developed.
- The EAC aims at widening and deepening cooperation among the Partner States in, among others, political, economic and social fields for their mutual benefit. To this extent the EAC countries established a Customs Union in 2005 and a Common Market in 2010. The next phase of the integration will see the bloc enter into a Monetary Union and ultimately become a Political Federation of the East African States.
- Is essentially a governance and political response to instability and could be a source for greater regional and economic cooperation.

### Development Impact
- Tanzania supports the expansion of the East African Community. In 2010, Tanzanian officials expressed interest in inviting Malawi, DRC and Zambia to join the EAC.
- Sudan has applied to join the EAC, but its membership is strongly opposed by Tanzania and Uganda, which contend that due to Sudan’s lack of a direct border with the EAC, its allegedly discriminatory actions toward black Africans, its record of human rights violations, and its history of hostilities with both Uganda and candidate country South Sudan, it is ineligible to join and its application should be thrown out.
- Soon after its formation the mandate of IGADD widened, becoming a vehicle for regional security and political dialogue. Its name was changed to IGAD, Intergovernmental Authority on Development
- CEWARN is a part of IGADD with a focus on HOA early warning and conflict prevention needs.
- Impacts: trade, economic growth initiatives, and can be used as a political platform for more coherent policy coordination on border related conflicts and issues.
- The presidents of Kenya and Rwanda invited South Sudan to apply. Analysts suggested that South Sudan's early efforts to integrate infrastructure, including rail links and oil pipelines, with systems in Kenya and Uganda indicated intention on the part of Juba to pivot away from dependence on Sudan and toward East Africa.
- East African Region has adopted treaties to suppress the illicit traffic of drugs, and minerals, and cooperate in the prevention, control, and repression of the illicit traffic through the adoption of specific bilateral and multilateral programs.
- On October 28, 2011 the dedicated session for the Sectoral Council of Ministers responsible for EAC Affairs and Planning approved the roadmap for full integration of Burundi and Rwanda in the Community.

### Regional Impacts
- Recurring and severe droughts and other natural disasters between 1974 and 1984 caused widespread famine, ecological degradation and economic hardship in the HOA region.
- The six countries of the region took action through the UN to establish an intergovernmental body for development and drought control in their region. At a January 1986 assembly of heads of state and government, an agreement was signed which officially launched the Intergovernmental
## USAID/USG Resources/Interventions

- May 2011: USAID and Multi Donor efforts: The EAC’s efforts towards attaining seamless border operations gained new momentum with the commissioning of a resource document to facilitate the region’s journey towards actualizing the One Stop Border Post (OSBP) concept. The workshop organized jointly by the EAC Secretariat, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Trade Mark East Africa, USAID Compete and Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) brought together key stakeholders from EAC and other regional blocs to share ideas and experiences on One Stop Border Posts, a subject of growing importance as integration takes root on the African continent in general and the EAC in particular.
- COMESA (EGAT) and CEWARN (DG and Conflict Office) projects have done some work on EAC integration issues, but have been more targeted at the community level and not at the policy integration level. COMESA has looked at critical trade corridors as well as investment climate stability.
- Funding is moderate and consistent with key donors, USAID, DFID, JICA and the Chinese.
- Trade Mark East Africa a consortium of Private Sector interests in an important stakeholder and funder of the EAC. There is significant private sector potential and interest in strengthening the EAC.
- Several bilateral donor programs use indicators and benchmarks that encourage EAC recognition and strengthen representation and membership within the EAC. (i.e. Burundi and Rwanda)
- USAID/EA has supported CEWARN and currently has links to programs that coordinate with IGADD and CEWARN.

## Local/Other Resources

- EAC Protocol on Good Governance developed to increase regional stability.
- The draft Protocol is in line with the fundamental principles stipulated in the EAC Treaty under Article 6 (d) which emphasizes good governance, including adherence to the rule of law, accountability, transparency, respect for human rights and equal opportunities.
- Policy frameworks and cooperation in place to strengthen regional norms, performance and cooperation.
- The regional integration process is at a high pitch at the moment as reflected by the encouraging progress of the East African Customs Union and the establishment in 2010 of the Common Market.
- The negotiations for the East African Monetary Union, which commenced in 2011, and fast tracking the process towards East African Federation all underscore the serious determination of the East African leadership and citizens to construct a powerful and sustainable East African economic and political bloc.

## IGAD Examples (Regional Security, HOA)

- October 26, 2011: At an event held at the United Nations Conference Centre in Addis Ababa and attended by delegates from Member State and diplomats, the Prime Minister of Somalia, Dr. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, launched today the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP).
- The ISSP outlines and integrates a wide range of initiatives around four mutually reinforcing result areas of; counter terrorism, organized crime; maritime security and security institutions capacity building.
- The IGAD Security Sector Program replaces the IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT) which achieved important milestones since its existence for six years.
- The signing of the IGAD Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Conventions and the strengthening of cross-border cooperation networks amongst law enforcement officials in IGAD states was an important milestone for ICPAT.

### 9. LRA

To include displacement, human rights abuses, current and past efforts to stop LRA, international transgressions
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Spread and Scale</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Most direct and impacted countries, Uganda, South Sudan, CAR and DRC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Impact on regional instability is severe and systemic. Human trafficking by the LRA is one of the worst situations in the world.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Upwards of 350,000 impacted by displacement issues. IDP issues stemming from attacks in CAR, DRC and South Sudan are significant and ongoing and have been tracked by numerous international and bilateral organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Systemic and strategic attacks in neighboring nations threaten stability, effective and collaborative country level cooperation, and show a lack of political will by the Ugandan Government to commit to resolving these cross border incursions by rebel movement grown within its borders.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th>Development Impact</th>
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<tr>
<td>• The conflict continues to slow down Uganda’s development efforts, costing the poor country's economy a cumulative total of at least $1.33 billion, which is equivalent to 3% of GDP, or $100 million annually.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The impact now on South Sudan, DRC and CAR is significant and growing annually.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The LRA conflict has a long history (1987 – present). Although diminished in numbers and influence in Northern Uganda, recent and systemic incursions into South Sudan, DRC and CAR have caused considerable regional instability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The most direct and immediate impact and issue is displacement in the border areas of the impacted countries. Displacement is most significant in remote and already conflict prone areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The LRA mobilization and movements in remote border areas, has destabilized fragile and remote country government areas and also disrupted long standing social responses and systems to cross border and regional collaboration and movement.</td>
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<th>USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions</th>
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<tr>
<td>• USAID Uganda and the USG have intervened consistently with strategies, programs and interventions, but these have been largely funded at the bilateral level and have been focused primarily on Northern Uganda.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• In May 2010, Congress enacted the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and North Uganda Recovery Act, following a long campaign from human rights groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The legislation called on the White House to devise a comprehensive strategy to eliminate the LRA, although it did not commit any funds to do so.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• In late 2010, the White House announced its broad approach, which contained plans to apprehend Kony and his commanders, encourage defections, protect civilians, and increase humanitarian assistance to regions affected by the LRA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The October 14 troop announcement adds details to this general plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The anti-LRA mission falls firmly within the core remit of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), which is to improve the capacity, effectiveness, and professionalism of African militaries so that they can ultimately deal with their own security challenges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There has been less analysis of the regional responses necessary to support the AU and others in responding to the crisis of the LRA. This issue is rarely a top national priority, but rather seen as a political problem or a symptom of poor state control and weak national security apparatus.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Local/Other Resources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Many local civil society organizations (CSOs) complain about a lack of consultation in the design of international aid programs, poor communication by international agencies and NGOs about their role and objectives and lack of accountability to the local population for their actions and policy messages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Local civil society actors and organizations are a potentially invaluable partner in humanitarian and development efforts to build up the resilience of communities to the LRA, for example through information dissemination to otherwise inaccessible areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• They also have a vital role to play in aiding reconciliation and reintegration of LRA returnees into communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• However, the predominance of short-term, international humanitarian funding programs attracts staff away from local CSOs and has also resulted in a proliferation of opportunistic local CSOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Only civil society has so far in practice endorsed the importance of a regional approach to end the conflict by peaceful means. A Regional Civil Society Task Force, comprising a number of religious and traditional leaders from across the conflict-affected countries, gathers at regular intervals to analyze the status of the conflict, provide mutual support and look for ways forward.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Since they began, these interfaith meetings have come a long way in achieving consensus and provide evidence that civil society is playing a key role in bringing diverse and sometimes dissenting voices together through dialogue and thus laying the ground for coordinated action.</td>
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10. Failed States/ Ungoverned Spaces
Regional insecurity and conflicts stemming from failed states, poorly governed regions, or countries in transition over central government authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Spread and Scale</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Somalia, Sudan, Chad, DRC, CAR and Kenya (top 20) are concerns. Somalia is ranked #1 for the 4th consecutive year.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Regional insecurity, mass displacement caused by insecurity and food shortages in border regions is causing political, economic and social tensions (i.e. Kenya and Somalia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- There are several regional areas where border management and security as well as displacement and migration areas are taxing government responses for containment. Somalia and the impact of its state failure is significant in the region and the impact economically and politically many feel is pushing regional governments to crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- There has been an argument that the impact of a failed state is largely a problem for its inhabitants and less one of regional instability, but in the case of Somalia this may need to be analyzed further.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The impact on displacement in Somalia alone in 2011 topped 560,000 people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The trajectory for Somalia and its impact regionally on border countries and areas is significant and prolonged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- There is also evidence that recruitment for insurgency is high and systemic and that this problem is growing exponentially across the region.</td>
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<th>Development Impact</th>
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<tr>
<td>- According to Oxford University economist Paul Collier and his colleague Lisa Chauvet, the total cost of a single country falling into the “fragile state” category, for itself and its neighbors, may reach $85 billion. This is a gargantuan sum, equivalent to 70 percent of worldwide official development assistance from international donors in 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The economic and political impact of failed states in East Africa would be difficult to quantify, but is there a case to be made for looking at the vulnerability and risk of state failure in certain region states such as Somalia and/ or CAR. Is there an appropriate and reasonable approach for a $20 million USAID program?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Economic impacts from instability in Somalia are clearly critical to border nations, especially Kenya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Social and diplomatic impacts of recent Kenya incursions and interventions in the border regions also bring regional relations and stability to question.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Indeed, the perceived need to counter the failed-state threat has transformed U.S. military, diplomatic, and development policy in the post-9/11 era.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Seeking to bolster the world's most vulnerable countries, police its &quot;ungoverned spaces,&quot; and mitigate negative &quot;spillovers&quot; from failed states, the Pentagon, the State Department, and USAID adopted new doctrines, reallocated budgets, and embraced new missions of conflict prevention and state-building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Governments and international institutions from Britain to the World Bank followed suit. This flurry of activity reflects a shared conviction: In an interdependent world, our collective security is only as strong as its weakest link.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- In the words of USAID: &quot;When development and governance fail in a country, the consequences engulf entire regions and leap around the world. Terrorism, political violence, civil wars, organized crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking, infectious diseases, environmental crises, refugee flows, and mass migration cascade across the borders of weak states more destructively than ever before.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Regional bodies have been important in maintaining country level engagement even when significant border areas or considered ungoverned, or in control of non state actors (i.e. Somalia, parts of DRC, CAR etc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- CSO and Regional network analysis is weak in some of these countries and regional entities need more funding and coordinated technical assistance (i.e. CEWARN, ICGLR, etc).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Criteria Analysis and Scoring Guidelines

Scoring Guidelines:

**Category 1: Geographic Spread/Scale (Score 1-10)**
- Countries affected
- Impact on regional instability
- Number of people affected
- Trajectory: Current and future projections

1-3 Minimal impact on stability across country regions
- 2 countries only
- Less than 300,000 people impacted
- Minimal potential for future conflict over 5 years and may only impact one of the countries

4-6 Moderate impact on stability across country regions
- More than 3 countries
- More than 300,000 people impacted and less than 1,000,000 (fairly steady over time frame)
- Moderate potential for regional conflict within a five year period in multiple countries

7-9 Significant impact on stability across country regions
- More than 3 countries
- More than 1,000,000 impacted and growing
- Significant potential for regional and sustained conflict within a five – ten year period in multiple countries

10 Immediate and Prolonged Impact Eminent
- More than 3 countries
- More than 1,500,000 impacted and growing
- Immediate and prolonged impact eminent within a five – ten year period in multiple countries

**Note:**
Weighted add 3 points to final score

**Category 2: Development impact (Score 1-10)**
- Duration of issue
- Projected impact over 5 years
- Economic
- Political
- Social

1-3 Minimal development impact as a result of instability
- 2 countries only
- Less than 300,000 people impacted
- Minimal potential for future conflict over 5 years and may only impact one of the countries
- Minimal economic impact regionally (minimal GDP or causes host country/ international resources to be expended)
- Minimal political impact regionally (local or regional elections, minimal impact on regional, national or local governance)
- Minimal social impact regionally (mortality rate (maternal/ infant), education access, access to economic or job related resources (i.e. service delivery etc)

4-6 Moderate development impact as a result of instability
- Greater than 2 countries
- More than 300,000 people impacted and less than 1,000,000 (fairly steady over time frame)
- Moderate potential for regional conflict within a five year period in multiple countries
- Moderate economic impact regionally (moderate GDP impact or causes host country/ international resources to be expended)
• Moderate political impact regionally (moderate impact local or regional elections, moderate impact on regional, national or local governance
• Moderate social impact regionally (mortality rate (maternal/ infant), education access, access to economic or job related resources (i.e. service delivery etc)

7-9 Significant impact on stability across country regions
• More than 3 countries
• More than 1,000,000 impacted and growing
• Significant potential for regional and sustained conflict within a five – ten year period in multiple countries
• Significant economic impact regionally (moderate GDP impact or causes host country/ international resources to be expended)
• Significant political impact regionally (moderate impact local or regional elections, significant impact on regional, national or local governance
• Significant social impact regionally (mortality rate (maternal/ infant), education access, access to economic or job related resources (i.e. service delivery etc)

10 Immediate and Prolonged Impact Eminent
• More than 3 countries
• More than 1,500,000 impacted and growing
• Immediate and prolonged impact eminent within a five – ten year period in multiple countries

Note:
Weighted add 3 points to final score

Category 3: USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions (Score 1-10)
• Expert Analysis
• Current Programs
• Stakeholders, partners
• Political and Diplomatic will
• Economic variables (Funding etc)

1-3 Minimal USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions Deployed
• Minimal USG resources deployed on issues currently or in the past 3 years
• Less than $20 Million USD
• Programs target less than 300,000 people and less than 2 countries
• Minimal USAID and USG political will to tackle regional issue (congress, funding levels and projections etc)
• Minimal funding available and/or projected to be available in the next 3-5 years

4-6 Moderate USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions Deployed
• Moderate USG resources deployed on issues currently or in the past 3 years
• More than $20 Million USD and less $50 Million USD
• Programs target more than 300,000 people and more than 2 countries
• Moderate USAID and USG political will to tackle regional issue (congress, funding levels and projections etc)
• Moderate funding available and/or projected to be available in the next 3-5 years

7-9 Significant USAID/ USG Resources/ Interventions Deployed
• Significant USG resources deployed on issues currently or in the past 3 years
• More than $50 Million USD and less $100 Million USD
• Programs target more than 1,000,000 people and more than 3 countries
• Significant USAID and USG political will to tackle regional issue (congress, funding levels and projections etc)
• Significant funding available and/or projected to be available in the next 3-5 years

10 Immediate and Prolonged Resources and Interventions (USAID and USG)
• Evident in more than 3 countries
• More than 1,500,000 impacted and growing
• Immediate and prolonged funding available and planned within a five – ten year period in multiple countries (USAID and USG)
Category 4: Local/Other Resources (Score 1-10)

- Stakeholders (local, regional, economic and political)
- Local will and capacity
- Resolutions and actions taken (peace negotiations, diplomatic tools, force, military intervention etc)
- Current programs
- Projected funding

1-3 Minimal Resources/Interventions Deployed
- Minimal resources deployed on issues currently or in the past 3 years (local, regional, economic and political)
- Less than $20 Million USD
- Programs target less than 300,000 people and less than 2 countries
- No regional or country level MOUs, minimal or sporadic sustained engagement
- No peace negotiations or frameworks in place, minimal UN and international engagement
- Minimal funding available and/or projected to be available in the next 3-5 years

4-6 Moderate Resources/Interventions Deployed
- Moderate resources deployed on issues currently or in the past 3 years (local, regional, economic and political)
- More than $20 Million USD and less than $50 Million USD
- Programs target more than 300,000 people and more than 2 countries
- Regional or country level MOUs and/or agreements/frameworks, ongoing and sustained engagement
- Peace negotiations or frameworks in place, moderate UN and international engagement
- Moderate funding available and/or projected to be available in the next 3-5 years

7-9 Significant Resources/Interventions Deployed
- Significant resources deployed on issues currently or in the past 3 years (local, regional, economic and political)
- More than $50 Million USD and less than $100 Million USD
- Programs target more than 1,000,000 people and more than 3 countries
- Regional or country level MOUs and/or agreements/frameworks, sustained engagement and international support
- Peace negotiations or frameworks in place, significant and sustained UN and international engagement (3-5 years)
- Significant funding available and/or projected to be available in the next 3-5 years

10 Immediate and Prolonged Resources/Interventions Deployed
- Evident in more than 3 countries
- More than 1,500,000 impacted and growing
- Immediate and prolonged funding available and planned within a five – ten year period in multiple countries (Host countries and/or international and multilateral donors/bodies)